Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-763j-3p5v-jfc6: androidqf: APK download Path Traversal in device APK paths

Low—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/mvt-project/androidqf (Go) 1.8.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/mvt-project/androidqf (Go) 1.8.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary During device acquisition, `getPathToLocalCopy()` constructs local filesystem paths for downloaded APKs using a filename component extracted by `extractFileName()`. The extraction splits on `==/` and takes the remainder without sanitization. If a compromised device returns a crafted APK path containing traversal sequences, `filepath.Join` resolves them, allowing the file to be written outside the intended `apks/` directory. Practical exploitability is limited because Android enforces strict package path formats under `/data/app/` and does not allow apps to register paths containing traversal sequences. Rated Informational as a defense-in-depth concern. ### Impact An attacker with control of the connected device could potentially write files outside the expected output directory on the acquisition workstation, leading to arbitrary file overwrite with attacker-controlled content. ### Patched version [1.8.3](https://github.com/mvt-project/androidqf/releases/tag/v1.8.3) ### Credits - This issue was identified during a security assessment conducted by 0xche. - An additional vulnerability was independently identified by @0x0v1

Published
May 21, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-763j-3p5v-jfc6

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/mvt-project/androidqf

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/mvt-project/androidqfbefore 1.8.31.8.3

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-5464androidqf: Zip entry Name Injection in APK bundle (Zip Slip for zip consumers) in github.com/mvt-project/androidqf
    0Monitor
  • GO-2026-5206androidqf: APK download Path Traversal in device APK paths in github.com/mvt-project/androidqf
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-jf2q-463c-6f52androidqf: Zip entry Name Injection in APK bundle (Zip Slip for zip consumers)
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/mvt-project/androidqf1.8.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • GHSA-jf2q-463c-6f520 days apartandroidqf: Zip entry Name Injection in APK bundle (Zip Slip for zip consumers)
    0Monitor

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

osv

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records