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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-cp6q-959q-f8rh: Tiptap: mergeAttributes() turns an own __proto__ key into inherited executable DOM attributes

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @tiptap/core (npm) 3.30.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @tiptap/core (npm) 3.30.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary `@tiptap/core`'s public `mergeAttributes()` helper uses ordinary bracket assignment on keys returned by `Object.entries()`. An own `__proto__` key from JSON therefore invokes the legacy prototype setter on the fresh merged object. The function returns an object whose prototype is attacker-controlled, while `Object.keys()` and ordinary own-property checks show no attacker attributes. When that result is used as a ProseMirror DOMOutputSpec attribute object, `prosemirror-model`'s `DOMSerializer.renderSpec()` enumerates it with `for...in` and applies inherited values with `setAttribute()`. In a browser proof, inherited `src` and `onerror` values were copied to an `<img>` and the error handler executed once. This is per-object prototype manipulation; the proof does not modify global `Object.prototype`. ## Root cause The affected loop is conceptually: ```ts const mergedAttributes = { ...items } for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(item)) { const exists = mergedAttributes[key] // ... mergedAttributes[key] = value } ``` `Object.entries(JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}'))` includes `__proto__`. Reading `mergedAttributes['__proto__']` resolves the inherited `Object.prototype`; assigning to the same key invokes `Object.prototype.__proto__`'s setter and replaces `mergedAttributes`' prototype. ## Browser reproduction The following shape was tested with exact `@tiptap/core` 3.29.2 and `prosemirror-model` 1.25.11: ```js const input = JSON.parse(`{ "__proto__": { "data-inherited-canary": "present", "src": "x-invalid://canary", "onerror": "globalThis.__tiptapXss += 1" } }`) const attrs = mergeAttributes(input) // Object.keys(attrs) === [] // Object.getPrototypeOf(attrs) === input.__proto__ const schema = new Schema({ nodes: { doc: { content: 'image' }, image: { toDOM: () => ['img', attrs] }, text: {}, }, }) const doc = schema.node('doc', null, [schema.node('image')]) const fragment = DOMSerializer.fromSchema(schema).serializeFragment(doc.content) document.body.append(fragment) ``` Chromium produced an image with `data-inherited-canary`, `src`, and `onerror`; the handler executed exactly once. `Object.prototype` remained clean. ## Impact and preconditions Applications that merge untrusted imported document, plugin, CMS, API, tenant, or AI-derived attribute objects can receive a prototype-manipulated result. Consumers that enumerate inherited keys, including ProseMirror's DOM serializer, can turn the hidden properties into DOM attributes and execute JavaScript in the application's origin. Own-key validation, object spread, JSON serialization, and logging can miss the inherited values. Other component consumers can read inherited authorization or configuration fields. Tiptap's standard fixed ProseMirror schemas discard unknown document attributes, so arbitrary Tiptap JSON is not automatically exploitable in every application. A vulnerable application needs an untrusted object boundary into `mergeAttributes()` or a dynamic/custom extension or schema that preserves the relevant attribute object. ## Affected versions The unsafe assignment was introduced in commit `ecadf7ea0a7f8f39a8496a60edf0ac8f379e6eb3` and is present in the first package tag `@tiptap/core@2.0.0-alpha.0`, v2.0.0, v2.27.1, v3.0.0, and current v3.29.2 source. No fixed release was found. ## Recommended remediation Reject `__proto__` before reading or assigning the key, or define copied keys as own data properties without invoking legacy setters. A minimal hardening is to skip `key === '__proto__'`. Add regression tests using an own JSON-origin `__proto__` key and assert that the result keeps `Object.prototype` as its prototype, exposes no inherited attacker keys, and cannot create an event-handler attribute through `DOMSerializer`. This was found during authorized dependency review and is being reported privately. No public zero-day issue has been opened.

Published
Sep 2, 2026
Updated
Sep 2, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
npm@tiptap/core

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@tiptap/corefrom 2.0.0-alpha.0 · before 3.30.43.30.4

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-j95f-988m-3j2fTiptap: Quadratic ReDoS in block and inline Markdown attribute parsing
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@tiptap/core3.30.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

osv

References

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