GHSA-c873-wfhp-wx5m: SP1 has missing verifier checks and fiat-shamir observations
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: sp1-stark (crates.io) 4.0.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to sp1-stark (crates.io) 4.0.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
In SP1’s STARK verifier, the prover provided `chip_ordering` is used to fetch the index of the chips that have preprocessed columns. Prior to v4.0.0, the validation that this `chip_ordering` correctly provides these indexes was missing. In v4.0.0, this was fixed by adding a check that the indexed chip’s name is equal to the name stored in the verifying key’s chip information. In the recursive verifier, every verifier program is generated beforehand and later checked for correctness by requiring a merkle proof to the precomputed merkle root of valid verifier keys. Therefore, the recursive verifier and the on-chain verifier were not affected by this vulnerability. This code was audited twice, once as a part of the audit by KALOS and once by Cantina for v1.0.0. This bug was found by the Succinct team during preparation of v4.0.0. Out of abundance of caution, we will be deprecating all previous versions and freeze the corresponding verifiers. Furthermore, in the recursive verifier, the `is_complete` boolean flag is used to flag a proof of complete execution. Prior to v4.0.0, this flag was underconstrained in parts of our recursive verifier, such as the first layer of the recursion. In v4.0.0, this bug was fixed by adding appropriate calls to the `assert_complete` function, which constrains the correctness of the `is_complete` flag. This code was a part of the audit for v3.0.0. This bug affects the soundness of the Rust SDK for verifying compressed proofs, and the soundness of on-chain verifier for deferred proofs. This issue was found by a combined effort from Aligned, LambdaClass and 3MI Labs, and was also independently found by Succinct during the preparation of v4.0.0. Lastly, SP1’s STARK verifier relied on logic inside Plonky3, one SP1's core dependencies, to check that the polynomial evaluation claims are correct using a FRI-based polynomial commitment scheme. To batch this check, multiple polynomial evaluation claims are combined using a random linear combination. Prior to v4.0.0, the individual evaluation claims were not observed into the challenger before sampling the coefficient for the random linear combination. In v4.0.0, this was fixed by observing all the evaluation claims into the challenger correctly inside of Plonky3. This bug was found by Lev Soukhanov and Onur Kilic, and we have worked closely with the Plonky3 team to mitigate this vulnerability. We will be deprecating all previous versions and freezing their verifiers to ensure that versions with the vulnerability will not be used in production.
- Published
- Jan 15, 2025
- Updated
- Jan 28, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | sp1-stark | pkg:cargo/sp1-stark |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | sp1-stark | before 4.0.0 | 4.0.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:sp1-stark | 4.0.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.