GHSA-9v4j-7g44-qcqw: Algernon: Auto-refresh SSE event server binds to all interfaces with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and no authentication
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/xyproto/algernon (Go) 1.17.7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/xyproto/algernon (Go) 1.17.7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary When auto-refresh is enabled, Algernon spins up an SSE handler that streams a `data:` line for every filesystem event under the watched directory. The handler performs **no authentication** of any kind — no shared token, no cookie check against the `permissions2` userstate, no IP allow-list, no path-prefix permission. Any client that can complete a TCP connection to the listener address receives the stream. This advisory covers the authentication gap in isolation. The cross-origin browser-reach (advisory #2b) and the network-reach (advisory #2c) amplify the impact, but each is independently fixable; this finding addresses the case where a same-origin or LAN-local client connects directly to the SSE port and reads the stream without proving anything about its identity. ### Details #### Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult `permissions2` or any other auth ```go // vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:100-144 (1.17.6) func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc { return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream;charset=utf-8") w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache") w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive") w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowed) // ... loop emits one SSE record per filename touched ... } } ``` Note the handler signature: `func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request)`. The request is discarded — no `Cookie`, `Authorization`, query-string, or remote-IP check is performed before the stream begins. In 1.17.6 the listener was placed on its own `http.ServeMux` ([recwatch/eventserver.go:200-215](../vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go)), wholly outside the `perm.Rejected` middleware chain that gates Algernon's main HTTP listener. Even an operator who had configured admin/user path prefixes via `perm.AddAdminPath`, set a `cookieSecret`, and forced authentication on every URL of the main server had no way to gate this listener — it was unreachable from the `mux` argument the perm middleware uses. #### Why authentication matters for this listener The stream contents are not public data. They reveal: - Which files the developer is actively editing, with sub-second timing precision. - The existence of files inside the watched root (including files the operator may have meant to keep private — `.env.local`, `secrets.lua`, in-progress draft files). - By inference, the directory layout of the project. A client that can connect to the listener obtains a low-rate continuous information disclosure for the lifetime of the connection. The handler is an infinite `for {}` loop — there is no natural session boundary or expiry. #### Source-level evidence ```text $ rg -n 'GenFileChangeEvents|EventServer\(' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/ vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:101:func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc { vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:177:func EventServer(path, allowed, eventAddr, eventPath string, refreshDuration time.Duration) { $ rg -n 'Cookie|Authorization|Token|state\.User' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go # zero matches — no authentication primitive is referenced anywhere in the file ``` ### PoC (against 1.17.6) ```bash # 1. Operator runs algernon with auto-refresh on a project directory: algernon -a /path/to/project # spins up :5553 on Linux/macOS, localhost:5553 on Windows # 2. Any client that can reach the listener connects without credentials: curl -sN http://<server>:5553/sse # => id: 0 # data: /path/to/project/secret-notes.md # # id: 1 # data: /path/to/project/.env.local ``` No `Cookie`, no `Authorization`, no `X-Token`, no preflight, no challenge. The connection succeeds and the stream is delivered for as long as the client keeps the socket open. ### Impact - **Confidentiality:** medium. Continuous information disclosure of filenames and edit timing to anyone who can connect. - **Integrity:** none. - **Availability:** low. Each connection consumes a goroutine indefinitely; many simultaneous connections can exhaust descriptors. ### Suggestions to fix **Primary fix — require a shared secret on the SSE endpoint.** The auto-refresh feature already injects a script into served HTML ([engine/sse.go:118-165](../engine/sse.go)); that script knows the SSE URL. Add a per-startup token, embed it in the injected JS, and require it on the SSE request: ```go // engine/sse.go -- in InsertAutoRefresh tmplData.SessionToken = ac.sseToken // generated once at startup, e.g. crypto/rand 32 bytes // JS: // var source = new EventSource('...?token={{.SessionToken}}'); // recwatch handler: // if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.URL.Query().Get("token")), // []byte(serverToken)) != 1 { // http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden); return // } ``` Cookie-bearing requests work too if `recwatch.EventServer` is moved behind `perm.Rejected` (see "Defence in depth"). The token approach is the smaller change. **Defence in depth — mount the SSE handler on the main mux.** Moving `recwatch.EventServerHandler` onto the main `http.ServeMux` automatically places the SSE handler behind whatever middleware the operator has configured — `perm.Rejected`, `tollbooth`, custom auth wrappers. This closes the same-origin half of the gap without a per-token implementation. Any dedicated-port path bypasses `perm.Rejected` because it uses its own `http.ServeMux`, and that path needs the token fix from "Primary fix" above. ### Live verification ``` $ ./algernon.exe --nodb --httponly --server -a --addr 127.0.0.1:18781 --quiet poc2/site $ ( curl -sN --max-time 4 http://127.0.0.1:5553/sse > stream.txt & sleep 1 echo "edit-1" >> poc2/site/secret-notes.md echo "edit-2" >> poc2/site/.env.local wait ) $ cat stream.txt id: 0 data: C:\Users\xbox\Desktop\VulnTesting\algernon-main\poc-test\poc2\site\secret-notes.md id: 1 data: C:\Users\xbox\Desktop\VulnTesting\algernon-main\poc-test\poc2\site\.env.local ``` No `Cookie`, no `Authorization` header. Stream delivered.
- Published
- May 19, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-1188
Report tools
Action score
21
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/xyproto/algernon | pkg:golang/github.com/xyproto/algernon |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/xyproto/algernon | before 1.17.7 | 1.17.7 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5300Algernon: Auto-refresh SSE event server binds to all interfaces with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and no authentication in…0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/xyproto/algernon | 1.17.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1188 · Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure DefaultCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.