GHSA-9wgg-m99q-hhfc: Expired tokens can be renewed without validating the account password
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: emailproxy (PyPI) 2023.12.19.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to emailproxy (PyPI) 2023.12.19 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact In versions of the proxy from `2022-09-05` onwards (since 8c874c2ff3d503ac20c7d32f46e08547fcb9e23f), expired OAuth 2.0 client credentials grant (CCG) flow authorisation tokens could be renewed automatically without checking their validity against the original account configuration (i.e., the password that was set up when first creating an account in the proxy). An attacker with knowledge of valid account addresses and careful timing (specifically, attempting to log in during a period from 10 minutes prior to the token expiry time, but before a genuine login request is received) could use this issue to gain access to an account. This issue is only a security concern if you use the proxy with the CCG flow and no additional account secret encryption (see below). If this is the case, it is particularly important to update if you use the proxy in a publicly-accessible setting (i.e., it is available from the internet or across a network). To fix the issue you should switch to version [`2023-12-19`](https://github.com/simonrob/email-oauth2-proxy/releases/tag/2023-12-19) or later of the proxy immediately. If you use this flow, but have also set `encrypt_client_secret_on_first_use = True` *and* removed the original `client_secret` value from the proxy's configuration file then this issue is not a concern. For all other use-cases (e.g., a normal interactive account authentication, or the ROPCG flow), this issue is also not a concern. However, it is always recommended as best practice to keep the proxy up-to-date. ### Patches [Email OAuth 2.0 Proxy version `2023-12-19`](https://github.com/simonrob/email-oauth2-proxy/releases/tag/2023-12-19) (commit eaaa1a2e7a132bf0958dd2f99a749ad98e3212aa) fixes this issue. ### Issue details Because it was originally designed for use as an interactive, local-only service on a single device, the proxy automatically resets account access tokens if incorrect IMAP/POP/SMTP login details are provided. For public-facing deployments, the `delete_account_token_on_password_error` option is provided, and can be set to `False` to disable this behaviour, which would normally be only a nuisance, rather than a security risk. Regardless of this option's value, the proxy encrypts locally-stored tokens, and requires interactive re-authentication (or, with the resource owner password credentials grant (ROPCG) flow, the correct remote account password) to renew tokens if they expire or are reset. The proxy's token retrieval implementation was created with this interactive process in mind. The CCG flow is an administrator-level method that grants broad access without user knowledge or consent – no user interaction (or remote account password) is ever required. From 8c874c2ff3d503ac20c7d32f46e08547fcb9e23f until the fix in eaaa1a2e7a132bf0958dd2f99a749ad98e3212aa, when CCG tokens neared their expiry date (or had already expired), and the original unencrypted `client_secret` value was available they were automatically reset, renewed and encrypted with the given login password, but without checking whether that password was actually able to decrypt the _existing_ token. ### Detecting unauthorised access If you do not use the OAuth 2.0 CCG flow (which is currently only known to be supported by O365), unauthorised account access was not possible.[^1] Attempts to exploit this flaw will be revealed in the same way as any other malicious access: an unexpected reauthorisation prompt from the proxy when trying to log in with the legitimate account details. When using the CCG flow, if you have set `delete_account_token_on_password_error = False`, unauthorised access will be revealed by the presence of an unexpected login failure from the proxy when attempting to log in with the correct password. It you have not set this value, it is not possible to detect unauthorised access in O365 CCG mode except via AAD/Entra or other external logs. However, it is also worth reiterating that the CCG flow should never be used in a publicly-accessible context due to the significant and potentially dangerous account control it provides. [^1]: If you are using a provider that does not provide an OAuth 2.0 refresh token (or have configured your account's scope so that this is not present), it is possible to trigger the line of code that caused this issue, but there is no way to use it for account access because interactive authentication is still required.
- Published
- Dec 19, 2023
- Updated
- Nov 28, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-620
Report tools
Action score
32
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | emailproxy | pkg:pypi/emailproxy |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | emailproxy | before 2023.12.19 | 2023.12.19 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:emailproxy | 2023.12.19 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-620 · Unverified Password ChangeCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.