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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r: spomky-labs/otphp: Mass-assignment in Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri lets a hostile provisioning URI corrupt OTP state or leak an uncaught TypeError

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: spomky-labs/otphp (Packagist) 11.4.3.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to spomky-labs/otphp (Packagist) 11.4.3 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary `OTPHP\Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri()` parses an attacker-supplied `otpauth://` URI and forwards **every** query key to `OTP::setParameter($key, $value)`. `setParameter()` resolves the name with `property_exists($this, $parameter)` and performs a dynamic write `$this->{$parameter} = $value` (`src/OTP.php:196-197`). Because the query keys are entirely controlled by whoever produced the URI, a URI can target the internal properties of the OTP object that are not meant to be set from a URI: `parameters`, `issuer`, `label`, `issuer_included_as_parameter`, and (on TOTP) the readonly `clock`. This is an instance of object property mass-assignment (CWE-915). ## Impact The `Factory` is documented as the entry point for third-party provisioning URIs (e.g. QR codes from Microsoft 365 / Google Authenticator). An application that loads such a URI is exposed to: - **State corruption.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&parameters[foo]=bar` overwrites the whole internal `$parameters` array that `createFromSecret()` primed (`period`, `algorithm`, `digits`, `epoch`). The resulting object is silently unusable: `getProvisioningUri()`, `getDigits()`, `at()`, `verify()` then throw `ParameterNotFoundException`. - **Uncaught TypeError escaping the documented exception type.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool` assigns a string to a typed `bool` property and raises a `TypeError`. The `try/catch` in `loadFromProvisioningUri()` only wraps `Url::fromString()`; `createOTP()` and `populateOTP()` run outside it, so the `TypeError` (and `Error` on the readonly `clock`) escapes past the documented `InvalidProvisioningUriException`, breaking callers that catch only the documented type. - **Label/issuer validation bypass.** `parameters[label]=hijacked` stores a label into the parameters array without running the `label` validation callback (keyed on `label`, not `parameters`). `getLabel()` and `getParameter('label')` then disagree — a confused-deputy risk. ## Affected component - `src/OTP.php:187-201` — `setParameter()` dynamic property write - `src/Factory.php:50-55` — `populateParameters()` forwarding all query keys ## Proof of concept ```php use OTPHP\Factory; // State corruption $otp = Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri( 'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&parameters[foo]=bar', $clock ); $otp->getProvisioningUri(); // ParameterNotFoundException: Parameter "period" does not exist // Uncaught TypeError Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri( 'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool', $clock ); // TypeError escapes InvalidProvisioningUriException ``` ## Remediation Restrict the keys accepted from a provisioning URI to a known allow-list of public OTP parameters, and never let a URI key resolve to an internal object property via `property_exists`. Route all URI-sourced values through the validated parameter map only.

Published
Jun 18, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
Packagistspomky-labs/otphp

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Packagistspomky-labs/otphpbefore 11.4.311.4.3

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-g7m4-839x-ch6vspomky-labs/otphp: Unbounded digits parameter in a provisioning URI triggers an uncaught DivisionByZeroError in OTP generation
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Packagist:spomky-labs/otphp11.4.3Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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Attack context

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References

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