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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-5vwr-qchf-q4pf: @cyclonedx/cdxgen: Maven project scanning may allow shell command injection through repository-controlled module paths

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @cyclonedx/cdxgen (npm) 12.4.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @cyclonedx/cdxgen (npm) 12.4.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary A command injection vulnerability existed in the Maven scanning flow of cdxgen before version 12.4.3. When cdxgen scanned an attacker-controlled Maven project, repository-controlled paths could be used in the Maven command construction. In affected versions, some Maven invocations were executed with `shell: true`. A directory name containing shell metacharacters could therefore be interpreted by the shell instead of being treated only as a filesystem path. This could allow an attacker who controls a scanned repository to execute commands in the cdxgen process context. The issue affected both the CLI and server mode. The issue is patched in `12.4.3`. ## Affected asset - Project: cdxgen - Tested version: 12.4.1 - Mode tested: server mode - Endpoint: `POST /sbom` - Scanner path: Java / Maven project scanning ## Patch Version 12.4.3 includes hardening for this issue with PR #4059 The patch adds multiple mitigations: - Maven command invocations no longer use unconditional shell execution on POSIX platforms. - Bazel command invocation was similarly changed away from unconditional shell execution. - Windows compatibility is preserved using `shell: isWin` where needed. - `safeSpawnSync` now blocks `shell: true` invocations when the command or direct argument values contain shell metacharacters. - cdxgen does not validate or sanitise every nested directory. The threat model is updated to clarify mitigation scope. ## Workarounds The recommended remediation is to upgrade to 12.4.3 or later. If immediate upgrade is not possible: - Do not run cdxgen server mode on untrusted networks. - Do not expose POST /sbom to unauthenticated or untrusted clients. - Avoid scanning untrusted Java/Maven repositories. - Run cdxgen inside a locked-down container or sandbox. - Remove sensitive environment variables from the cdxgen process environment. - Use least-privilege filesystem mounts. - Restrict outbound network access where possible. Use cdxgen secure/dry-run modes where suitable to inspect planned operations before performing scans. Configure host and command allowlists where applicable, such as: - CDXGEN_SERVER_ALLOWED_HOSTS - CDXGEN_GIT_ALLOWED_HOSTS - CDXGEN_ALLOWED_COMMANDS - CDXGEN_SECURE_MODE=true These mitigations reduce exposure but do not fully address the vulnerable command construction in affected versions. ## Threat model clarification The mitigation added in 12.4.3 applies to the cdxgen process boundary. Specifically, cdxgen now hardens command, option, and path values that cdxgen itself passes to external processes through safeSpawnSync. This does not mean cdxgen sanitizes every nested path, module name, generated path, or project-controlled value that an external build tool later discovers and interprets inside its own process. Once cdxgen safely invokes Maven, Gradle, Bazel, SBT, or another build tool, that tool’s internal behavior remains a separate trust boundary. ### In scope for this fix: - command and argument values passed directly by cdxgen to child processes; - cdxgen’s own use of shell: true; - Maven/Bazel command invocation paths controlled by cdxgen. ### Out of scope for this specific mitigation: - arbitrary nested paths later discovered by Maven itself; - Maven plugin behavior; - Maven lifecycle hooks; - build-tool-specific interpretation of project files after cdxgen has launched the tool. This residual risk is documented in the cdxgen threat model and is why untrusted project scans should still be run in sandboxed, least-privileged environments. ## Detection Possible indicators of exploitation or probing include: - Maven module directories containing shell metacharacters such as: ``` ; & | < > $ backticks newlines ``` - Logs showing settings.xml or pom.xml discovered in suspicious paths. - Unexpected files created outside the scanned repository during a Java/Maven scan. - Unexpected child process behavior during cdxgen server scans. - cdxgen server receiving POST /sbom requests for attacker-controlled Git URLs. Example suspicious path pattern: ``` evil;cd${IFS}..;cd${IFS}..;printf${IFS}...>...;# ``` ## Credits Reported-By: @aleff-github ## Resources - Patch PR - https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/pull/4059

Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npm@cyclonedx/cdxgen

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@cyclonedx/cdxgenbefore 12.4.312.4.3

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-qhh4-458h-xwh2@cyclonedx/cdxgen: Docker registry auth substring match forwards credentials to a different registry
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@cyclonedx/cdxgen12.4.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

osv

Root cause

User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const host = req.body.host;exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);

Fixed

ts
const host = req.body.host;if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records