GHSA-7vfx-4246-jcfh: SolidInvoice: IDOR in LiveComponent allows same-company cross-user access to API tokens and notification transport settings
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: solidinvoice/solidinvoice (Packagist) 2.3.16.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to solidinvoice/solidinvoice (Packagist) 2.3.16 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Four authorization bypass vulnerabilities in Symfony LiveComponent actions allow any authenticated user within a company to access, modify, or delete other users' API tokens and notification transport settings. The root cause is that LiveComponent actions accept entity IDs without verifying ownership, while the listing methods correctly filter by user. ## Findings ### 1. Cross-User API Token Revocation (MEDIUM) **File:** `src/UserBundle/Twig/Components/ApiTokens.php`, lines 50-55 The `revoke()` LiveAction accepts any `ApiToken` via `#[LiveArg]` without checking ownership. The `apiTokens()` method correctly filters by user (`getApiTokensForUser($this->security->getUser())`). ```php #[LiveAction] public function revoke(#[LiveArg] ApiToken $token): void { $this->apiTokenRepository->revoke($token); // No ownership check } ``` ### 2. Cross-User API Token History Disclosure (MEDIUM) **File:** `src/UserBundle/Twig/Components/ApiTokenHistory.php`, lines 30-55 The writable `$token` LiveProp performs `$this->apiTokenRepository->find($this->token)` without user verification. Exposes IP addresses, request methods, paths, and user agents from other users' API token usage. ### 3. Cross-User Notification Transport Settings Disclosure (HIGH) **File:** `src/NotificationBundle/Twig/Components/NotificationIntegrations.php`, lines 48-55 The `integration()` method performs `$this->repository->find($this->setting)` using a writable LiveProp without user check. The `enabledIntegrations()` method correctly filters: `$this->repository->findBy(['user' => $this->getUser()])`. The `TransportSetting` entity stores notification credentials in a JSON `settings` column, potentially exposing API keys for Slack, Discord, Telegram, or SMS services. ### 4. Cross-User Notification Transport Setting Takeover (HIGH) **File:** `src/NotificationBundle/Twig/Components/NotificationTransportConfiguration.php`, lines 39-40, 84-101 The writable `$setting` LiveProp accepts any `TransportSetting` entity. The `save()` action overwrites the user field with the current user via `$setting->setUser($user)`, effectively stealing the transport configuration and its stored credentials. ## Root Cause The application relies on Doctrine's `CompanyFilter` for tenant isolation but has no user-level access controls within a company. LiveComponent actions that resolve entities from client-provided IDs don't verify ownership. ## Suggested Fix Add user ownership verification in each LiveAction/LiveProp before performing operations: ```php if ($token->getUser() !== $this->security->getUser()) { throw $this->createAccessDeniedException(); } ```
- Published
- Jun 26, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | solidinvoice/solidinvoice | pkg:composer/solidinvoice/solidinvoice |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | solidinvoice/solidinvoice | before 2.3.16 | 2.3.16 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:solidinvoice/solidinvoice | 2.3.16 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.