GHSA-2m67-wjpj-xhg9: Jackson Core: Document length constraint bypass in blocking, async, and DataInput parsers
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: tools.jackson.core:jackson-core (Maven) 3.1.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to tools.jackson.core:jackson-core (Maven) 3.1.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Jackson Core 3.x does not consistently enforce `StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength`. Oversized JSON documents can be accepted without a `StreamConstraintsException` in multiple parser entry points, which allows configured size limits to be bypassed and weakens denial-of-service protections. ## Details Three code paths where `maxDocumentLength` is not fully enforced: ### 1. Blocking parsers skip validation of the final in-memory buffer Blocking parsers validate only previously processed buffers, not the final in-memory buffer: - `ReaderBasedJsonParser.java:255` - `UTF8StreamJsonParser.java:208` Relevant code: ```java _currInputProcessed += bufSize; _streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed); ``` This means the check occurs only when a completed buffer is rolled over. If an oversized document is fully contained in the final buffer, parsing can complete without any document-length exception. ### 2. Async parsers skip validation of the final chunk on end-of-input Async parsers validate previously processed chunks, but do not validate the final chunk on end-of-input: - `NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser.java:49` - `NonBlockingByteBufferJsonParser.java:57` - `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java:75` Relevant code: ```java _currInputProcessed += _origBufferLen; _streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed); public void endOfInput() { _endOfInput = true; } ``` `endOfInput()` marks EOF but does not perform a final `validateDocumentLength(...)` call, so an oversized last chunk is accepted. ### 3. DataInput parser path does not enforce `maxDocumentLength` at all - `JsonFactory.java:457` Relevant construction path: ```java int firstByte = ByteSourceJsonBootstrapper.skipUTF8BOM(input); return new UTF8DataInputJsonParser(readCtxt, ioCtxt, readCtxt.getStreamReadFeatures(_streamReadFeatures), readCtxt.getFormatReadFeatures(_formatReadFeatures), input, can, firstByte); ``` `UTF8DataInputJsonParser` does not call `StreamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(...)`, so `maxDocumentLength` is effectively disabled for `createParser(..., DataInput)` users. > **Note:** This issue appears distinct from the recently published nesting-depth and number-length constraint advisories because it affects document-length enforcement. ## PoC ### Async path reproducer ```java import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; import tools.jackson.core.JsonParser; import tools.jackson.core.ObjectReadContext; import tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints; import tools.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder; import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory; public class Poc { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder() .streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder() .maxDocumentLength(10L) .build()) .build(); byte[] doc = "{\"a\":1,\"b\":2}".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); try (JsonParser p = factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty())) { ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) p.nonBlockingInputFeeder(); feeder.feedInput(doc, 0, doc.length); feeder.endOfInput(); while (p.nextToken() != null) { } } System.out.println("Parsed successfully"); } } ``` - **Expected result:** Parsing should fail because the configured document-length limit is 10, while the input is longer than 10 bytes. - **Actual result:** The document is accepted and parsing completes. ### Blocking path reproducer ```java import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; import tools.jackson.core.JsonParser; import tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints; import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory; public class Poc2 { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder() .streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder() .maxDocumentLength(10L) .build()) .build(); byte[] doc = "{\"a\":1,\"b\":2}".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8); try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(new ByteArrayInputStream(doc))) { while (p.nextToken() != null) { } } System.out.println("Parsed successfully"); } } ``` ## Impact Applications that rely on `maxDocumentLength` as a safety control for untrusted JSON can accept oversized inputs without error. In network-facing services this weakens an explicit denial-of-service protection and can increase CPU and memory consumption by allowing larger-than-configured request bodies to be processed.
- Published
- Apr 4, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-770
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Maven | tools.jackson.core:jackson-core | pkg:maven/tools.jackson.core/jackson-core |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | tools.jackson.core:jackson-core | from 3.0.0 · before 3.1.1 | 3.1.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:tools.jackson.core:jackson-core | 3.1.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or ThrottlingCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- FloodingCAPEC-125likelihood: High · Medium
- Excessive AllocationCAPEC-130likelihood: Medium · Medium
- XML Ping of the DeathCAPEC-147likelihood: Low · Medium
- Exponential Data ExpansionCAPEC-197likelihood: High · Medium
- Serialized Data Parameter BlowupCAPEC-229likelihood: High · High
- Serialized Data with Nested PayloadsCAPEC-230likelihood: Medium · High
- Oversized Serialized Data PayloadsCAPEC-231likelihood: Medium · High
- HTTP DoSCAPEC-469Low
ATT&CK techniques
- Network Denial of Service:Direct Network FloodT1498.001
- Network Denial of Service:Reflection AmplificationT1498.002
- Endpoint Denial of ServiceT1499
- Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion FloodT1499.001
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion FloodT1499.002
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Application Exhaustion FloodT1499.003
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.