GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r: spomky-labs/otphp: Mass-assignment in Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri lets a hostile provisioning URI corrupt OTP state or leak an uncaught TypeError
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: spomky-labs/otphp (Packagist) 11.4.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to spomky-labs/otphp (Packagist) 11.4.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary `OTPHP\Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri()` parses an attacker-supplied `otpauth://` URI and forwards **every** query key to `OTP::setParameter($key, $value)`. `setParameter()` resolves the name with `property_exists($this, $parameter)` and performs a dynamic write `$this->{$parameter} = $value` (`src/OTP.php:196-197`). Because the query keys are entirely controlled by whoever produced the URI, a URI can target the internal properties of the OTP object that are not meant to be set from a URI: `parameters`, `issuer`, `label`, `issuer_included_as_parameter`, and (on TOTP) the readonly `clock`. This is an instance of object property mass-assignment (CWE-915). ## Impact The `Factory` is documented as the entry point for third-party provisioning URIs (e.g. QR codes from Microsoft 365 / Google Authenticator). An application that loads such a URI is exposed to: - **State corruption.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP¶meters[foo]=bar` overwrites the whole internal `$parameters` array that `createFromSecret()` primed (`period`, `algorithm`, `digits`, `epoch`). The resulting object is silently unusable: `getProvisioningUri()`, `getDigits()`, `at()`, `verify()` then throw `ParameterNotFoundException`. - **Uncaught TypeError escaping the documented exception type.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool` assigns a string to a typed `bool` property and raises a `TypeError`. The `try/catch` in `loadFromProvisioningUri()` only wraps `Url::fromString()`; `createOTP()` and `populateOTP()` run outside it, so the `TypeError` (and `Error` on the readonly `clock`) escapes past the documented `InvalidProvisioningUriException`, breaking callers that catch only the documented type. - **Label/issuer validation bypass.** `parameters[label]=hijacked` stores a label into the parameters array without running the `label` validation callback (keyed on `label`, not `parameters`). `getLabel()` and `getParameter('label')` then disagree — a confused-deputy risk. ## Affected component - `src/OTP.php:187-201` — `setParameter()` dynamic property write - `src/Factory.php:50-55` — `populateParameters()` forwarding all query keys ## Proof of concept ```php use OTPHP\Factory; // State corruption $otp = Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri( 'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP¶meters[foo]=bar', $clock ); $otp->getProvisioningUri(); // ParameterNotFoundException: Parameter "period" does not exist // Uncaught TypeError Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri( 'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool', $clock ); // TypeError escapes InvalidProvisioningUriException ``` ## Remediation Restrict the keys accepted from a provisioning URI to a known allow-list of public OTP parameters, and never let a URI key resolve to an internal object property via `property_exists`. Route all URI-sourced values through the validated parameter map only.
- Published
- Jun 18, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-915
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist | spomky-labs/otphp | pkg:composer/spomky-labs/otphp |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | spomky-labs/otphp | before 11.4.3 | 11.4.3 |
Same product
Packagist: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-g7m4-839x-ch6vspomky-labs/otphp: Unbounded digits parameter in a provisioning URI triggers an uncaught DivisionByZeroError in OTP generation0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Packagist:spomky-labs/otphp | 11.4.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-915 · Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object AttributesCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.