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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-4899-mpch-38p3: netty-incubator-codec-ohttp BinaryHttpParser: Unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion DoS via infinite loop in field-section decoding

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (Maven) 0.0.23.Final.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (Maven) 0.0.23.Final or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

# BinaryHttpParser: Unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion DoS via infinite loop in field-section decoding - **ID:** BHTTP-LOOP-001 - **Severity:** High - **CVSS v3.1:** 7.5 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` - **CWE:** CWE-835 (Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition) — secondary CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) - **Affected component:** `codec-bhttp` → `io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser#readFieldSection`, file `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:619-626` - **Affected version:** netty-incubator-codec-ohttp HEAD `d3f2b49` (release `0.0.22.Final` + 3 commits). The loop has existed since the parser was introduced and is present in the latest code; all published advisory fixes are already applied. - **Reachable from:** `io.netty.incubator.codec.ohttp.OHttpRequestResponseContext$ContentDecoder#decodeChunk` (`codec-ohttp/.../OHttpRequestResponseContext.java:214`), i.e. the auto-wired OHTTP server **and** client codecs. - **Confidence:** High (empirically reproduced hang + thread dump against the unmodified parser). ## Summary `BinaryHttpParser` decodes Binary HTTP (RFC 9292) messages. An OHTTP gateway/client built on this library feeds the **decrypted** OHTTP body straight into `BinaryHttpParser.parse(...)`. The field-section decoding loop terminates only on the exact condition `fieldSectionLength != 0` and relies on a Java `assert` to guarantee forward progress. Because (a) the loop counter can be driven negative and (b) `readFieldLine(...)` legitimately consumes **zero** bytes and returns `null` on a truncated/over-long field line, the loop can spin forever. Assertions are disabled in any normal production JVM, so the two `assert` statements meant to catch this provide no protection. A single ~17-byte Binary HTTP message — encapsulated by an unauthenticated attacker inside a normal OHTTP request, using the gateway's **public** key configuration — pins one Netty event-loop thread at 100% CPU permanently. A handful of such requests exhausts the entire event-loop group and takes the OHTTP gateway (or client) fully offline. ## Root cause `BinaryHttpParser.java:619-626`: ```java HeaderType lastType = HeaderType.PSEUDO_HEADER; while (fieldSectionLength != 0) { // 619 — "!= 0", not "> 0" int readableBytes = in.readableBytes(); lastType = readFieldLine(in, headers, lastType, trailers); assert lastType != null; // 622 — no-op without -ea int read = readableBytes - in.readableBytes(); assert read > 0; // 624 — no-op without -ea fieldSectionLength -= read; // 625 } ``` Two cooperating defects: 1. **Counter can never hit zero.** `fieldSectionLength` is the *declared* field-section byte length read from the wire (line 592). The loop subtracts the bytes each `readFieldLine` actually consumes. If a field line consumes more bytes than the (attacker-understated) declared length, `fieldSectionLength` goes negative and `!= 0` stays true forever. 2. **Zero-progress iterations.** `readFieldLine` (lines 654-707) returns `null` **without consuming any bytes** when the remaining buffer cannot hold a complete field line — at lines 656, 664, 670, and 681 (the `in.skipBytes(sumBytes)` that advances the reader is only reached on the success path, line 705). When it returns `null`, `read == 0`, `fieldSectionLength` is unchanged, and the loop re-enters with identical state — a tight busy spin. The only constructs that would have stopped either case are the `assert` statements on lines 622 and 624, which the JVM strips unless started with `-ea`. Production deployments do not run with assertions enabled. ## Reachability (hop-by-hop, every guard resolved) Attacker model: OHTTP gateways publish their HPKE key configuration so that *any* client can encrypt requests to them. The attacker therefore encrypts a malicious BHTTP body under the gateway's public key — a perfectly valid OHTTP request. HPKE decapsulation succeeds; the plaintext is attacker-chosen. 1. `OHttpServerCodec.decode` → `OHttpRequestResponseContext.parse` → chunk decode → `ContentDecoder.decodeChunk`. 2. `OHttpRequestResponseContext.java:211` decrypts the chunk into `decryptedChunk`; line 212 cumulates it; **line 214** calls `binaryHttpParser.parse(binaryHttpCumulation, completeBodyReceived)` — attacker-controlled plaintext, no application code in between. 3. `parse` → `READ_KNOWN_LENGTH_REQUEST_HEAD` → `readRequestHead` (line 190). 4. `readRequestHead` reads the control data, then at lines 445-451 slices **all** remaining readable bytes as the field section and calls `readFieldSection(..., knownLength=true, maxFieldSectionSize)`. 5. Inside `readFieldSection`: - **Guard `checkFieldSectionTooLarge(fieldSectionLength, max)` (line 607):** bounds only the *declared* length, which the PoC sets to `1`. **Passes — not a barrier.** - **Guard `in.readableBytes() < sumBytes` (line 609):** `sumBytes` is built from the *declared* length, also tiny. **Passes — not a barrier.** - **Guards `assert` (lines 622, 624):** no-ops in production. **Defeated by default.** - Loop entered → spins forever (defects 1 + 2). No reachable guard bounds the *actual* consumption or forces progress. `maxFieldSectionSize` is irrelevant because the declared length is small and the loop is CPU-bound on a fixed, small buffer (no allocation, no memory growth to trip any size cap). ## Proof of concept (executed locally, benign liveness oracle) The real `codec-bhttp` sources were compiled unmodified against netty `4.1.135.Final` (the version pinned in `pom.xml`). The harness builds a valid known-length BHTTP request whose declared field-section length (`0x01`) is understated relative to the actual field line, then calls `parse(in, true)` on a worker thread with a 6-second watchdog. No payload, no side effects — purely a timing/CPU oracle. Malicious message (17 bytes): ``` 00 01 67 01 68 01 61 01 70 01 01 61 01 62 01 63 01 │ └method g └scheme h └auth a └path p │ └hdr a:b──┘ └ partial line └ framing 0 (known-length request) └ declared field-section length = 1 ``` Observed (production default, assertions OFF): ``` [*] malicious BHTTP bytes (17): 0001670168016101700101610162016301 [!!] HANG CONFIRMED: parse() still running after 6000 ms [!!] worker thread CPU time: 6029 ms (≈100% of one core => busy spin) [!!] worker stack (top frames): at io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection(BinaryHttpParser.java:626) at io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser.readRequestHead(BinaryHttpParser.java:451) at io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser.parse(BinaryHttpParser.java:190) ``` CPU time ≈ wall time ⇒ a busy spin (RUNNABLE), not a blocked wait. Controls: - **Same input with `-ea`:** `parse()` throws `AssertionError` at `readFieldSection:624` immediately — proving the assertion is the only would-be guard and is absent in production. - **Well-formed request (declared length matches):** `parse()` returns `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` promptly — proving the harness does not hang on valid input. PoC sources: `findings/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/raw/Poc.java` (hang + control 1) and `raw/Poc2.java` (negative control). ## Impact Unauthenticated, pre-business-logic remote denial of service. Each malicious request permanently consumes one Netty event-loop thread at 100% CPU. Netty event-loop groups have a small fixed thread count (default `2 × cores`); a handful of requests exhausts every I/O thread, after which the gateway/client accepts no further connections and serves no traffic — a complete, persistent DoS that survives until process restart. Availability impact High; no confidentiality/integrity impact. ## Adversarial re-reading (attempts to refute) - *"`maxFieldSectionSize` caps it."* No — the declared length in the PoC is `1`; the cap (line 607) checks the declared value only. The spin happens on a 17-byte buffer with no allocation. Refutation fails. - *"An upstream HTTP size limit / `HttpObjectAggregator` blocks it."* No — the bug is CPU-bound, not memory-bound. The whole malicious message is tiny and well within any size limit. Refutation fails. - *"This is just CVE-2024-40642 (absent input validation)."* No — that advisory was about missing validation of method/scheme/authority/path enabling injection; that fix (the `ALLOWED_TOKEN`/`ALLOWED_SCHEME` validators, lines 76-122/461-466) is present and unrelated. This is a control-flow/termination defect in field-section length accounting. Distinct class, distinct code. - *"The hang might be a harness artifact."* No — the thread dump pinpoints `readFieldSection:626`; CPU≈wall confirms a spin; the `-ea` control throws at the exact assert; the well-formed control returns. The hang is for the claimed reason. - *"`completeBodyReceived` must be true."* Not required — the loop is inside `readFieldSection`, reached via `readRequestHead` once the control data is present, independent of that flag. The flag only affects a branch taken *after* `readRequestHead` returns `null`, which never happens here. No concrete blocker survived. Verdict: **CONFIRMED**. ## Remediation 1. Change the loop exit condition to `while (fieldSectionLength > 0)` so an overshoot (negative counter) terminates. 2. Treat a `null` / zero-progress return from `readFieldLine` while `fieldSectionLength > 0` as a hard framing error — throw `CorruptedFrameException("truncated or over-long field line")` instead of re-looping. 3. Reject any field line whose consumed byte count would drive `fieldSectionLength` below 0 (the declared length must be consumed exactly, per RFC 9292 §3.6). 4. Do not rely on `assert` for wire-format invariants on attacker-controlled input; assertions are disabled in production. Promote lines 622/624 to explicit exceptions. Example: ```java while (fieldSectionLength > 0) { int readableBytes = in.readableBytes(); lastType = readFieldLine(in, headers, lastType, trailers); int read = readableBytes - in.readableBytes(); if (lastType == null || read <= 0) { throw new CorruptedFrameException("truncated or over-long field line"); } if (read > fieldSectionLength) { throw new CorruptedFrameException("field line exceeds declared field-section length"); } fieldSectionLength -= read; } ``` ## Notes - The indeterminate-length field-section path (framing indicators 2/3) shares the same loop and the same `!= 0` / zero-progress structure; the fix above should cover both. A dedicated trace of `getIndeterminateLength` (lines 538-566) under non-default `maxFieldSectionSize` is recorded separately as a lead. - Default `maxFieldSectionSize` for the OHTTP codecs is `8 * 1024` (`OHttpCodecBuilder.DEFAULT_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE`), and is irrelevant to this CPU-bound spin.

Published
Aug 20, 2026
Updated
Aug 20, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Mavenio.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttpbefore 0.0.23.Final0.0.23.Final

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Maven:io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp0.0.23.FinalPackage registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

All records