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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-2p3c-p3qw-69r4: The graphql-upload library included in Apollo Server 2 is vulnerable to CSRF mutations

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Fixed version: apollo-server (npm) 2.25.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to apollo-server (npm) 2.25.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Impact The [graphql-upload](https://www.npmjs.com/package/graphql-upload) npm package can execute GraphQL operations contained in `content-type: multipart/form-data` POST requests. Because they are POST requests, they can contain GraphQL mutations. Because they use `content-type: multipart/form-data`, they can be "simple requests" which are not preflighted by browsers. If your GraphQL server uses `graphql-upload` and uses `SameSite=None` cookies for authentication, then JS on any origin can cause browsers to send cookie-authenticated mutations to your GraphQL server, which will be executed without checking your CORS policy first. (The attack won't be able to see the response to the mutation if your CORS policy is set up properly, but the side effects of the mutation will still happen.) Additionally, if your GraphQL server uses `graphql-upload` and relies on network properties for security (whether by explicitly looking at the client's IP address or by only being available on a private network), then JS on any origin can cause browsers (which may be on a private network or have an allowed IP address) to send mutations to your GraphQL server, which will be executed without checking your CORS policy first. (This attack does not require your server to use cookies. It is in some cases prevented by some browsers such as Chrome.) Apollo Server 2 bundled `graphql-upload` and enabled it by default, so by default, Apollo Server 2 servers are vulnerable to these CSRF attacks. (Apollo Server 1 did not bundle `graphql-upload`. Apollo Server 3 no longer bundles `graphql-upload`, although AS3's docs do document how to manually integrate with `graphql-upload`.) It is enabled even if your server makes no use of the upload functionality. If you are running Apollo Server 2 (older than v2.25.4) and do not specify `uploads: false` to `new ApolloServer`, then you are vulnerable to this CSRF mutation attack. We recently introduced an opt-in CSRF prevention feature in Apollo Server 3.7. This feature successfully protects against CSRF even if you have manually integrated your AS3.7 server with `graphql-upload`. However, this feature is not available for Apollo Server 2. ### Patches If you are using Apollo Server 2 and do *not* actually use uploads in your schema (ie, the `Upload` scalar is not used as the argument to any field or in any input object definition, and you do not specify `uploads` to `new ApolloServer`), then upgrading to Apollo Server 2.25.4 will automatically disable `graphql-upload` in your server. This will fix the CSRF mutation vulnerability. Upgrading to v2.25.4 does still leave your server vulnerable to non-mutation CSRF attacks such as timing attacks against query operations. To protect yourself against these potentially lower impact CSRF attack, we encourage upgrading to Apollo Server v3.7 and enabling CSRF prevention. See [the Apollo Server 3 migration guide](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/migration/) and the [CSRF prevention docs](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/security/cors/#preventing-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf) for details. If you are actively using the uploads feature with Apollo Server 2, then upgrading to v2.25.4 will not disable the feature and you will still be vulnerable. You should instead upgrade to v3.7 and enable the CSRF prevention feature. If you are manually integrating the `graphql-upload` package with any version of Apollo Server (or any Node GraphQL server) and need to continue using the feature, then you must enable some sort of CSRF prevention feature to fix this vulnerability. We recommend the CSRF prevention feature in Apollo Server 3.7. ### Workarounds Instead of upgrading your Apollo Server 2 server, you can specify `uploads: false` to `new ApolloServer` to disable the `graphql-upload` integration and protect against CSRF mutations. (Only do this if you do not actually use the uploads feature in your server!) This will still leave your server vulnerable to non-mutation CSRF attacks such as timing attacks against query operations; you need to upgrade to v3.7 and enable CSRF prevention to protect against these attacks. ### Related work - [PR adding a Security section to the GraphQL multipart request spec](https://github.com/jaydenseric/graphql-multipart-request-spec/pull/64)

Published
Oct 12, 2022
Updated
Jul 31, 2023
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
npmapollo-server

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmapollo-serverfrom 2.0.0 · before 2.25.42.25.4

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-qm7x-rc44-rrqwCross-site Scripting Vulnerability in GraphQL Playground (distributed by Apollo Server)
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-w42g-7vfc-xf37Introspection in schema validation in Apollo Server
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:apollo-server2.25.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.

Root cause

State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);

Fixed

ts
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

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