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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-77hh-43cm-v8j6: tuf's Metadata API: Targets.get_delegated_role() is missing input validation

Low—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Fixed version: tuf (PyPI) 3.1.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to tuf (PyPI) 3.1.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

The security of both a TUF client and repository implementations depend on the concept of trusted Metadata objects verifying the signatures over other Metadata that it delegates to. This verification process uses `Targets.get_delegated_role(delegated_role: str)` to find the delegation information. `tuf.api.metadata.Targets.get_delegated_role()` should ensure that the given `delegated_rolename` is actually a name of a role that is delegated by that Targets, but in the case of "succinct delegation" this does not happen. `tuf.ngclient` users are **not** impacted but direct users of `tuf.api.metadata` could be impacted. ### Impact If an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.get_delegated_role()` so that 1. the `Targets` uses succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is not actually delegated by the `Targets` the result will be incorrect. This also means that if an attacker can make a Metadata API user run `Targets.verify_delegate()` or `Targets.get_verification_result()` so that 1. the delegating `Targets` uses a succinct delegation 1. the `delegated_role` argument is the name of some unrelated Metadata 1. that other Metadata is correctly signed by the keys defined in the succinct delegation the result would be a successful verification even though the `Targets` in question does not actually delegate to `delegated_role`. The impact is estimated to be low for following reasons: * This cannot impact a TUF client that implements the client workflow as specified since the delegated role name is not an input but is collected from the (trusted) delegating Targets itself * Actual signature verification is not bypassed: The verified metadata _must_ still be correctly signed by the keys specified in the delegating role. * The described situations are somewhat hypothetical: there does not seem to be any reason for a python-tuf user (whether client or a repository) to use `tuf.api.metadata` in this way. All users of `tuf.ngclient` are specifically **not** impacted. Users of `tuf.api.metadata` could be impacted if they use succinct delegations in a way described above. ### Patches A fix is available in python-tuf 3.1.1 as commit 77cb66bc and in later releases as commit eb4834d9._ ### Workarounds `tuf.api.metadata` users should only call `Targets.get_delegated_role()`, `Targets.verify_delegate()` or `Targets.get_verification_result()` with `delegated_role` argument that is known to be delegated by the `Targets` in question.

Published
Feb 16, 2024
Updated
Feb 16, 2024
EPSS
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CWE
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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VendorProduct
PyPItuf

Package-level exposure

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EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPItuffrom 2.0.0 · before 3.1.13.1.1

Same product

PyPI: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-r7vq-6425-j94wPython-TUF vulnerable to incorrect threshold signature computation for new root metadata
    0Monitor

Remediation

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Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:tuf3.1.1Package registry (OSV)

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