GHSA-3278-c88v-xrh4: Kong Ingress Controller for Kubernetes (KIC): Secret-backed plugin configurations leak through non-sensitive diagnostics endpoint
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v3 (Go) 3.5.7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v3 (Go) 3.5.7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary A vulnerability in the Kong Ingress Controller (KIC) allows for the unauthorized exposure of sensitive plugin credentials through the diagnostics interface. Even when configured to redact sensitive information (using `--dump-sensitive-config=false`), KIC fails to sanitize the `Plugins` field in diagnostic configuration dumps. This causes secrets referenced via `configFrom.secretKeyRef` to be resolved and displayed in plaintext. Because the diagnostics HTTP endpoints require no authentication, any process within the cluster network capable of reaching the KIC pod can exfiltrate sensitive data, including API keys, bearer tokens, and database passwords. ## Am I affected? You are affected if all of the following hold: 1. You are using Kong Ingress Controller with **diagnostics enabled** (`--dump-config=true`). 2. You have **not explicitly enabled** sensitive dumping (`--dump-sensitive-config=false`), creating an expectation of redaction. 3. You use `KongPlugin` or `KongClusterPlugin` resources that reference Kubernetes Secrets via **`configFrom.secretKeyRef`**. 4. The KIC diagnostics port (default `10256`) is reachable by other workloads or users within your cluster. You are not affected if: - The `--dump-config` flag is set to `false` (default behavior). - You do not use secret-backed configurations in your Kong plugins. - Access to the KIC pod's diagnostic port is strictly blocked by NetworkPolicies. ## Mitigation 1. **Disable Diagnostics**: If not actively debugging, disable the diagnostic server by setting `--dump-config=false`. 2. **Network Isolation**: Implement a `NetworkPolicy` to restrict access to the KIC diagnostics port (default `10256`), ensuring only authorized administrative pods or IPs can reach it. 3. **Restrict Port-Forwarding**: Limit `kubectl port-forward` RBAC permissions to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the pod's local ports. ## Fix The fix introduces proper sanitization for the `Plugins` field within the configuration state. When sensitive dumping is disabled, the controller now replaces all plugin configuration values with a redaction placeholder before they are served via the diagnostics endpoints. Additionally, it is recommended to ensure your deployment environment follows the principle of least privilege regarding network access to controller components. Users should upgrade to the latest patched version of Kong Ingress Controller to ensure diagnostic dumps are correctly redacted.
- Published
- May 19, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 8, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-201
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v3 | pkg:golang/github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v3 |
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v2 | pkg:golang/github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v2 |
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller | pkg:golang/github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller | up to and including 1.3.4 | — |
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v2 | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v2 | up to and including 2.12.8 | — |
| Go | github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v3 | before 3.5.7 | 3.5.7 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-m23h-6mwm-39m8Kong Ingress Controller for Kubernetes (KIC): Cross-namespace TLS Secret Exfiltration in Gateways with GatewayClass missing `konghq.com/gatewayclass-unmanaged: 'true'` annotation0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/kong/kubernetes-ingress-controller/v3 | 3.5.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-201 · Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent DataCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Choosing Message IdentifierCAPEC-12likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL/TLSCAPEC-217likelihood: Low
- WiFi MAC Address TrackingCAPEC-612Low
- WiFi SSID TrackingCAPEC-613Low
- Cellular Broadcast Message RequestCAPEC-618Low
- Signal Strength TrackingCAPEC-619Low
- Analysis of Packet Timing and SizesCAPEC-621Low
- Electromagnetic Side-Channel AttackCAPEC-622Low
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.