GHSA-7qjx-gp9h-65qj: Dex: Token-exchange endpoint is missing AllowedConnectors enforcement
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 34/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/dexidp/dex (Go) 0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/dexidp/dex (Go) 0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary `server/handlers.go::handleTokenExchange` (lines 1804-1893) does not call `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` before issuing tokens, while sibling handlers do. This is a per-client connector ACL gap on the token-exchange endpoint; the redirect-flow paths enforce the same field correctly. ## Affected code path `handleTokenExchange` reads `connector_id` from the request body at `server/handlers.go:1822`. Validators called between read and token issuance: - `s.getConnector(ctx, connID)` at line 1836 - confirms connector exists - `GrantTypeAllowed(conn.GrantTypes, grantTypeTokenExchange)` at line 1842 - confirms connector permits this grant - **(missing)** `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` - never called Tokens are issued at lines 1887 / 1889, bound to `client.ID` carrying claims derived from `connID`. Sibling handlers DO enforce the check: - `server/handlers.go::handleConnectorLogin:377` - calls `isConnectorAllowed`, returns HTTP 403 "Connector not allowed for this client." (line 380). - `server/oauth2.go::parseAuthorizationRequest:535` - same enforcement for the authorization-code flow. The doc-string at `storage/storage.go:192-194` reads: > *AllowedConnectors is a list of connector IDs that the client is allowed to use for authentication. If empty, all connectors are allowed.* The phrasing is unconditional - a permission ACL, not a UX filter. ## Impact (concrete scenario) - Connector `corp-okta` - high-trust, gates production access - Connector `dev-google` - low-trust, internal Gmail - Client `dev-app` configured with `allowedConnectors: ["dev-google"]` (admin intent: dev-app only sees dev-google identities) - `dev-app`s client secret leaks (CI artifact, env file, breached service-account secret store) Without the bug, the leaked secret would only allow the attacker to mint tokens via `dev-google` - blast radius bounded by what any dev-google user can already do. With the bug, an attacker holding their own legitimate `corp-okta` ID token sends: ``` POST /token Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange &client_id=dev-app &client_secret=<leaked> &connector_id=corp-okta &subject_token=<attackers own corp-okta id token> &subject_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token &scope=openid+groups ``` Dex returns an ID token signed by Dex, `aud=dev-app`, carrying the attackers `corp-okta` groups. Downstream services trusting tokens issued for `dev-app` see the attacker as a `corp-okta` user - a combination the admins policy explicitly forbade. ## Severity (self-assessed) CVSS 3.1 vector: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N` -> **8.7 HIGH**. The `PR:H` precondition is a real reduction (requires leaked confidential client_secret PLUS attacker holding a `subject_token` from a forbidden connector that has token-exchange enabled). Defer to your scoring - HIGH and MEDIUM are both defensible. ## Affected version `master` only - **not yet in any released tag**. Latest release `v2.45.1` (2026-03-03) predates PR #4610 (commit `f80a89d`, 2026-03-11) which introduced `AllowedConnectors`. Production deployments on stable releases are NOT affected; deployments pulling from master / nightly images are. A fix can be merged ahead of the next release without an embargo for past versions. ## Precedent / lineage - PR #4610 (commit `f80a89d`, 2026-03-11) - added the `AllowedConnectors` field, `isConnectorAllowed`, `filterConnectors`, and the redirect-flow check sites (`handleConnectorLogin:377`, `parseAuthorizationRequest:535`). Did not modify `handleTokenExchange`. - PR #4619 (commit `7777773`, 2026-03-11, same author, one day earlier) - added `GrantTypeAllowed(conn.GrantTypes, grantTypeTokenExchange)` to `handleTokenExchange`. Added a connector-side grant-type gate but did not add the symmetric client-side connector ACL. ## Suggested fix Insert `isConnectorAllowed(client.AllowedConnectors, connID)` between the existing `getConnector` / `GrantTypeAllowed` checks and the connector cast at line 1847, returning HTTP 403 via the token-endpoint error helper. Mirror the existing patterns at `handlers.go:377-380` and `oauth2.go:535`. One-block addition. ## Verification methodology Two-stage verification per IRIS / XBOW pattern (LLM-assisted research with non-LLM verifier as last stage): 1. **Code-mechanics** - independent cold-read of `server/handlers.go`, `server/oauth2.go`, `storage/storage.go` confirmed the missing check at `handleTokenExchange` and the present checks at the two siblings; cross-checked diffs of PR #4610 (`f80a89d`) and PR #4619 (`7777773`). 2. **External grounding** - cross-checked `docs/configuration/customization`, `docs/guides/token-exchange/`, RFC 8693 (which defers per-client policy to implementations), `.github/SECURITY.md`, GHSA dashboard, huntr.com, and existing issues including #3546 (different mechanism: connector-level disable list, orthogonal to this finding). No prior public report of this gap was found. `semgrep` (`p/golang` + `p/security-audit`) on `server/` returned no ERROR-severity findings - the static tool cannot detect missing-validator gaps; evidence rests on file:line grep + sibling-handler comparison above. ## Reporter Matteo Panzeri (GitHub: @matte1782, contact: matteo1782@gmail.com). Please credit as **Matteo Panzeri** if a CVE is requested.
- Published
- Jun 9, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-285
Report tools
Action score
34
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 34 / 40 · 8.7 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/dexidp/dex | pkg:golang/github.com/dexidp/dex |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/dexidp/dex | before 0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7 | 0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5231Dex: Token-exchange endpoint is missing AllowedConnectors enforcement in github.com/dexidp/dex0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/dexidp/dex | 0.0.0-20260303131938-204dbb2e3ff7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-285 · Improper AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLsCAPEC-1likelihood: High · High
- Cross Zone ScriptingCAPEC-104likelihood: Medium · High
- Directory IndexingCAPEC-127likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Malicious FilesCAPEC-17likelihood: High · Very High
- Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data TokensCAPEC-39likelihood: High · Medium
- Bypassing ATA Password SecurityCAPEC-402
- Buffer Overflow via Symbolic LinksCAPEC-45likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Data from Local SystemT1005
- Query RegistryT1012
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in RegistryT1552.002
- Impair Defenses:Impair Command History LoggingT1562.003
- Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data ManipulationT1565.002
- Hijack Execution Flow: Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessT1574.005
- Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker HijackingT1574.006
- Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.007
- Hijack Execution Flow: ServicesFile Permissions WeaknessT1574.010
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.