GHSA-cjcg-cxmh-9wcr: Praxis affected by HTTP/2 Bomb
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: praxis-proxy (crates.io) 0.5.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to praxis-proxy (crates.io) 0.5.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Multiple denial-of-service vulnerabilities have been discovered in HTTP/2 server implementations. All have been rated with a severity impact of [Important](https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification). The vulnerabilities target HPACK, the header compression scheme in HTTP/2, where a small request can trigger large memory allocations on the server. ### Details Credit to the original researcher, I'm mostly just run their tool against the code base. [Security Bulletins](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-007): https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-007 Exploit details: https://blog.calif.io/p/codex-discovered-a-hidden-http2-bomb This bug was fixed in upstream pingora v0.8.1, but our fork (v0.8.2) is missing this important [PR](https://github.com/praxis-proxy/pingora/commit/d193c8d49b8b7c1c1ede93183759caa4f6906bbd) to set the default h2 options. (edited) ### PoC * Generate certificates ``` openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 -keyout server.key -out server.crt -days 3650 -nodes -subj "/CN=localhost" ``` * Create praxis config as follow ``` listeners: - name: web address: "0.0.0.0:8443" tls: certificates: - cert_path: /etc/praxis/server.crt key_path: /etc/praxis/server.key filter_chains: [main] filter_chains: - name: main filters: - filter: router routes: - path_prefix: "/" host: "example.api.com" cluster: backend - filter: load_balancer clusters: - name: backend endpoints: - "httpbingo.org:443" tls: verify: false ``` * Start the container ``` docker run --name praxis --user $(id -u):$(id -g) -it --rm -p 8443:8443 -v ./config.yaml:/etc/praxis/config.yaml -v ./server.crt:/etc/praxis/server.crt -v ./server.key:/etc/praxis/server.key ghcr.io/praxis-proxy/praxis:0.5.1 ``` * Check container memory ``` $ docker stats CONTAINER ID NAME CPU % MEM USAGE / LIMIT MEM % NET I/O BLOCK I/O PIDS 362cfa472792 praxis 0.00% 6.473MiB / 62.49GiB 0.01% 7.57kB / 126B 0B / 0B 22 ``` * In another terminal run the attack ``` ./hpack_bomb.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8443 -n 10 ``` * Observer the container memory ``` 98b040c5e5ad praxis 0.13% 687.1MiB / 62.49GiB 1.07% 41.6MB / 362kB 0B / 0B 23 ``` Memory usage spiked to around 700MB, and even after the attack ended, the memory was not freed up. * Patch the code to set h2options ``` diff --git a/protocol/src/http/pingora/handler/mod.rs b/protocol/src/http/pingora/handler/mod.rs index dc684ad..fc59234 100644 --- a/protocol/src/http/pingora/handler/mod.rs +++ b/protocol/src/http/pingora/handler/mod.rs @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use std::{collections::HashMap, sync::Arc, time::Duration}; use arc_swap::ArcSwap; use bytes::Bytes; +use pingora_core::protocols::http::v2::server::H2Options; use pingora_core::{Result, apps::HttpServerOptions, server::Server, services::listening::Service}; use pingora_proxy::{Session, http_proxy}; use praxis_core::{config::ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES, connectivity::Upstream}; @@ -151,6 +152,11 @@ where let service_name = format!("http-proxy:{name}", name = listener.name); let mut proxy = http_proxy(&server.configuration, handler); proxy.server_options = Some(h2c_server_options()); + let mut h2_options = H2Options::new(); + h2_options.max_header_list_size(65536); + h2_options.max_concurrent_streams(32); + proxy.h2_options = Some(h2_options); + let mut service = Service::new(service_name, proxy); if let Some(tx) = super::listener::add_listener(&mut service, listener)? { cert_watcher_shutdowns.push(tx); ``` * Rerun the attack, the memory usage looks a lot better now ``` CONTAINER ID NAME CPU % MEM USAGE / LIMIT MEM % NET I/O BLOCK I/O PIDS b1c82abca409 praxis 0.04% 10.09MiB / 62.49GiB 0.02% 1.16MB / 23.4kB 950kB / 0B 23 ```
- Published
- Oct 2, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 2, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-409
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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—
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | praxis-proxy | before 0.5.2 | 0.5.2 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:praxis-proxy | 0.5.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recorded+20 d
- TodayNov 17, 2026+45 d
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-409 · Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.