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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-3w55-933p-8pv5: Strands Agents: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Attack in Default Session File Storage

HighCVSS 7.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 28/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: strands-agents (PyPI) 1.48.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to strands-agents (PyPI) 1.48.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The `FileSessionManager` defaults to storing session data in `/tmp/strands/sessions/` (a world-writable directory) using predictable file paths and a write pattern (`open(path + ".tmp", "w")` → `os.replace()`) that follows symbolic links. A local attacker can exploit this to overwrite arbitrary files or inject malicious session data for persistent prompt injection. ## Vulnerability Details **Component:** `strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py` **Root Cause:** 1. Default storage directory is `tempfile.gettempdir() + "/strands/sessions/"` (line 58) — resolves to `/tmp/strands/sessions/` on Linux/macOS 2. The `_write_file()` method (lines 116-123) writes to a predictable `.tmp` path without symlink protection: ```python tmp = f"{path}.tmp" with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as f: json.dump(data, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) os.replace(tmp, path) ``` 3. `open()` follows symlinks — a pre-placed symlink at the `.tmp` path causes writes to an arbitrary target file 4. No integrity verification (HMAC/signature) on session files — tampered data is loaded as-is ## Attack Vectors ### 1. Arbitrary File Overwrite (Local Privilege Escalation) 1. Attacker pre-creates `/tmp/strands/sessions/session_<id>/` (or monitors for new directories via inotify) 2. Attacker creates a symlink: `session.json.tmp` → `/home/victim/.bashrc` (or any writable file) 3. Victim application writes session data → follows symlink → overwrites target file with JSON content 4. Attacker achieves code execution on next shell login (or targets `.ssh/authorized_keys`, cron files, etc.) ### 2. Persistent Prompt Injection via Session Tampering 1. Attacker writes crafted message files into the session directory 2. Victim application restores the session → loads attacker-controlled conversation history 3. Injected messages instruct the agent to execute attacker commands on every future interaction 4. No integrity check prevents this — the SDK trusts all session files at face value ## Impact - **Arbitrary file overwrite** — local attacker can write attacker-controlled content to any file writable by the victim process - **Local privilege escalation** — via overwriting shell configs, SSH keys, cron jobs, or systemd user services - **Persistent agent compromise** — via session data injection, the agent follows attacker instructions indefinitely ## Reproduction ```python import os, json, tempfile, shutil # Setup: simulate the vulnerable write pattern session_dir = "/tmp/strands/sessions/session_test/" os.makedirs(session_dir, exist_ok=True) # Attacker: create symlink at the .tmp write path target_file = "/tmp/symlink_attack_proof.txt" with open(target_file, "w") as f: f.write("ORIGINAL - should not be overwritten\n") symlink_path = os.path.join(session_dir, "session.json.tmp") if os.path.exists(symlink_path): os.unlink(symlink_path) os.symlink(target_file, symlink_path) # Victim: FileSessionManager._write_file() equivalent with open(symlink_path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as f: json.dump({"session_id": "test", "injected": True}, f, indent=2) # Verify: target file overwritten with open(target_file) as f: print(f"Target file content: {f.read()}") # Output: {"session_id": "test", "injected": true} # Cleanup os.unlink(symlink_path) os.unlink(target_file) shutil.rmtree(session_dir) ``` ## Suggested Fix 1. **Use a user-private default directory** — `~/.strands/sessions/` or `$XDG_DATA_HOME/strands/sessions/` instead of `/tmp/` 2. **Use `os.open()` with `O_NOFOLLOW | O_CREAT | O_WRONLY`** — refuses to follow symlinks 3. **Use `tempfile.mkstemp()`** for atomic writes instead of predictable `.tmp` suffix 4. **Verify directory ownership** matches the current user before writing 5. **Add optional integrity verification** (HMAC) on session files to detect tampering

Published
Oct 27, 2026
Updated
Oct 27, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

28

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
28 / 40 · 7.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIstrands-agentsbefore 1.48.01.48.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:strands-agents1.48.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. TodayNov 16, 2026+20 d

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

osv

References

All records