GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5: Gittensory: Missing contributor-scoped access control on profile endpoint and MCP tool leaks miner financial data
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary `GET /v1/contributors/:login/profile` and the `gittensory_get_contributor_profile` MCP tool skip the contributor-scoped access check that every sibling endpoint enforces. Any authenticated session/API/MCP token holder can read any contributor's profile; for confirmed Gittensor miners that exposes `alphaPerDay`, `taoPerDay`, `usdPerDay` (and the `hotkey` on the REST path). Authenticated cross-contributor disclosure, CWE-284 / IDOR. ### Details In `src/api/routes.ts` the profile handler returns `buildContributorProfile(...)` with no `requireContributorAccess` call. Every sibling (`/decision-pack`, `/repos/:owner/:repo/decision`, etc.) gates and 403s on a cross-contributor request — the profile route is the only omission. `buildContributorProfile` (`src/signals/engine.ts`) embeds `hotkey` and the three `*PerDay` fields for any confirmed miner. The MCP tool `getContributorProfile` (`src/mcp/server.ts`) also omits `requireContributorAccess`. Its `redactSensitiveForMcp` filter only strips keys matching `hotkey|coldkey|wallet|private_key|privateKey|mnemonic`, so the hotkey is dropped but `alphaPerDay`/`taoPerDay`/`usdPerDay` pass through. The codebase treats these as secret everywhere else — `decision-pack.ts` destructures the hotkey out before serving, and three sanitizers scrub hotkey/wallet from AI/comment output — which is why this is an oversight, not by-design. Exposure: REST → hotkey + 3 financial fields; MCP → 3 financial fields (hotkey redacted). ### PoC 1. Get any valid session/API/MCP token. 2. Pick a target `login` that is a confirmed miner. 3. `GET /v1/contributors/{target}/profile` → 200 with `gittensor.hotkey`, `alphaPerDay`, `taoPerDay`, `usdPerDay`. 4. `GET /v1/contributors/{target}/decision-pack` (same token) → 403, proving the missing gate. 5. MCP `gittensory_get_contributor_profile` with `{target}` → result includes the three `*PerDay` fields. ### Impact Any token holder can enumerate other miners' daily TAO/alpha/USD revenue (plus hotkey via REST) without authorization. All miners with snapshot data are affected.
- Published
- Jul 9, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 9, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-284
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @jsonbored/gittensory-mcp | pkg:npm/%40jsonbored/gittensory-mcp |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @jsonbored/gittensory-mcp | up to and including 0.1.0 | — |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-284 · Improper Access ControlCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Embedding Scripts within ScriptsCAPEC-19likelihood: High · High
- Malicious Logic InsertionCAPEC-441likelihood: Medium · High
- Modification of Windows Service ConfigurationCAPEC-478likelihood: Low · High
- Malicious Root CertificateCAPEC-479likelihood: Low · Low
- Intent SpoofCAPEC-502
- WebView ExposureCAPEC-503
- Data Injected During ConfigurationCAPEC-536likelihood: Low · High
- Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant EnvironmentCAPEC-546likelihood: Low · Medium
ATT&CK techniques
- RootkitT1014
- Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded PayloadsT1027.009
- Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsT1037
- Taint shared contentT1080
- Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLLT1505.005
- Pre-OS Boot:BootkitT1542.003
- Create or Modify System ProcessT1543
- Create or Modify System Process: Launch AgentT1543.001
- Create or Modify System Process:Windows ServiceT1543.003
- Create or Modify System Process: Launch DaemonT1543.004
- Event Triggered Execution:Change Default File AssociationT1546.001
- Event Triggered Execution:.bash_profile and .bashrcT1546.004
- Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility FeaturesT1546.008
- Event Triggered Execution: Installer PackagesT1546.016
- Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionT1547
- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Kernel Modules and ExtensionsT1547.006
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.