Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-8g98-m4j9-qww5: Taylored webhook validation vulnerabilities

Critical—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Fixed version: taylored (npm) 7.0.8.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to taylored (npm) 7.0.8 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Critical Security Advisory for Taylored npm package v7.0.7 - tag 7.0.5 #### Summary A series of moderate to high-severity security vulnerabilities have been identified specifically in version **7.0.7 of \`taylored\`**. These vulnerabilities reside in the "Backend-in-a-Box" template distributed with this version. They could allow a malicious actor to read arbitrary files from the server, download paid patches without completing a valid purchase, and weaken the protection of encrypted patches. **All users who have installed or generated a \`taysell-server\` using version 7.0.7 of \`taylored\` are strongly advised to immediately upgrade to version 7.0.8 (or later) and follow the required mitigation steps outlined below.** Versions prior to 7.0.7 did not include the Taysell functionality and are therefore not affected by these specific issues. #### Vulnerabilities Patched in v7.0.8 Version 7.0.8 addresses the following issues found in the v7.0.7 template: 1. **Path Traversal in Patch Download:** The patch download endpoint did not properly sanitize the user-provided \`patchId\`. An attacker could have crafted a request with path traversal sequences (e.g., \`../../etc/passwd\`) to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. The \`patchId\` is now sanitized to ensure only files within the intended patches directory can be accessed. 2. **Missing PayPal Webhook Validation:** The server endpoint did not cryptographically verify incoming payment notifications, allowing an attacker to spoof a purchase and gain unauthorized access to patches. 3. **Purchase Token Replay Vulnerability:** A legitimate purchase token could be reused indefinitely. The system now correctly invalidates tokens after their first use. 4. **Insufficient PBKDF2 Iterations:** The key derivation function used an insufficient number of iterations, making encrypted patches more susceptible to brute-force attacks. This has been strengthened. ### Required Actions To fix these vulnerabilities, users of version **7.0.7** must **upgrade the \`taylored\` tool and regenerate their \`taysell-server\` instance**. Please follow these steps carefully: 1. **Upgrade to the Secure Version of \`taylored\`:** Open your terminal and run the following command to install the latest version: \`\`\`bash npm install -g taylored@latest \`\`\` Verify that you have version 7.0.8 or later. 2. **Remove the Vulnerable Backend:** Navigate to the project directory where you previously generated the backend with v7.0.7 and **completely delete the old \`taysell-server\` directory**. \`\`\`bash # Back up any customizations if necessary rm -rf taysell-server \`\`\` 3. **Generate the New, Secure Backend:** From the same directory, run the \`setup-backend\` command again using the upgraded \`taylored\` tool. This will create a new \`taysell-server\` directory with the patched, secure code. \`\`\`bash taylored setup-backend \`\`\` Follow the prompts and enter your PayPal credentials and server configuration. **Using a new, strong, and unique \`PATCH_ENCRYPTION_KEY\` is highly recommended.** 4. **Recreate and Re-upload Commercial Patches:** Due to the cryptography improvements, **patches created with version 7.0.7 are not compatible with the new, secure backend**. You must recreate them: * For each of your commercial patches, run the \`taylored create-taysell\` command again. * Upload the new encrypted files (e.g., \`patch-name.taylored.encrypted\`) to the \`patches/\` directory of your new \`taysell-server\`. 5. **Launch the New Server:** Start your new backend using Docker Compose: \`\`\`bash cd taysell-server docker-compose up --build -d \`\`\` For questions or support, please refer to the official documentation or open an issue on our GitHub repository. Thank you for your attention to this important update.

Published
Jun 18, 2025
Updated
Jun 18, 2025
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-8g98-m4j9-qww5

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npmtaylored

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmtayloredfrom 7.0.5 · before 7.0.87.0.8

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-vh5j-5fhq-9xwgTaylor has race condition in /get-patch that allows purchase token replay
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:taylored7.0.8Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records