GHSA-c66w-hq56-4q97: Network policy may be bypassed by some ICMP Echo Requests
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: github.com/cilium/cilium (Go) 1.7.15, 1.8.8, 1.9.5.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cilium/cilium (Go) 1.7.15, 1.8.8, 1.9.5 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Impact Under certain conditions, ICMP Echo Request sent to a Cilium endpoint from an actor may bypass a network policy which _disallows_ access from the actor to the endpoint, but _allows_ from the endpoint to the actor. This does _NOT_ apply to UDP and TCP traffic. The actor is either a pod or a cluster host or a remote host. The following conditions must be met: 1. Network policies have been created which: a) do not allow access from the actor to the endpoint; b) allow access from the endpoint to the actor and does not specify neither protocol nor port. 2. The endpoint has sent ICMP Echo Request to the actor with the ICMP identifier X. 3. The actor sends ICMP Echo Request to the endpoint with the same ICMP identifier X. 4. The request from the actor (3.) is sent before the Cilium's conntrack GC has removed the previously created conntrack entry (2.). ## Detailed description See https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/dfb008a9099c4da1e0fd964c899c43ee13280b0e (v1.9.x), https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/ff6ebae6efca1bd991302b464dea428512823e79 (v1.8.x), https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/472bbeff75161979c317ab21d563f826291b5f37 (v1.7.x). ## Example ``` $ kubectl run server --image=quay.io/cilium/net-test:v1.0.0 --restart=Never -- sleep 3600 $ kubectl run client --image=quay.io/cilium/net-test:v1.0.0 --restart=Never -- sleep 3600 $ cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: server-netpol # allow client->server spec: podSelector: matchLabels: run: server ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: run: client policyTypes: - Ingress --- apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: client-netpol # deny any->client spec: podSelector: matchLabels: run: client policyTypes: - Ingress EOF $ kubectl exec -ti server -- xping -c1 -x666 $CLIENT_POD_IP PING 10.154.0.50 (10.154.0.50): 56 data bytes ^C --- 10.154.0.50 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss <--- "client-netpol" policy denied command terminated with exit code 1 $ kubectl exec -ti client -- xping -c1 -x666 $SERVER_POD_IP PING 10.154.1.16 (10.154.1.16): 56 data bytes 64 bytes from 10.154.1.16: seq=0 ttl=60 time=0.822 ms --- 10.154.1.16 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss <--- "server-netpol" policy allowed round-trip min/avg/max = 0.822/0.822/0.822 ms $ kubectl exec -ti server -- xping -c1 -x666 $CLIENT_POD_IP PING 10.154.0.50 (10.154.0.50): 56 data bytes 64 bytes from 10.154.0.50: seq=0 ttl=60 time=0.527 ms --- 10.154.0.50 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss <--- "client-netpol" policy bypassed round-trip min/avg/max = 0.527/0.527/0.527 ms ``` ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in [Cilium Issues](https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues) - Email us at security@cilium.io
- Published
- May 21, 2021
- Updated
- Aug 21, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | pkg:golang/github.com/cilium/cilium |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | from 1.7.8 · before 1.7.15 | 1.7.15 |
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | from 1.8.3 · before 1.8.8 | 1.8.8 |
| Go | github.com/cilium/cilium | from 1.9.0 · before 1.9.5 | 1.9.5 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-pfhr-pccp-hwmhNetwork Policies & (Clusterwide) Cilium Network Policies with namespace label selectors may unexpectedly select pods with maliciously crafted labels17Monitor
- GHSA-wc5v-r48v-g4vhCilium host policy bypass in endpoint-routes mode with dual-stack13Monitor
- GO-2022-0959Network Policies & (Clusterwide) Cilium Network Policies with namespace label selectors may unexpectedly select pods with maliciously…0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →GO-2022-0393Aug 21, 2024 · Network policy may be bypassed by some ICMP Echo Requests in github.com/cilium/cilium0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/cilium/cilium | 1.7.15 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Go:github.com/cilium/cilium | 1.8.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Go:github.com/cilium/cilium | 1.9.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.