GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f: ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: zeptoclaw (crates.io) 0.7.6.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to zeptoclaw (crates.io) 0.7.6 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary The email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input. ### Details Relevant code paths: - `src/channels/email_channel.rs:311` extracts sender identity from parsed message headers: - `let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...` - `src/channels/email_channel.rs:328` authorizes using that `from` value: - `if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }` - `src/channels/email_channel.rs:87` onward (`is_sender_allowed`) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value. - There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions. Result: - Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced. ### PoC 1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist: - `channels.email.enabled = true` - `channels.email.allowed_senders = ["ceo@example.com"]` - `channels.email.deny_by_default = true` 2. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly). 3. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity: ```bash python - <<'PY' import smtplib from email.message import EmailMessage msg = EmailMessage() msg["From"] = "ceo@example.com" # forged trusted sender msg["To"] = "bot-inbox@example.net" msg["Subject"] = "forged control message" msg.set_content("FORGED EMAIL CONTENT") # Example test SMTP endpoint with smtplib.SMTP("127.0.0.1", 25) as s: s.send_message(msg) PY ``` 4. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing. 5. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender `ceo@example.com` and published as inbound channel input. ### Impact - Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization. - Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed. - Security effect: - Spoofed `From` headers may bypass logical sender allowlist. - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities. - Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer. ### Patch Recommendation Add a sender-authentication gate in `src/channels/email_channel.rs` immediately after parsing `from` (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:311`) and before allowlist enforcement (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:328`). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, `DMARC=pass`, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before `is_sender_allowed` is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in `EmailConfig` (for example, `sender_verification_mode`), but recommend hardened settings in production: `dmarc_aligned`, exact-address allowlists, and `deny_by_default=true`.
- Published
- Mar 12, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 14, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-306
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | zeptoclaw | pkg:cargo/zeptoclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | zeptoclaw | before 0.7.6 | 0.7.6 |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8zeptoclaw has Shell allowlist-blocklist bypass via command/argument injection and file name wildcards40Plan
- GHSA-hhjv-jq77-cmvxzeptoclaw has Android device shell blocklist bypass via argument permutation30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:zeptoclaw | 0.7.6 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-306 · Missing Authentication for Critical FunctionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
osv
Root cause
A function added for development or support ships to production without authentication. It often relies on the assumption that it is “only reachable from the internal network.”
The bug in code
The whole CWE-306 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
// Added for the support team
app.post("/maintenance/reset", resetDevice);Fixed
if (config.maintenanceEnabled) {
app.post(
"/maintenance/reset",
requireSession, requireRole("admin"), resetDevice
);
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.