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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-72w7-mf9g-733p: nono-py has proxy-only network fallback bypass on older Linux kernels

MediumCVSS 6.4 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 25/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: nono-py (PyPI) 0.10.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to nono-py (PyPI) 0.10.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules, `nono_py.sandboxed_exec()` could run `CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy)` without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core. In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` environment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy. The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed `caps.block_network()` denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on the tested Linux 6.1 host. ## Impact The intended `proxy_only()` security property is: - child processes may connect only to the local nono proxy port - the proxy enforces host allowlists and metadata/link-local denial - direct TCP to any other target is denied Before the fix, on kernels without Landlock `AccessNet`, the Python binding applied the sandbox and then executed the child, but did not install and supervise the proxy-only seccomp-notify fallback. A child could therefore bypass the proxy layer in that old-kernel path. The highest-impact scenario is a sandboxed workload with access to cloud metadata discovery inputs, where direct TCP to a metadata endpoint could retrieve task or instance credentials after proxy environment variables are removed. ## Affected Conditions The issue requires all of the following: - Linux runtime. - Kernel without Landlock network support, such as Linux 6.1. Landlock network rules require Landlock ABI v4 / Linux 6.7 or newer. - `nono_py.sandboxed_exec()` is used. - The capability set uses `caps.proxy_only(proxy)`. - The child process removes or ignores proxy environment variables, or uses raw sockets. macOS Seatbelt proxy-only enforcement is not affected by this Linux seccomp-notify fallback issue. ## Affected Versions Known affected builds include nono-py versions that expose and use `CapabilitySet.proxy_only()` through `sandboxed_exec()` before the supervised fallback fix in this working tree. Earlier versions that did not expose `CapabilitySet.proxy_only()` are not affected by this specific proxy-only enforcement bug, though they may have separate environment-inheritance risks if callers passed broad parent environment variables into sandboxed children. **CVSS Score Rationale** | Metric | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | **Attack Vector (AV)** | L — Local | Exploit is performed by a local process (unsetting env vars or opening raw sockets). Not remotely triggerable. | | **Attack Complexity (AC)** | H — High | All of the following must be true: Linux runtime; kernel < 6.7 (no Landlock ABI v4); `sandboxed_exec()` used; capability set calls `proxy_only()`; child actively bypasses proxy env vars or uses raw sockets. | | **Privileges Required (PR)** | L — Low | Attacker is already executing code inside the sandbox — some user-level privilege is required to get there. | | **User Interaction (UI)** | N — None | No action from a user or operator is needed once the sandboxed child is running. | | **Scope (S)** | C — Changed | The exploit crosses the sandbox security boundary, allowing the child to reach network resources outside the defined policy scope. | | **Confidentiality (C)** | H — High | Highest-impact path: direct TCP to cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) yields IAM / task credentials. | | **Integrity (I)** | L — Low | Attacker can make arbitrary outbound requests; no direct data modification from the bypass itself, but lateral credential use creates indirect risk. | | **Availability (A)** | N — None | No denial-of-service impact described or implied. | ---

Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Jun 26, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

25

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
25 / 40 · 6.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
PyPInono-py

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPInono-pyfrom 0.9.0 · before 0.10.10.10.1

Same product

PyPI: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:nono-py0.10.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

osv

References

All records