GHSA-8r69-3cvp-wxc3: Batched HTTP requests may set incorrect `cache-control` response header
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: @apollo/server (npm) 4.1.0; apollo-server-core (npm) 3.11.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @apollo/server (npm) 4.1.0; apollo-server-core (npm) 3.11.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact In Apollo Server 3 and 4, the `cache-control` HTTP response header may not reflect the cache policy that should apply to an HTTP request when that HTTP request contains multiple operations using HTTP batching. This could lead to data being inappropriately cached and shared. Apollo Server allows clients to send multiple operations in a single HTTP request. The results of these operations are returned in a single HTTP response, with a single set of headers. Apollo Client Web and Apollo Kotlin both have opt-in features to use batched requests. Apollo Server has several features relating to caching. This advisory is about the ability to set the `cache-control` response header based on field- and operation-specific cache hints. (It is not about the "response cache plugin".) This header can be interpreted by a reverse proxy such as a CDN in front of your server, or by a browser. In Apollo Server 2, plugins such as the cache control plugin could not control the HTTP headers of responses to batch requests. This meant that batch requests never got the `cache-control` response header. In Apollo Server 3 and 4, plugins can set HTTP response headers. But for batched requests, plugins essentially assemble a separate set of response headers in parallel for each operation, and then the header sets are merged together. If plugins set the same header on multiple operations, one value is chosen arbitrarily. This meant that if a client sent a batched HTTP request with two operations with different cache policies, Apollo Server 3 and 4 would return a `cache-control` header that only applies to one of the operations. If one operation is allowed to be cached and the other operation is not allowed to be cached, the full response including both results could still end up being cached in a CDN or other reverse proxy cache. Note that valid batched requests must be POST requests. (There's no defined format for sending batched requests over GET.) So in order for this incorrect `cache-control` header to have a harmful effect, a cache must allow caching POST requests. This means this bug is unlikely to cause incorrect caching in browser or mobile client caches, or in many reverse proxy/CDN caches. This issue could lead to cache poisoning attacks. For example, if a client app regularly sends an operation that should not be cached due to its dependency on session-specific information in the same HTTP request as an operation that can be cached in a shared cache, an attacker could send its own version of the request to the server and manage to get the response to its request stored in the shared cache; other users would then see the response specific to the attacker for the first operation rather than the response for their own session. That said, we expect that in a system where this cache poisoning attack is feasible, normal operation would also run into the issue and users may have already disabled one of the features in order for their system to function properly. ### Patches This issue is patched in Apollo Server v3.11.0 and v4.1.0. The issue resolved differently in the two versions. If you are using Apollo Server 3, upgrade the package you depend on (eg `apollo-server` or `apollo-server-express`) to v3.11.0. This will restore the Apollo Server 2 behavior where the cache control plugin *never* sets the `cache-control` HTTP response header on batched requests. (Other cache-related features, like the response cache plugin, still function.) If you are using Apollo Server 4, upgrade `@apollo/server` to v4.1.0. This upgrade makes the response HTTP header object seen by plugins shared among all plugins processing *all operations* on a request, and makes the cache control plugin merge `cache-control` header values across operations in a request. (Note that if you set the `cache-control` response header in your own plugin, Apollo Server v4.1.0's cache control plugin will not try to overwrite the value you set.) ### Workarounds As a workaround, you can disable either the HTTP batching feature or the `cache-control` header feature. To disable HTTP batching in Apollo Server 3 (v3.5.0 or newer), pass `allowBatchedHttpRequests: false` to `new ApolloServer`.This is the default behavior for Apollo Server 4; in AS4, just make sure you're not passing `allowBatchedHttpRequests: true`. (You cannot disable batching in versions of Apollo Server 3 older than v3.5.0.) To disable the `cache-control` header feature, add `ApolloServerPluginCacheControl({ calculateHttpHeaders: false })` to the `plugins` list in `new ApolloServer()`. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [the `apollo-server` repository](https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server) * Email us at [security@apollographql.com](mailto:security@apollographql.com)
- Published
- Nov 2, 2022
- Updated
- Nov 2, 2022
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-524
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | apollo-server-core | pkg:npm/apollo-server-core |
| npm | @apollo/server | pkg:npm/%40apollo/server |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @apollo/server | before 4.1.0 | 4.1.0 |
| npm | apollo-server-core | from 3.0.0 · before 3.11.0 | 3.11.0 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-2fvv-qxrq-7jq6apollo-server-core vulnerable to URL-based XSS attack affecting IE11 on default landing page0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@apollo/server | 4.1.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:apollo-server-core | 3.11.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-524 · Use of Cache Containing Sensitive InformationAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.