GHSA-47qg-q58v-7vrp: UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS and UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES not respected by frontend service backend
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: amundsen-frontend (PyPI) 3.1.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to amundsen-frontend (PyPI) 3.1.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Impact Any install that has `UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS` and/or `UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES` set in the front-end, is being impacted. The value of these properties is ignored if set, allowing any user to modify table and column descriptions, even though the properties imply they shouldn't be. ### Patches There is an attached PR that applies this restriction on the back-end. ### Workarounds N/A ### References N/A ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at [amundsen-security@lists.lfaidata.foundation](mailto:amundsen-security@lists.lfaidata.foundation) ### More details Summary: I believe that UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS and UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES are only being applied on the front-end, not on the frontend service back-end, allowing any user to modify table and column descriptions even if this configuration parameter is set. Repro steps: 1. docker-compose -f docker-amundsen.yml up neo4j elasticsearch amundsensearch amundsenmetadata 2. python example/scripts/sample_data_loader.py 3. FRONTEND_SVC_CONFIG_MODULE_CLASS=amundsen_application.config.TestConfig PYTHONPATH=. python3 amundsen_application/wsgi.py 4. Attempt a modification to a table description: curl '<http://localhost:5000/api/metadata/v0/put_table_description>' \\\\ -X 'PUT' \\\\ -H 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8' \\\\ --data-binary '{"description":"2t test table","key":"hive://gold.test_schema/test_table1","source":"user"}' {"msg":"Success"} 5. This correctly succeeds, which can be validated by GETing the info: curl '<http://localhost:5000/api/metadata/v0/get_table_description?key=hive://gold.test_schema/test_table1>' {"description":"1st test table","msg":"Success"} At this point, modify TestConfig inside config.py to add this line: UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS = set(['test_schema']) You can now re-run step 4, and step 5 with different data, and confirm that the modification has persisted. If you build and run the UI, you can see that on the page <http://localhost:5000/table_detail/gold/hive/test_schema/test_table1> http://localhost:5000/table_detail/gold/hive/test_schema/test_table1, the inline editor is correctly disabled. Looking at amundsenfrontendlibrary/amundsen_application/api/metadata/v0.py:268 put_table_description, you can see there's no reference to UNEDITABLE_SCHEMAS or UNEDITABLE_TABLE_DESCRIPTION_MATCH_RULES. The only place I can find these referenced is in amundsenfrontendlibrary/amundsen_application/api/utils/metadata_utils.py:marshall_table_full, which would explain why the UI is correctly respecting this setting. If this is correct, put_column_description would also be similarly affected. I believe the correct fix for all of these methods is to load the table, run it through marshall_dashboard_partial to fully evaluate what's editable or not (to reuse the same code path for FE and back-end), and reject the response if it's not editable. I'll implement a fix along these lines once someone confirms this. History: This functionality was introduced in <https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsenfrontendlibrary/pull/497/files> https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsenfrontendlibrary/pull/497 on July 9, corresponding to the 2.3.0 release of amundsenfrontend. That release was introduced into the main repo dockerfile on October 28 in <https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsen/pull/785> https://github.com/amundsen-io/amundsen/pull/785
- Published
- Dec 2, 2020
- Updated
- Dec 2, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-602
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | amundsen-frontend | pkg:pypi/amundsen-frontend |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | amundsen-frontend | from 2.3.0 · before 3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
| PyPI | amundsen-frontend | from 3.0.0 · before 3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:amundsen-frontend | 3.1.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-602 · Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side SecurityAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Manipulating Hidden FieldsCAPEC-162High
- Create Malicious ClientCAPEC-202Medium
- Removing Important Client FunctionalityCAPEC-207likelihood: Medium · High
- Removing/short-circuiting 'Purse' logic: removing/mutating 'cash' decrementsCAPEC-208Medium
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP CookiesCAPEC-31likelihood: High · High
- Harvesting Information via API Event MonitoringCAPEC-383Low
- Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-MiddleCAPEC-384Low
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.