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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v: Gramps Web API: Private Sub-Object Data in Non-Private Objects Exposed to Guest Users

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: gramps-webapi (PyPI) 3.11.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to gramps-webapi (PyPI) 3.11.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary Users with the **Guest** role could receive private sub-object data (e.g. private alternate names, private addresses, private note/citation/media handles) through list API endpoints such as `GET /api/people/`, `GET /api/places/`, `GET /api/events/`, and all other object list endpoints. **This does not expose objects (people, places, events, …) that are themselves marked private.** Top-level private objects are correctly excluded from all responses. Only sub-object data attached to otherwise-public objects is affected. ## Affected Versions All versions of Gramps Web API prior to the fix. ## Root Cause The vulnerability originates from the behaviour of `PrivateProxyDb.iter_*()` in **Gramps core**. The `ProxyDbBase.__iter_object()` helper, which backs all `iter_*()` methods in `PrivateProxyDb`, correctly filters out top-level private objects but returns the remaining objects **unsanitized** — i.e. without stripping private sub-object references. In contrast, `PrivateProxyDb.get_*_from_handle()` does call the appropriate `sanitize_*()` function. Gramps Web API's `ModifiedPrivateProxyDb` (which wraps the raw database for non-admin users) inherited this behaviour without override. The same issue affects Gramps desktop features that consume `iter_*()` output: reports and exports generated via Gramps desktop using `PrivateProxyDb` may also include private sub-object data that should have been stripped. ## Conditions Required **This issue only affects trees in which sub-objects have been explicitly marked private in Gramps desktop.** The Gramps Web frontend UI does not expose controls for setting the private flag on sub-objects (alternate names, addresses, notes, citations, media references, event references, etc.). In practice, such flags are set in Gramps desktop and then synced or imported into Gramps Web. ## Impact When the conditions above are met, a user with the Guest role querying any list endpoint receives: - **Full content** of private embedded sub-objects on people, such as alternate names (first name, surname, etc.) and addresses (street, city, etc.). - **Handles referencing** private notes, citations, and media attached to places, events, sources, and other objects. These reveal the *existence* of private linked objects but not their content; fetching those objects by handle is correctly blocked by the proxy. ## Fix `ModifiedPrivateProxyDb` now overrides all `iter_*()` object methods to check `obj.get_privacy()` directly on the already-loaded object (eliminating the redundant per-object refetch) and to call the appropriate `sanitize_*()` function before yielding each object. This is consistent with the behaviour of `get_*_from_handle()` in `PrivateProxyDb`.

Published
Apr 9, 2026
Updated
Apr 9, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
PyPIgramps-webapi

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIgramps-webapibefore 3.11.03.11.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:gramps-webapi3.11.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Root cause

The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

json
{  "permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],  "background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }}

Fixed

json
{  "permissions": ["activeTab"],  "host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]}

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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