GHSA-89v5-38xr-9m4j: Postiz has Multiple SSRF Vectors - Webhooks, RSS Feed, URL Loader
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Postiz has multiple SSRF vulnerabilities where user-provided URLs are fetched server-side without any IP validation or SSRF protection. ## Vulnerable Code ### 1. Webhook Send Endpoint (Most Critical) **`apps/backend/src/api/routes/webhooks.controller.ts` lines 58-70:** ```typescript async sendWebhook(@Body() body: any, @Query('url') url: string) { try { await fetch(url, { // No URL validation method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(body), headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, }); } catch (err) { } return { send: true }; } ``` Accepts arbitrary URL via query parameter and fetches directly. ### 2. Stored Webhook Delivery **`apps/orchestrator/src/activities/post.activity.ts` lines 256-281:** ```typescript async sendWebhooks(postId: string, orgId: string, integrationId: string) { const webhooks = await this._webhookService.getWebhooks(orgId); return Promise.all( webhooks.map(async (webhook) => { await fetch(webhook.url, { // Stored URL, no validation method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(post), }); }) ); } ``` ### 3. RSS/XML Feed Parser **`libraries/nestjs-libraries/src/database/prisma/autopost/autopost.service.ts` line 135:** ```typescript async loadXML(url: string) { const { items } = await parser.parseURL(url); // No URL validation } ``` ### 4. HTML Content Loader **`libraries/nestjs-libraries/src/database/prisma/autopost/autopost.service.ts` line 185:** ```typescript async loadUrl(url: string) { const loadDom = new JSDOM(await (await fetch(url)).text()); // No validation } ``` ## Missing Protections - No `request-filtering-agent` or SSRF library - No private IP range filtering - No cloud metadata endpoint blocking - No DNS rebinding protection - URL validation only via `@IsUrl()` decorator (format only, no IP check) ## Attack Scenarios 1. `POST /webhooks/send?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` → AWS metadata theft 2. `POST /autopost/send?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379` → Internal Redis access 3. Create webhook with `http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin` → Internal service access on post publish ## Impact - **Cloud metadata theft**: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials - **Internal network scanning**: Full access to private IP ranges - **Multiple entry points**: Webhooks, RSS feeds, URL loader all vulnerable
- Published
- Mar 27, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 27, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-918
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | postiz | pkg:npm/postiz |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | postiz | up to and including 2.0.12 | — |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-vj2p-7pgw-g2wfPostiz App has a High-Severity SSRF Vulnerability via Next.js30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-918 · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.