GHSA-c279-989m-238f: Sliver: Nil Pointer Dereference in tunnelCloseHandler causes panic when a reverse tunnel (rportfwd) close is attempted
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary A nil pointer dereference in `tunnelCloseHandler` causes the handler goroutine to panic whenever a reverse tunnel (rportfwd) close is attempted. Both the legitimate close path AND the unauthorized close path dereference `tunnel.SessionID` where `tunnel` is guaranteed nil. This means rportfwd tunnels can never be cleanly closed, and any authenticated implant can trigger repeated goroutine panics. ### Details File: `server/handlers/sessions.go` lines 172 and 175 The function enters an `else` block precisely because `core.Tunnels.Get(tunnelData.TunnelID)` returned `nil`. Both conditions inside that else block then dereference `tunnel.SessionID` instead of `rtunnel.SessionID`: ```go } else { rtunnel := rtunnels.GetRTunnel(tunnelData.TunnelID) if rtunnel != nil && session.ID == tunnel.SessionID { // LINE 172 — nil deref rtunnel.Close() rtunnels.RemoveRTunnel(rtunnel.ID) } else if rtunnel != nil && session.ID != tunnel.SessionID { // LINE 175 — nil deref sessionHandlerLog.Warnf("...") } } ``` Note: The identical bug was already fixed in `tunnelDataHandler` at lines 124/126 (correctly uses `rtunnel.SessionID`), but the fix was not applied to `tunnelCloseHandler`. ### PoC ```go tunnel := GetTunnel(999) // returns nil — no normal tunnel with this ID // tunnel is nil here rtunnel := GetRTunnel(999) // returns valid rtunnel owned by session-AAAA // Both lines below panic with: // runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference if rtunnel != nil && sessionID == tunnel.SessionID { ... } // line 172 } else if rtunnel != nil && sessionID != tunnel.SessionID { ... } // line 175 ``` Confirmed on master commit `7ac4db3fa` with standalone reproducer. Output: ``` PANIC on line 172 (legitimate close): runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference PANIC on line 175 (unauthorized close): runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference ```    ### Impact - rportfwd tunnels **cannot be closed** — functional regression - Any authenticated implant can trigger repeated handler goroutine panics - rtunnel map entries leak (never cleaned up on close failure) - `recoverAndLogPanic()` prevents full server crash but silently drops the close operation ### Fix Replace `tunnel.SessionID` with `rtunnel.SessionID` on both lines: ```diff - if rtunnel != nil && session.ID == tunnel.SessionID { + if rtunnel != nil && session.ID == rtunnel.SessionID { rtunnel.Close() rtunnels.RemoveRTunnel(rtunnel.ID) - } else if rtunnel != nil && session.ID != tunnel.SessionID { + } else if rtunnel != nil && session.ID != rtunnel.SessionID { ```
- Published
- Mar 29, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 2, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-476
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/bishopfox/sliver | pkg:golang/github.com/bishopfox/sliver |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/bishopfox/sliver | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/bishopfox/sliver | up to and including 1.7.3 | — |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-4899Sliver: Nil Pointer Dereference in tunnelCloseHandler causes panic when a reverse tunnel (rportfwd) close is attempted in…0Monitor
- GO-2026-4548Sliver has Potential Zip Bomb Denial of Service in GzipEncoder in github.com/bishopfox/sliver0Monitor
- GHSA-2phg-qgmm-r638Sliver has Potential Zip Bomb Denial of Service in GzipEncoder0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-hjr9-wj7v-7hv8Jan 5, 2026 · Sliver Vulnerable to Pre-Auth Memory Exhaustion via NoEncoder Bypass0Monitor
- ← EarlierGO-2026-4280Jan 12, 2026 · Sliver Vulnerable to Pre-Auth Memory Exhaustion via NoEncoder Bypass in github.com/bishopfox/sliver0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-476 · NULL Pointer DereferenceCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- CVSS8 → —
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.