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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-29h2-jr22-frmh: OpenZeppelin Confidential Contracts `VestingWalletConfidential`: a malicious ERC-7984 token is able to extract private data from the vesting wallet

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @openzeppelin/confidential-contracts (npm) 0.4.2, 0.5.2, 0.3.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @openzeppelin/confidential-contracts (npm) 0.4.2, 0.5.2, 0.3.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Impact Two locations consume an encrypted handle returned by an untrusted external party and use it without verifying that the party is ACL-authorized on it. #### `VestingWalletConfidential` Malicious users can call `release` with a malicious token. This token could return an alternative handle on `confidentialBalanceOf`, which represents the balance of the vesting wallet on an alternative ERC-7984 token (or any other handle that the vesting wallet has access to). The vesting wallet does not check that the token has ACL access and grants access to a new handle derived from the returned handle. Effectively, this bug allows a malicious user to gain information about any private `euint64` handle that the vesting wallet has access to via a malicious ERC-7984 token. There is no loss of funds. #### ERC7984 On a transfer with callback, `ERC7984` uses the `ebool` returned by the recipient's `IERC7984Receiver.onConfidentialTransferReceived` to drive the refund logic, without checking that the recipient has ACL access to it. A malicious recipient can return any `ebool` the token has access to and recover its plaintext from the refund result, which the token grants the caller access to. The leak is limited to `ebool` handles (the value is only used as an `FHE.select` condition), and there is no loss of funds. ### Patches Both issues were fixed in the same patch releases: v0.5.2, v0.4.2, v0.3.2 - `VestingWalletConfidential`: 93e75ceed2b9648f53f9d133f431064353456805 (#423). - `ERC7984` transfer callback: fe0863af2c9dce7614acce98720a913bf6a767a5 (#428), with follow-up ee47edf189ab681cebdad18bfb53dee541987be2 (#431) permitting an uninitialized returned handle.

Published
Sep 25, 2026
Updated
Sep 25, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
npm@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@openzeppelin/confidential-contractsfrom 0.4.0-rc.0 · before 0.4.20.4.2
npm@openzeppelin/confidential-contractsfrom 0.5.0-rc.0 · before 0.5.20.5.2
npm@openzeppelin/confidential-contractsbefore 0.3.20.3.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts0.3.2Package registry (OSV)
npm:@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts0.4.2Package registry (OSV)
npm:@openzeppelin/confidential-contracts0.5.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

References

All records