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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-647h-p824-99w7: @grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @grackle-ai/mcp (npm) 0.70.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @grackle-ai/mcp (npm) 0.70.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Impact The `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries. This is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used. **Affected code:** - `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler) - `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler) - `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS) **Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers. ### Design Note Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce: - Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings - A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens - Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context ### Patches **Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`: ```typescript const resolvedWorkspaceId = authContext?.type === "scoped" ? authContext.workspaceId ?? "" : workspaceId ?? ""; ``` When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls. ### Workarounds Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`. ### References - CWE-284: Improper Access Control - File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts` - File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`

Published
Mar 25, 2026
Updated
Mar 25, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
npm@grackle-ai/mcp

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@grackle-ai/mcpbefore 0.70.20.70.2

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-f9ff-5x35-7gfwGrackle: Fail-open authorization in the MCP tool layer lets scoped agents perform cross-task and cross-session mutations (IDOR)
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@grackle-ai/mcp0.70.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

osv

References

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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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