GHSA-78g4-xqwv-q3g8: Pillow: Bundled libopenjp2 2.5.4 in all wheels since 11.1.0 carries OSV-2025-219 heap-buffer-overflow write reachable from Image.open().load()
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: pillow (PyPI) 13.0.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to pillow (PyPI) 13.0.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Every Pillow wheel from 11.1.0 onward bundles a libopenjp2 containing a heap-buffer-overflow **write** that is fixed upstream on master but has never appeared in an OpenJPEG release. See https://osv.dev/vulnerability/OSV-2025-219 Because the wheel bundles its own copy, a patched host OS does not help. It is reachable from `Image.open(fp); im.load()` with default settings. I am reporting it here rather than only upstream because Pillow is where the vulnerable binary actually reaches users. Note the inversion that makes this easy to miss: **OpenJPEG 2.5.2 and earlier are safe.** The bug was introduced in `954c6e3c` (2024-06-25), so keeping the dependency current is what creates the exposure. ### Details ## Affected wheels From `.github/dependencies.json` (`openjpeg`) at each tag: | Pillow | bundled OpenJPEG | status | |---|---|---| | 10.4.0 | 2.5.2 | safe | | 11.0.0 | 2.5.2 | safe | | **11.1.0, 11.2.1, 11.3.0** | **2.5.3** | **affected** | | **12.0.0 … 12.3.0** | **2.5.4** | **affected** | Confirmed on an installed wheel: `PIL.features.version_codec('jpg_2000')` → `2.5.4`, bundled file `pillow.libs/libopenjp2-*.so.2.5.4`. `main` still pins `2.5.4` as of 2026-10-06. ## The defect `src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c`, in `opj_j2k_read_sod`: ```c OPJ_UINT32 l_current_tile_part = l_cstr_index->tile_index[p_j2k->m_current_tile_number].current_tpsno; l_cstr_index->tile_index[...].tp_index[l_current_tile_part].end_header = l_current_pos; l_cstr_index->tile_index[...].tp_index[l_current_tile_part].end_pos = l_current_pos + p_j2k->m_specific_param.m_decoder.m_sot_length + 2; ``` `tp_index` is neither null-checked nor bounds-checked, and `l_current_tile_part` comes directly from the one-byte `TPsot` field of the SOT marker. The correct guard already exists a few lines later in `opj_j2k_add_tlmarker` (j2k.c:8459), writing the **same array at the same index** behind `if (tp_index && l_current_tile_part < nb_tps)`. One writer checked, its sibling not. Reached by giving the codestream a *valid* TLM marker — so `tp_index` is allocated once by `opj_j2k_build_tp_index_from_tlm`, sized to the TLM entry count, and `opj_j2k_read_sot` then skips all resizing — while setting `TNsot = 0` in every SOT, which keeps the TLM "valid" and lets `TPsot` walk past the allocation. ## Patch status Fixed upstream in `91d08b11` ("Fix heap buffer overlfow in opj_j2k_read_sod", 2026-02-10). The newest OpenJPEG tag is **v2.5.4 (2025-09-20)**, and `compare/v2.5.4...91d08b11` reports *ahead 6, behind 0* — the fix is **in no release, 8 months on**. ## Suggested remediation 1. Carry `91d08b11` as a patch in the wheel build until an OpenJPEG release includes it — three lines, identical to a guard already present in the same file. 2. Consider asking OpenJPEG to cut a release; they have had an unreleased memory-corruption fix on master since February 2026, and every distro is shipping the vulnerable code. 3. Your security handbook already tells applications to block EPS at the application layer. A similarly explicit note that `Image.open()` ignores filename/Content-Type and will reach any compiled-in codec unless `formats=` is passed would help downstream apps a lot. ## Not a Pillow bug, but relevant: the extension allowlist most apps rely on does not apply `Image.open()` sniffs magic bytes, so a JPEG 2000 codestream in a file named `avatar.png` declared `Content-Type: image/png` reaches the JP2 decoder anyway. I verified this against a production service documenting PNG/JPEG-only uploads: it accepted and fully decoded a JP2 through exactly that path, with 16 formats reachable from one upload endpoint against 43 registered openers. That service has since fixed it by passing `formats=` and validating on the detected format rather than the client's `Content-Type`. That is the reason a decoder-level issue like this one has much wider reach than downstream maintainers tend to assume. ### Proof of concept ASan build of OpenJPEG 2.5.4 interposed under a **stock Pillow 12.3.0**, running `Image.open(p); im.load()`: ``` ==766332==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 8 #0 opj_j2k_read_sod j2k.c:5086 #1 opj_j2k_read_tile_header j2k.c:9912 #2 opj_read_tile_header openjpeg.c:575 #3 j2k_decode_entry src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:793 #4 ImagingJpeg2KDecode src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:949 #5 _decode src/decode.c:132 located 8 bytes to the right of a 24-byte region allocated by opj_j2k_build_tp_index_from_tlm j2k.c:8939 ``` Frames 3–5 are Pillow's own decoder, not a synthetic harness. No non-default decoder options are involved; strict mode is on, which is Pillow's behaviour since Pillow never calls `opj_decoder_set_strict_mode`. A benign twin image runs the same path cleanly and returns a valid image, so this is the payload and not a parse failure. I have deliberately **not** attached the PoC file to this initial report. I'm happy to attach the PoC, the builder script and the RIP-control harness here on request, or hold everything until a fix is ready. No disclosure deadline from me; I will not publish anything while this is being worked on. ### Impact Any application that calls `Image.open()` / `im.load()` on an image it did not produce — the overwhelmingly common case for upload handlers, thumbnailers and preview pipelines — can be made to perform an out-of-bounds heap write by supplying one crafted file. **Floor, already certain.** On a stock non-sanitised wheel the overflow performs 245 writes walking to +5856 bytes past a 24-byte allocation, and glibc's own heap-metadata checker aborts the process (`corrupted size vs. prev_size`, `corrupted double-linked list`, SIGABRT). One file reliably kills a long-lived worker. **Ceiling, demonstrated as a primitive but not as a finished exploit.** With same-size-class objects alive on both sides — an ordinary busy heap — the walk crosses `opj_event_mgr_t`, which holds three `opj_msg_callback` function pointers, and `opj_event_msg` then calls one (event.c:136): ``` rip 0x4000 <- value chosen by the attacker's file layout rsi 0x3ff2 <- m_error_data, written by the same walk ``` Shifting the codestream with a COM marker moves `rip` with it (`0x16ce` → `0x4000`), so the instruction pointer is attacker-**chosen** rather than incidentally invalid. A benign control image leaves the same groomed heap untouched. To be explicit about what I did not do: I have **not** built a working exploit. That additionally needs remote heap grooming and an ASLR defeat, and I attempted neither. I am reporting a controlled control-flow primitive, not a finished chain. The CVSS AC:H reflects that.
- Published
- Oct 22, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 22, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-1395
Report tools
Action score
32
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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—
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | pillow | from 11.1.0 · before 13.0.0 | 13.0.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:pillow | 13.0.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 17, 2026+26 d
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1395 · Dependency on Vulnerable Third-Party ComponentCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (6 more)Show less
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/5f8114c8096b181fae493543cd3837d9f9a971cc
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/d3470c327840f4c216a1610f30e7091dfd0b97c0
- github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/91d08b11a72764f6d199f32fa0c1b1abd4edc2ad
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow
- github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0
- osv.dev/vulnerability/OSV-2025-219
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.