GHSA-8q49-2h5h-434x: FrontMCP: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the OpenAPI adapter spec-change poller
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 23/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: @frontmcp/adapters (npm) 1.5.6.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @frontmcp/adapters (npm) 1.5.6 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The OpenAPI adapter's spec-change **poller** (`OpenApiSpecPoller`) re-fetched the configured spec `url` on a timer using a raw global `fetch()`, bypassing the SSRF guard (`safeFetch` / `assertUrlSafe`) that `OpenAPIToolGenerator.fromURL()` applies to the initial spec load. As a result, the pinning/DNS-resolution hardening delivered via `mcp-from-openapi >= 2.5.0` (advisory GHSA-65h7-9wrw-629c) protected the initial load but **not** the recurring poll of the same URL. When polling is enabled against an untrusted or attacker-influenceable spec URL, this is an unguarded SSRF vector. ## Details The initial spec load is guarded. `OpenapiAdapter` resolves a secure `refResolution` policy and passes it to the guarded loader: ```ts // libs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi.adapter.ts — initializeGenerator() return await OpenAPIToolGenerator.fromURL(this.options.url, { // ... followRedirects: this.options.loadOptions?.followRedirects ?? false, refResolution, // secure default: external $refs off, internal targets blocked }); ``` But the poller — which re-fetches **the same URL** on every interval — did not: ```ts // libs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi-spec-poller.ts — doFetch() (vulnerable, <= 1.5.5) const controller = new AbortController(); const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.fetchTimeoutMs); try { const response = await fetch(this.url, { // <-- raw global fetch, no SSRF guard headers, signal: controller.signal, }); // ...hash the body, fire onChanged... } ``` Because `doFetch()` never called `safeFetch`, none of the guard's protections applied to the polled request: - no allow-list / block-list enforcement (`allowedHosts` / `blockedHosts`); - no internal/private/loopback/link-local/CGNAT/cloud-metadata IP blocking; - no DNS resolution of the hostname (so a DNS name that resolves to an internal IP, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/`, was reached); - no connection **pinning** to the validated IP (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU); - no per-hop re-validation of HTTP redirects. This is the identical threat model to `fromURL()` / external `$ref` resolution (GHSA-65h7-9wrw-629c), applied to a request path that the fix for that advisory did not cover. ## Impact A server that enables spec polling against an untrusted or attacker-influenceable spec URL will, on every poll interval, issue a server-side `GET` to whatever host the URL (or a DNS name it resolves to, or a redirect it returns) points at — including internal-only addresses unreachable from the public internet. Consequences include: - reading cloud-instance metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) — credential / token theft; - probing and reaching internal services and private-range hosts (internal network scanning); - DNS-rebinding to swap a public host for an internal one between validation and connection. The poller issues `GET` requests only, so the primary impact is **confidentiality** (reaching and reading internal endpoints); the fetched body is content-hashed to detect change and the subsequent tool rebuild goes back through the guarded `fromURL()` path. ## Preconditions Exploitation requires **both**: 1. `polling.enabled: true` on an `OpenapiAdapter` (polling is off by default and requires the URL-based `url` option, not an inline `spec`); **and** 2. the spec `url` is untrusted / attacker-influenceable (e.g. it is derived from user input, a tenant-supplied value, or otherwise not a fixed trusted constant), or an otherwise-trusted spec host is attacker-controlled or can redirect. Servers that poll a fixed, trusted, first-party spec URL are not exposed in practice, though they still benefit from the guard as defense-in-depth. ## Proof of concept ```ts import { OpenapiAdapter } from '@frontmcp/adapters'; // url is attacker-influenceable and points (directly, via DNS, or via redirect) // at an internal target; polling re-fetches it every interval. const adapter = OpenapiAdapter.init({ name: 'evil', url: 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/', // or http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/... polling: { enabled: true, intervalMs: 5000 }, }); await adapter.fetch(); // initial load IS guarded (blocked) adapter.startPolling(); // <= 1.5.5: each poll issues an UNGUARDED GET to the internal target ``` On `<= 1.5.5` the timed poll reaches the internal address. On the patched version the poll fails closed (no request is made; the failure is logged) exactly as the initial load does. ## Patch The fix routes the poller through the same SSRF guard as the initial load, with the same policy, so both paths share one DNS resolution + connection pinning and cannot diverge: - `OpenApiSpecPoller.doFetch()` now calls `safeFetch(this.url, { headers, timeoutMs, followRedirects, ssrf })` from `mcp-from-openapi` instead of the global `fetch()`. - `OpenapiAdapter.startPolling()` injects the adapter's resolved policy into the poller: `ssrf: normalizeSsrfOptions(this.resolveRefResolution())` and `followRedirects: loadOptions?.followRedirects ?? false` — identical to what `fromURL()` receives. - `SpecPollerOptions` gained optional `ssrf` / `followRedirects`; standalone use of `OpenApiSpecPoller` defaults to the secure policy (internal targets blocked, redirects not followed). Files changed: - `libs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi-spec-poller.ts` - `libs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi-spec-poller.types.ts` - `libs/adapters/src/openapi/openapi.adapter.ts` Requires `mcp-from-openapi >= 2.5.0` (already a dependency at `2.5.1`), which exports `safeFetch` / `normalizeSsrfOptions` and performs the resolved-IP validation and connection pinning. ## Remediation Upgrade `@frontmcp/adapters` to `1.5.6` or later. No configuration change is required: polling now inherits the same secure defaults as the initial spec load (external targets blocked, redirects not followed). To poll a genuinely internal or localhost spec server in a trusted environment, opt in explicitly with `loadOptions.refResolution.allowInternalIPs: true` — the same knob that gates the initial load. ## Workarounds For users who cannot upgrade immediately: - disable polling (`polling.enabled: false`) on adapters whose spec `url` is not a fixed, trusted, first-party value; or - only enable polling against spec URLs you fully control, served over HTTPS from a host that cannot be made to redirect to internal targets; and - enforce network egress controls / an allow-list at the platform layer so the server cannot reach internal ranges or cloud-metadata endpoints.
- Published
- Jul 24, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 24, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-918
Report tools
Action score
23
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @frontmcp/adapters | pkg:npm/%40frontmcp/adapters |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @frontmcp/adapters | before 1.5.6 | 1.5.6 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@frontmcp/adapters | 1.5.6 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-918 · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.