GHSA-32wx-4gxx-h48f: Users can edit the tags of any discussion
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: flarum/tags (Packagist) 0.1.0-beta.13.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to flarum/tags (Packagist) 0.1.0-beta.13.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
This advisory concerns a vulnerability which was patched and publicly released on October 5, 2020. ### Impact This vulnerability allowed any registered user to edit the tags of any discussion for which they have READ access using the REST API. Users were able to remove any existing tag, and add any tag in which they are allowed to create discussions. The chosen tags still had to match the configured Tags minimums and maximums. By moving the discussion to new tags, users were able to go around permissions applied to restricted tags. Depending on the setup, this can include publicly exposing content that was only visible to certain groups, or gain the ability to interact with content where such interaction was limited. The full impact varies depending on the configuration of permissions and restricted tags, and which community extensions are being used. All tag-scoped permissions offered by extensions are impacted by this ability to go around them. Forums that don't use restricted tags and don't use any extension that relies on tags for access control should not see any security impact. An update is still required to stop users from being able to change any discussion's tags. Forums that don't use the Tags extension are unaffected. ### Patches The fix will be available in version v0.1.0-beta.14 with Flarum beta 14. The fix has already been back-ported to Flarum beta 13 as version v0.1.0-beta.13.2 of the Tags extension. ### Workarounds Version v0.1.0-beta.13.2 of the Tags extension allows existing Flarum beta 13 forums to fix the issue without the need to update to beta 14. Forums that have not yet updated to Flarum beta 13 are encouraged to update as soon as possible. ### References - [Release announcement](https://discuss.flarum.org/d/25059-security-update-to-flarum-tags-010-beta132) - [GitHub issue](https://github.com/flarum/core/issues/2355) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please start a new discussion on our [support forum](https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support). If you discover a security vulnerability within Flarum, please send an e-mail to [security@flarum.org](mailto:security@flarum.org). All security vulnerabilities will be promptly addressed. More details can be found in our [security policy](https://github.com/flarum/core/security/policy).
- Published
- Jan 29, 2021
- Updated
- Dec 2, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | flarum/tags | pkg:composer/flarum/tags |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | flarum/tags | before 0.1.0-beta.13.2 | 0.1.0-beta.13.2 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:flarum/tags | 0.1.0-beta.13.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyRoot cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.