GHSA-6hxq-p678-4hr2: SimpleWebAuthn: Registration verification does not sufficiently ensure that attestation certificates chain to a trust anchor
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @simplewebauthn/server (npm) 13.3.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @simplewebauthn/server (npm) 13.3.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary `validateCertificatePath()` does not verify that an attestation's certificate chain actually terminates at a configured trust anchor. When walking the chain it stops at the first self-signed certificate it finds (which could be user-supplied), and exits early. This happens before the configured Apple/Google/etc trust anchor (which is concatenated to the end of the chain) is reached. A user can therefore register a credential and have the server accept it as if it were backed by a genuine Apple / Android SafetyNet / Yubikey / etc. ## Details `packages/server/src/helpers/validateCertificatePath.ts`: The configured trust anchor is appended to the end of the untrusted chain (line **83**): ```ts const x5cWithTrustAnchor = x5cCertsParsed.concat([anchor]); ``` The walk then verifies each cert was signed by the next, but breaks on the first self-signed cert (lines **104–116**): ```ts if (issuer.subject === issuer.issuer) { // Root cert detected, make sure it signed itself const issuerSignedIssuer = await issuer.verify( { publicKey: issuer.publicKey, signatureOnly: true }, WebCrypto, ); if (!issuerSignedIssuer) { throw new InvalidSubjectAndIssuer(); } break; // <-- exits before the appended trust anchor is ever checked if user supplied self-signed cert comes first } ``` The success condition is therefore "the certs form an internally-consistent chain ending in some self-signed cert" Rather than "the chain terminates at one of the configured trust anchors." ## Exploit shape ``` attacker sends: x5c = [ forgedLeaf (signed by attacker root), attackerSelfSignedRoot ] library builds: [ forgedLeaf, attackerSelfSignedRoot, <configured Apple/Google/etc root> ] walk: forgedLeaf -> attackerSelfSignedRoot (verifies, attacker controls both) attackerSelfSignedRoot is self-signed -> break attackerSelfSignedRoot -> configured root (NEVER CHECKED) ``` `return true`. The configured anchor never gets checked. As far as observed, all attestation enforcement uses validateCertificatePath when using MDS etc.
- Published
- Sep 4, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-295
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @simplewebauthn/server | pkg:npm/%40simplewebauthn/server |
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This vulnerability is about certificate validation or weak cryptography. The free SSL checker tests your certificate, enabled TLS versions and weak ciphers.
Run the SSL checkPackage-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @simplewebauthn/server | before 13.3.2 | 13.3.2 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@simplewebauthn/server | 13.3.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- A
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-295 · Improper Certificate ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Root cause
A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-295 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) {
// Left empty for the test environment
}Fixed
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()
.certificatePinner(
CertificatePinner.Builder()
.add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…")
.build()
).build()Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/MasterKale/SimpleWebAuthn/commit/67a41fed3dfd96cab1dcf414f6d1792a72e06e35
- github.com/MasterKale/SimpleWebAuthn/commit/8a53d70f42bcbb7c744ef1b90e6db35bc4b26d06
- github.com/MasterKale/SimpleWebAuthn/commit/dd0d73c716a528e6645efafbd43a972b64df71f9
- github.com/MasterKale/SimpleWebAuthn
- github.com/MasterKale/SimpleWebAuthn/releases/tag/v13.3.2
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.