GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6: Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon (Go) 1.1.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon (Go) 1.1.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, an attacker can use the typically 20-byte address bytes (from the PoP context) to form the StartHeight, NumPubRand, and a shorter-than-expected Commitment (e.g., 4 bytes). The replayed signature will pass verification for this crafted message, leading to the injection of an invalid PubRand commitment. ### Impact Successful exploitation of this vulnerability, specifically via the PoP signature replay, allows an attacker to store an invalid PubRand commitment (with a non-standard length, e.g., 4 bytes) for a targeted Finality Provider (FP). Despite the commitment itself being malformed, it's the associated StartHeight and NumPubRand (derived from the replayed address bytes and typically very large) that cause severe consequences ### Future recommendations To minimize future risk of such attacks, all finality providers should: 1. Never re-use your finality provider EOTS across the networks (e.g., the testnet) or for any other purpose. 2. Never use EOTS keys to sign any other data than relevant to in-protocol messages. Ideally EOTS key should only be used to: - Sign initial proof of possession message - Sign periodic randomness commits - Sign finality votes with every block ### Finder Vulnerability discovered by: - Marco Hextor - https://x.com/marcohextor - @marcohextor
- Published
- May 15, 2025
- Updated
- Jul 31, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-290
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon | pkg:golang/github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon | before 1.1.0 | 1.1.0 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2025-4214Babylon Incorrect FP inactive accounting in costaking creates “phantom stake” that earns rewards after BTC unbond in…0Monitor
- GO-2025-4211Babylon Nil BlockHash in BLS vote extensions triggers panics in consensus handlers in github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon0Monitor
- GO-2025-4157Babylon's malformed vote extensions are not rejected in github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →GHSA-869w-47c6-fq8qMay 15, 2025 · Babylon Integer Overflow in Distribution Module CumulativeRewardRatio Calculation Leading to Chain Halt0Monitor
- Later →GO-2025-3686May 15, 2025 · Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack in github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon0Monitor
- Later →GO-2025-3687May 15, 2025 · Babylon Integer Overflow in Distribution Module CumulativeRewardRatio Calculation Leading to Chain Halt in…0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon | 1.1.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-290 · Authentication Bypass by SpoofingCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension WeaknessCAPEC-461High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by MisrepresentationCAPEC-476likelihood: Low · High
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.