GHSA-9r75-g2cr-3h76: Vercel Workflow Allows Webhook Creation with Predictable User-Specified Tokens
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @workflow/core (npm) 4.2.0-beta.64; workflow (npm) 4.2.0-beta.64.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @workflow/core (npm) 4.2.0-beta.64; workflow (npm) 4.2.0-beta.64 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
`createWebhook()` in Vercel Workflow DevKit accepts a user-specified `token` parameter that serves as the credential for the public webhook endpoint `/.well-known/workflow/v1/webhook/{token}`. Official documentation recommended predictable token patterns, making it possible for an unauthenticated remote attacker to guess the token and inject arbitrary payloads into the workflow execution context. #### Impact An attacker who guesses a webhook token can resume the associated workflow with an attacker-controlled HTTP request body, potentially triggering downstream side effects such as API calls, database writes, or deployments. #### Fix * Upgrade to version 4.2.0-beta.64. The fix removes the `token` option from `createWebhook()` so that webhook tokens are always randomly generated by the SDK. * Runs created with versions prior to 4.2.0-beta.64, that are 1) still active (i.e. running), and 2) have open hooks, are still susceptible to this vulnerability. If users suspect the hook tokens are predictable or leaked - consider cancelling those runs and restarting them on the latest patch. #### Workarounds In case a version upgrade is not possible, avoid passing predictable or guessable values to the `token` parameter of `createWebhook()`. Instead, users can either * switch from `createWebhook()` to `createHook()` instead and programmatically resume hooks using `resumeHook()` instead of the public webhook endpoint, or * use `createWebhook()` without passing a user-provided `token`, which uses a non-guessable random `nanoid` by default.
- Published
- Mar 6, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 6, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-287
Report tools
Action score
21
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @workflow/core | before 4.2.0-beta.64 | 4.2.0-beta.64 |
| npm | workflow | before 4.2.0-beta.64 | 4.2.0-beta.64 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@workflow/core | 4.2.0-beta.64 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:workflow | 4.2.0-beta.64 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
osv
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middleware
app.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();
admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);
app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.