GHSA-8pqq-224h-x875: ogham-mcp had credentials embedded in published PyPI sdists -- Neon postgres URLs and Voyage API key
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: ogham-mcp (PyPI) 0.11.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to ogham-mcp (PyPI) 0.11.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Between 2026-02 and 2026-04-24 a total of 22 public PyPI sdists of `ogham-mcp` contained development credentials embedded in source files. All credentials have since been rotated on the respective providers. No known exploitation. Upgrade to **v0.11.1** to get a clean release. ## What was leaked | Credential | Location in sdist | Vulnerable range | Count | |---|---|---|---| | 3x Neon postgres URLs with passwords (US / EU / AP development databases) | top-level `Makefile` (`NEON_US`, `NEON_EU`, `NEON_AP` vars) | `>=0.6.5, <0.11.0` | 21 sdists | | 1x Voyage AI API key (`pa-...`) | `tests/test_hooks.py::test_mask_secrets_key_value` -- test fixture that fed a real key into the redaction-function tester | `>=0.6.3, <0.11.1` | 22 sdists | ## Impact - **Primary risk**: any consumer of the affected sdists could have extracted the credentials and used them. The Neon URLs pointed at development databases; the Voyage key was a rate-limited API key. - **Observed exploitation**: none detected. Audit logs on both providers were reviewed post-rotation. - **Remediation on our side**: - Neon passwords for all three regions rotated. - Voyage API key rotated. - All affected versions yanked from PyPI (v0.3.0 through v0.10.4 yanked on 2026-04-24; v0.11.0 pending yank after this advisory). - v0.11.0 removed the Neon URLs and introduced `make publish-check` which scans every sdist for credential patterns before upload. - v0.11.1 scrubs the Voyage key from the test fixture and excludes `benchmarks/`, `docs/`, `research/`, `extras/`, and `**/*.env*` from all future sdists via explicit hatchling sdist include/exclude in `pyproject.toml`. ## Action for users - If users installed any version from `v0.3.0` through `v0.11.0`, upgrade to **v0.11.1** immediately: ``` pip install --upgrade "ogham-mcp>=0.11.1" ``` - Users do not need to rotate anything on their end. The leaked credentials were owned by the project maintainer, not by users. ## Credit Discovered during an internal pre-release audit on 2026-04-24 while preparing v0.11.1.
- Published
- May 5, 2026
- Updated
- May 5, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-798
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | ogham-mcp | pkg:pypi/ogham-mcp |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | ogham-mcp | from 0.6.3 · before 0.11.1 | 0.11.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:ogham-mcp | 0.11.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsRoot cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";
const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);
if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.