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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-5739-39v2-5754: PHP JWT Library: RSA1_5 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) decryption lacks implicit rejection, exposing a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: web-token/jwt-library (Packagist) 4.0.7, 4.1.7, 3.4.10.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to web-token/jwt-library (Packagist) 4.0.7, 4.1.7, 3.4.10 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Impact `RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15()` (used by the `RSA1_5` key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing `InvalidArgumentException` as soon as the padding is malformed. It does **not** implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly). From a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted `encrypted_key` values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though `JWEDecrypter` returns the same `false` in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `RSA1_5` in their decryption `AlgorithmManager` and hold an RSA private key. ### Patches PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rejection: on invalid padding (or unexpected recovered length) it returns a random CEK of the expected size selected in constant time, so the full content-decryption (AEAD) step always runs and fails uniformly, removing the observable difference between padding-valid and padding-invalid ciphertexts. Users are still strongly encouraged to migrate to `RSA-OAEP`. ### Workarounds Prefer `RSA-OAEP`/`RSA-OAEP-256`; do not enable `RSA1_5` for untrusted tokens. ### References - RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 - Bleichenbacher (1998); Marvin attack - CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy ## Résolution Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur `3.4.x`, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1). **RSA1_5** — déchiffrement PKCS#1 v1.5 avec *implicit rejection* en temps constant (RFC 3447 §7.2.2) : un padding invalide n'est plus distinguable d'un padding valide, neutralisant l'oracle Bleichenbacher. **Validation :** `php -l` OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs `3.4.x`), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue `3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x`.

Published
Jun 18, 2026
Updated
Aug 31, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Packagistweb-token/jwt-library

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Packagistweb-token/jwt-libraryfrom 4.0.0 · before 4.0.74.0.7
Packagistweb-token/jwt-libraryfrom 4.1.0 · before 4.1.74.1.7
Packagistweb-token/jwt-librarybefore 3.4.103.4.10

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-jc38-x7x8-2xc8PHP JWT Framework: JWSVerifier uses algorithm from unprotected header, enabling algorithm confusion attacks
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-3prj-6hqw-cm82PHP JWT Library: PBES2-HS*+A*KW unwrap accepts an unbounded p2c iteration count, enabling CPU-amplification denial of service
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Packagist:web-token/jwt-library3.4.10Package registry (OSV)
Packagist:web-token/jwt-library4.0.7Package registry (OSV)
Packagist:web-token/jwt-library4.1.7Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

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