GHSA-9c5c-9qcx-q35q: @nestjs/platform-fastify: Path-scoped middleware bypass via absolute-form request targets
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 29/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: @nestjs/platform-fastify (npm) 12.0.2, 11.2.4.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @nestjs/platform-fastify (npm) 12.0.2, 11.2.4 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
| Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Ecosystem | npm | | Package | `@nestjs/platform-fastify` | | Affected versions | `>= 12.0.0, < 12.0.2` and `< 11.2.4` | | Patched versions | `12.0.2` and `11.2.4` (upgrade to `12.0.3` / `11.2.5`) | ### Summary On the Fastify adapter, an HTTP request that uses an **absolute-form request target** (`GET http://host/path HTTP/1.1` instead of `GET /path HTTP/1.1`) reaches the route handler without running the path-scoped Nest middleware bound to that route. Applications that enforce authentication or authorization in middleware execute the protected handler with those checks skipped. ### Impact Any application that - uses `@nestjs/platform-fastify`, and - binds middleware to specific paths via `MiddlewareConsumer.forRoutes(...)` or `.exclude(...)`, and - is reachable by a client that controls the raw request line. Node's HTTP server accepts absolute-form targets, so no special server configuration is needed. Exposure is reduced when a reverse proxy in front of the application rewrites the request target to origin-form, which most do. Where the bypassed middleware performs authentication or authorization, the result is an authentication or authorization bypass. Where it performs logging, rate limiting or body handling, those are silently skipped instead. ### Details Fastify's router (`find-my-way`) resolves an absolute-form target to its path before matching, so the route handler is dispatched normally. Two places on the middleware side matched against the **raw** request target instead: 1. The bundled copy of the `@fastify/middie` engine at `packages/platform-fastify/adapters/middie/fastify-middie.ts`. NestJS carried this fork to apply an earlier path-decoding fix and it did not track the upstream absolute-form fix released in `@fastify/middie@9.3.4`. 2. `FastifyAdapter`'s own re-check in `createMiddlewareFactory()`, which tests the middleware path regexp against `req.originalUrl`. Both normalized and percent-decoded the target, but neither resolved absolute-form to a path, so the router and the middleware layer disagreed about which path was being requested. A second, related defect contributed. Because the adapter always passes `routerOptions` (to install the version constraint), Fastify did not reflect the deprecated **top-level** router options (`ignoreTrailingSlash`, `ignoreDuplicateSlashes`, `caseSensitive`, `useSemicolonDelimiter`) in `initialConfig.routerOptions`, which is what the middleware engine reads. Applications passing those options at the top level had middleware normalize paths differently from the router, which widened the mismatch. ### Proof of concept ```ts @Controller('users') export class UsersController { @Get() findAll() { return 'protected data'; } } @Module({ controllers: [UsersController] }) export class AppModule implements NestModule { configure(consumer: MiddlewareConsumer) { consumer .apply((req, res) => res.end('blocked by auth middleware')) .forRoutes({ path: 'users', method: RequestMethod.GET }); } } ``` `supertest` and `light-my-request` always emit origin-form targets, so the request has to be written to the socket: ```js const { connect } = require('node:net'); const socket = connect(3000, '127.0.0.1', () => { socket.write( 'GET http://127.0.0.1:3000/users HTTP/1.1\r\n' + 'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\r\n' + 'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', ); }); socket.pipe(process.stdout); ``` Observed on an affected version: `protected data` — the middleware did not run. Expected, and observed on a patched version: `blocked by auth middleware`. ### Patches Fixed in **12.0.2** and **11.2.4**. Upgrading to **12.0.3** or **11.2.5** is recommended. - The bundled `@fastify/middie` fork was removed and the package now depends on `@fastify/middie@9.3.4`, which resolves absolute-form targets before matching. - The adapter resolves absolute-form targets in its own route check, mirroring `find-my-way`. - Deprecated top-level Fastify router options are folded into `routerOptions` so the middleware engine and the router normalize paths identically. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, reject non-origin-form request targets before middleware runs. Register the hook on the Fastify instance **before the application is initialized**, so that it runs ahead of the middleware engine's own `onRequest` hook, and confirm with the request above that the rejection takes effect: ```ts const adapter = new FastifyAdapter(); adapter.getInstance().addHook('onRequest', (request, reply, done) => { const target = request.raw.url ?? ''; // "*" is the legitimate request target of "OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1" if (target[0] !== '/' && target !== '*') { reply.code(400).send(); return; } done(); }); ``` Rejecting or normalizing absolute-form targets at a reverse proxy in front of the application is equally effective. ### Credit Reported by ZeroVuln Labs.
- Published
- Sep 30, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 30, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-288
Report tools
Action score
29
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 29 / 40 · 7.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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—
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @nestjs/platform-fastify | from 12.0.0 · before 12.0.2 | 12.0.2 |
| npm | @nestjs/platform-fastify | before 11.2.4 | 11.2.4 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@nestjs/platform-fastify | 11.2.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:@nestjs/platform-fastify | 12.0.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recorded+22 d
- TodayNov 17, 2026+47 d
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-288 · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or ChannelCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log (2)
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
- github.com/nestjs/nest/security/advisories/GHSA-9c5c-9qcx-q35q
- github.com/nestjs/nest/pull/17737
- github.com/nestjs/nest/commit/5226fe084cf64b357de436f154bc89f2d319b621
- github.com/nestjs/nest/commit/dda252090ecb65009d9ff366444303796fc44fd7
- github.com/nestjs/nest
- github.com/nestjs/nest/releases/tag/v11.2.4
- github.com/nestjs/nest/releases/tag/v12.0.2
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.