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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f: Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening

CriticalCVSS 9.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow (Go) 7.5.0, 7.5.0+incompatible.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow (Go) 7.5.0, 7.5.0+incompatible or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade. ## Affected versions `< 7.5.0`. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below. ## Patched versions `>= 7.5.0`. ## Impact | # | Item | Affected | Patched | CWE | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | **MAP execution multi-tenant isolation.** A body-supplied `org_id` could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set. | `< 7.4.5` | `>= 7.4.5` | CWE-863 | | 2 | **Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers.** The handlers behind `/api/v1/evidence/*` and `/api/v1/decisions/*/explain` failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. | `< 7.2.0` | `>= 7.2.0` | CWE-200, CWE-863 | | 3 | **License-validation bypass on `onboard-customer`.** The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. | `< 7.2.0` | `>= 7.2.0` | CWE-862 | | 4 | **Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain.** Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. | `< 7.2.0` | `>= 7.2.0` | CWE-862 | | 5 | **Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes.** Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass `apiAuthMiddleware`. | `< 7.2.0` | `>= 7.2.0` | CWE-863 | | 6 | **Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal.** The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. | `< 7.1.3` | `>= 7.1.3` | CWE-208 | | 7 | **Portal DoS via unbounded request body.** The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. | `< 7.1.5` | `>= 7.1.5` | CWE-770 | | 8 | **SQL-injection enforcement regression on `try.getaxonflow.com`.** The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the `warn` SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. | `< 7.5.0` (try.getaxonflow.com only) | `>= 7.5.0` | CWE-89 | ## Remediation Upgrade to AxonFlow platform **v7.5.0** or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work. For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations: - **Items 1–5:** ensure the agent middleware sets `X-Org-ID` / `X-Tenant-ID` from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity. - **Item 8 (Community SaaS):** `SQLI_ACTION=block` can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default. ## Resources - AxonFlow v7.5.0 CHANGELOG entry: https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md - AxonFlow v7.5.0 GitHub Release: https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/releases/tag/v7.5.0 ## Credit Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.

Published
May 6, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

36

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
36 / 40 · 9.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/getaxonflow/axonflow

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/getaxonflow/axonflowbefore 7.5.07.5.0
Gogithub.com/getaxonflow/axonflowbefore 7.5.0+incompatible7.5.0+incompatible

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-5290Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening in github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow7.5.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow7.5.0+incompatiblePackage registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

osv

Root cause

The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

json
{  "permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],  "background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }}

Fixed

json
{  "permissions": ["activeTab"],  "host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]}

References

All records