GHSA-8f24-6m29-wm2r: use-after-free in tracing
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: tracing (crates.io) 0.1.40.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to tracing (crates.io) 0.1.40 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
The implementation of the [`Instrumented::into_inner`] method in affected versions of this crate contains undefined behavior due to incorrect use of [`std::mem::forget`] The function creates `*const` pointers to `self`, calls [`mem::forget(self)`][`std::mem::forget`], and then moves values out of those pointers using [`std::ptr::read`]. ```rust // To manually destructure `Instrumented` without `Drop`, we // move it into a ManuallyDrop and use pointers to its fields let span: *const Span = &this.span; let inner: *const ManuallyDrop<T> = &this.inner; mem::forget(self); // SAFETY: Those pointers are valid for reads, because `Drop` didn't // run, and properly aligned, because `Instrumented` isn't // `#[repr(packed)]`. let _span = unsafe { span.read() }; let inner = unsafe { inner.read() }; ``` However, the [`mem::forget` documentation][`std::mem::forget`] states: > Any resources the value manages, such as heap memory or a file handle, will > linger forever in an unreachable state. **However, it does not guarantee that > pointers to this memory will remain valid.** This means that these pointers are no longer valid. This could result in a stack use-after-free if LLVM chooses to reuse `self`'s stack slot for a rebinding after the call to [`std::mem::forget`]. This undefined behavior has not been observed to cause miscompilation as of Rust 1.73.0. However, any use of this method with the affected versions of `tracing` are unsound. The flaw was corrected in commit [20a1762] ([PR #2765]) by replacing the use of [`std::mem::forget`] with `std::mem::ManuallyDrop`, ensuring that the stack slot is not reused and the pointers remain valid when they are read. The fix is published in `tracing` [v0.1.40]. Affected versions have been yanked from crates.io. Thanks to [Taylor Cramer] and [Manish Goregaokar] for finding and correcting this issue! [`Instrumented::into_inner`]: https://docs.rs/tracing/latest/tracing/instrument/struct.Instrumented.html#method.into_inner [`std::mem::forget`]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/mem/fn.forget.html [`std::ptr::read`]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/primitive.pointer.html#method.read-1 [20a1762]: https://github.com/tokio-rs/tracing/commit/20a1762b3fd5f1fafead198fd18e469c68683721 [PR #2765]: https://github.com/tokio-rs/tracing/pull/2765 [v0.1.40]: https://crates.io/crates/tracing/0.1.40 [Taylor Cramer]: https://github.com/cramertj [Manish Goregaokar]: https://github.com/manishearth
- Published
- Jan 17, 2024
- Updated
- Feb 10, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-416
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | tracing | pkg:cargo/tracing |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | tracing | from 0.1.38 · before 0.1.40 | 0.1.40 |
| crates.io | tracing | from 0.1.38-0 · before 0.1.40 | 0.1.40 |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- RUSTSEC-2023-0078Potential stack use-after-free in `Instrumented::into_inner`0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:tracing | 0.1.40 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-416 · Use After FreeRoot cause
After a memory region is freed, another reference pointing to it is still used. By then, the same region may have been allocated for different data.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-416 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
free(dev->buf);
/* ... another thread is still running ... */
process(dev->buf);Fixed
lock(&dev->lock);
free(dev->buf);
dev->buf = NULL;
unlock(&dev->lock);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.